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Abstract
This study examines the impact of regulations on earnings management via related 
party sales (RPSs) in China. RPSs have been regarded as a primary means of earnings 
management in China. Manipulated RPS might involve sales of product or services 
between related parties at distorted prices or inflated sales volumes. However, 
manipulating transaction prices is less costly than inflating volumes as price 
manipulation does not require unnecessary production and transfer costs. The abuse of 
RPSs was associated with a series of corporate failures and a huge decline in investor 
confidence at the late 1990s. These scandals were highly publicised and regulators 
subsequently implemented an accounting treatment regulation in 2001, aimed at 
reducing earnings inflation via RPSs.
Despite significant regulatory changes, the scope of events that led to the passage of the 
2001 RPT measurement regulation, and the consequences of the regulatory changes 
have yet to be studied. This thesis addresses two sets of research questions in this study. 
The first research question examines whether there is a change in the prevalence of 
price inflation in RPSs before and after the 2001 RPT measurement regulation. The 
second research question examines motivations for using RPSs to inflate earnings, and 
the effect of regulatory change on the extent of earnings management for firms with 
incentives to inflate earnings.
To carry out the investigation, this thesis estimates earnings management using RPSs in 
two ways. The change measure is defined as the difference between RPSs in the current 
year and previous year. The change in RPSs is decomposed into the positive change in 
RPSs denoting income-increasing RPSs and the negative change in RPSs denoting
i i i
income-decreasing RPSs. The level measure is defined as the difference between a 
firm’s RPS and the mean RPS for all other firms in the same industry. I argue that, if 
there was a widespread use of transfer pricing techniques in RPSs to inflate earnings, 
there should be a positive association between the change in gross margin and income- 
increasing RPSs.
The results provide evidence that income-increasing RPSs are associated with price 
inflation in the pre-RPT regulation period but refer mainly to volumes inflation in the 
post-RPT regulation period. To my best knowledge, this is the first study to examine the 
nature of income-increasing RPSs by considering the prevalence of price versus 
volumes inflation in RPSs. Moreover, this study documents that both before and after 
the 2001 RPT measurement regulation, the level of RPS manipulation is abnormally 
higher for firms with incentives to use RPSs to meet the regulatory thresholds of new 
equity offerings or avoid special treatment policies when compared to firms in various 
control samples. However, suspected earnings management firms use significantly less 
RPSs after the regulatory change when compared to firms in similar circumstances prior 
to the regulatory change. The results provide evidence that the regulation in 2001 
reduced but did not eliminate earnings inflation.
Contents
Declaration........................................................................................................................i
Acknowledgements......................................................................................................... ii
Abstract.......................................................................................................................... iii
Contents...........................................................................................................................v
List of Tables................................................................................................................ vii
List of Abbreviations.................................................................................................. viii
Chapter 1: Introduction................................................................................................ 1
1.1 Introduction.......................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Price Inflation in Related Party Sales....................................................................4
1.3 Earnings Management Incentives.........................................................................6
1.4 Contribution and Significance...............................................................................9
1.5 Organisation of the Thesis................................................................................... 11
Chapter 2: Related Party Transactions in China......................................................12
2.1 Introduction......................................................................................................... 12
2.2 Institutional Background..................................................................................... 12
2.3 Accounting Standards of Related Party Transactions in China.........................16
2.3.1 Definition of Related Parties and Related Party Transactions......................17
2.3.2 Disclosure Requirements of Related Party Transactions............................... 18
2.4 Prior Studies of Related Party Transactions........................................................ 19
2.4.1 Theoretical Perspectives of Related Party Transactions................................20
2.4.2 Transfer Pricing Through Related Party Transactions...................................23
2.4.3 Earnings Management Through Related Party Sales.....................................26
2.4.4 Hypothesis One..............................................................................................29
2.5 Chapter Summary................................................................................................31
Chapter 3: Earnings Management Incentives in China............................................32
3.1 Introduction.........................................................................................................32
3.2 Earnings Management Studies in Other Countries.............................................32
3.3 Earnings Management Studies in China.............................................................35
3.3.1 Regulations and Earnings Management Incentives.......................................36
3.3.2 Prior Earnings Management Studies and Hypothesis Two............................40
3.4 Chapter Summary................................................................................................43
Chapter 4: Research Design.........................................................................................44
4.1 Introduction.........................................................................................................44
4.2 Measuring Earnings Management.......................................................................45
4.3 Empirical Models to Test Hypotheses.................................................................48
4.3.1 Empirical Models to Test HI, Hla and H lb.................................................48
4.3.2 Empirical Models to Test H2a and H2b.........................................................54
4.4 Chapter Summary................................................................................................59
Chapter 5: Data and Descriptive Statistics.................................................................60
5.1 Introduction.........................................................................................................60
5.2 Sample and Data..................................................................................................60
5.3 Descriptive Statistics...........................................................................................64
5.3.1 Statistics of Continuous Variables.................................................................64
5.3.2 Descriptive Statistics by Regimes..................................................................68
5.3.3 Firm Characteristics by Related Party Sales................................................74
5.4 Correlation Tables...............................................................................................76
5.5 Chapter Summary............................................................................................... 79
Chapter 6: Results.........................................................................................................80
6.1 Introduction.........................................................................................................80
6.2 Price Inflation in RPSs (HI, HI a, HI b )..............................................................81
6.2.1 The Change Model....................................................................................... 81
6.2.2 The Level Model.......................................................................................... 87
6.2.3 Alternative measure.......................................................................................91
6.3 Using RPS to Beat Regulatory Thresholds (H2a, H2b)......................................96
6.3.1 The Change Model....................................................................................... 96
6.3.2 The Level Model......................................................................................... 101
6.3.3 The Effect of the 2001 Related Party Transactions Measurement
Regulation.................................................................................................... 104
6.3.4 Controlling for Corporate Governance Proxies........................................... 108
6.4 Trade-Offs Between RPS and Discretionary Accruals..................................... 114
6.5 Chapter Summary.............................................................................................. 118
Chapter 7: Conclusion................................................................................................119
7.1 Introduction....................................................................................................... 119
7.2 Summary of Findings.......................................................................................119
7.3 Contribution and Implications of Findings....................................................... 121
7.4 Limitations and Future Research....................................................................... 122
Appendices................................................................................................................... 124
References....................................................................................................................151
\
vi
List of Tables
Table 5.1: Sample Selection Procedures.........................................................................61
Table 5.2: Sample Composition......................................................................................63
Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics and Variable Definitions.............................................65
Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics by Regulatory Regimes...............................................70
Table 5.5: Descriptive Statistics of Earnings Management Proxies by Regimes...........73
Table 5.6: Firm Characteristics by RPS..........................................................................75
Table 5.7: Pearson Correlation Matrix from 1999-2005................................................77
Table 6.1: The Use of RPS to Inflate Transaction Price Dependent Variable is AGM,..82
Table 6.2: The Use of RPS to Inflate Transaction Price; Robustness Checks-Using
the Change Model; Dependent Variable = AGMt.........................................85
Table 6.3: The Use of RPS to Inflate Transaction Price Dependent Variable = EGM, ..88 
Table 6.4: The Use of RPS to Inflate Transaction Prices; Robustness Checks Using
the Level Model; Dependent Variable = ABGMt..........................................90
Table 6.5: The Use of RPP to Deflate the Purchase Price Dependent Variable =
A GMt ..............................................................................................................94
Table 6.6: The Use of RPP to Deflate the Purchase Price Dependent Variable =
EGM,............................................................................................................. 95
Table 6.7: Earnings Management Incentive; Dependent Variable = ARPS,.................. 98
Table 6.8: Earnings Management Incentive; Robustness Checks-Using the Change
Model; Dependent Variable = A RPS,.............................................................99
Table 6.9: Earnings Management Incentive; Dependent Variable = ERPS,.................102
Table 6.10: Earnings Management Incentive; Robustness Checks-Using the Level
Model; Dependent Variable = ERPS,........................................................... 103
Table 6.11: The Effect of Regulation (2000-2005); Dependent Variable = ARPS, 105
Table 6.12: The Effect of Regulation (1999-2005); Dependent Variable = ERPS, 106
Table 6.13: Corporate Governance and RPS manipulation (2000-2005); Dependent
Variable = A RPS,.......................................................................................... 112
Table 6.14: Corporate Governance and RPS manipulation (1999-2005); Dependent
Variable = ERPS,.......................................................................................... 113
Table 6.15: The Trade-Off between Discretionary Accruals and ERPS Dependent
Variable = DA,.............................................................................................. 117
vii
List of Abbreviations
C E O C h ie f  E x ecu tive  O fficer
C S M A R C h in a  S tock  M arket and  A ccoun ting  R esearch
C S R C C h in a  S ecu rity  R egu la to ry  C o m m ission
G A A P G en era lly  A ccep ted  A cco u n tin g  Princip les
IPO Initial P ub lic  O ffering
M O F M in istry  o f  F inance
M TB M ark e t-T o -B o o k
O LS O rd in ary  L east Squares
O W N C O N O w n ersh ip  C o n cen tra tio n
PPE P roperty , P lan t and E q u ip m en t
PT P articu la r T ran sfe r
R M B R enm inb i (currency)
R O E R eturn  on E quity
R PP R ela ted  Party  P urchases
RPS R ela ted  Party  Sales
R PT R elated  P arty  T ransac tions
SD S tandard  D ev iation
SE O S easo n ed  E q u ity  O fferings
SO E S ta te -O w n ed  E nterp rise
SSE S hanghai S tock  E xchange
ST S pecia l T rea tm en t
V IF V ariance  In fla tion  F ac to r
v i i i
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Introduction
This study examines the impact of regulations on earnings management via related 
party sales (RPSs) in China. RPSs have been regarded as a primary means of earnings 
management in China (Aharony et al. 2010; Jian & Wong 2010; Noronha et al. 2010; 
Lei & Song 2011). Manipulated RPS might involve sales of product or services between 
related parties at distorted prices (often referred to as transfer pricing techniques) or 
inflated sales volumes. However, manipulating transaction prices is less costly than 
inflating volumes, assuming volumes need to be verifiable, as price manipulation does 
not require unnecessary production and transfer costs. Moreover, using transfer pricing 
techniques to shift earnings between related parties can be more effective than accrual- 
based earnings manipulations that merely shift earnings between periods.
RPSs along with other types of related party transactions (RPTs) play an important role 
in tunnelling and propping activities. Sales of products to a related party at the below- 
market price can understate earnings, transferring wealth from the firm to the related 
party. This is known as the tunnelling hypothesis, which can be used for firms to 
expropriate minority shareholders’ interests (e.g Cheung et al. 2006; Berkman et al. 
2009; Cheung et al. 2009a; Jiang et al. 2010; Peng et al. 2010; Lei & Song 2011). The 
opposites of such transactions like sales to a related party at the above-market price 
would overstate earnings, transferring wealth from the related party to the listed firm. 
This is known as the propping-up hypothesis, which can be used by firms to beat 
various benchmarks (e.g. Cheung et al. 2009b; Aharony et al. 2010; Jian & Wong 2010; 
Lo et al. 2010; Yeh et al. 2012). In the Chinese setting where most listed firms have
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concentrated ownership, propping and tunnelling activities via RPTs are very common. 
Mr. Zhou Xiaochuan, former Chairman of the China Security Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC), stated at the seminar of Corporate Governance on Chinese Listed Firms in 
2001:
Chinese large and medium enterprises have a common characteristic that is the 
level of sate-share holdings is extremely high. If there is a blockholder, from 
the perspective of voting rights, there is a high likelihood of engaging in unfair 
RPT. Currently, the issue of RPT is very serious in China. If firms have 
incentives to inflate earnings, they can prop up them by these transactions; if 
they want to transfer profits, they can also tunnel resources by these 
transactions. These sorts of propping and tunnelling activities often occur, 
leading to a poor market confidence. As a result, research on the background 
and reasons of RPT is very urgent.1
The abuse of related party sales was associated with a series of corporate failures and a 
huge decline in investor confidence in the late 1990s. In particular, the scandal of Qiong 
Minyuan was regarded as the most serious securities fraud since the establishment of 
China’s capital market. 94 per cent of Qiong Minyuan’s total profits in 1996 were 
generated from RPSs at inflated prices or even fake RPSs.2 As an additional anecdotal 
example, GuangXia Industry manipulated both RPS price and volumes to inflate 
earnings from 1999 to 2001. 748 million sales of GuangXia Industry were from 26 
related parties that should have been consolidated over 1999 to 2001. The gross margin 
of GuangXia Industry was 46 per cent that is abnormally higher than the industry 
average in 2000. The GuangXia Industry collapsed in 2001, and its auditing firm was 
liquidated because of material audit deficiencies.3
Following these scandals, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) implemented the Provisional 
Regulation on the Accounting Measurement for Sales of Assets and Other Transactions
1 Retrieved from http://www.chinanews.com/2001-Q5-31/26/94912.html. on 20 February 2014 (in 
Chinese).
2 Retrieved from http://stock.hexun.com/2008/qmv30/index.html on 20 February 2014 (in Chinese).
3 Retrieved from http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/35/159/20020526/737124.html on 20 February 2014 
(in Chinese).
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between Related Parties on 21 December 2001 (hereafter the 2001 RPT measurement 
regulation).4 This regulation fundamentally changed the accounting treatment for RPTs 
by mandating a fair value measurement system. In terms of RPSs, which are the 
primary interest of this study, this regulation proposed several methods to calculate the 
fair value of RPSs. Under this regulation, if the transacted price of a RPS is above its 
fair value, the price differential (price less fair value) cannot be recognised as earnings. 
Instead, the price differential must be credited to a Capital-Surplus Price Differential of 
RPT account. This account is notionally a capital reserve account, but it cannot be used 
to increase reported capital or offset future losses.
Despite the MOF proposal of significant regulatory changes, the scope of events that led 
to the passage of the 2001 RPT measurement regulation, and the consequences of the 
resulting regulatory changes have yet to be systematically studied. Specifically, there 
are two important issues that remain unclear. First, it is unclear whether in the period 
prior to the regulatory change, there really was a prevalent use of inflated RPSs to prop 
up earnings or whether these highly publicised scandals were just isolated instances of 
financial manipulations. Second, it is unclear whether in period after the regulatory 
change the 2001 RPT measurement regulation was successful in reducing earnings 
manipulation via RPSs, because there are continuing reports of RPSs being used to 
inflate earnings after 2001. For instance, Pan et al. (2006) suggests that sole reliance on 
the fair value treatment for RPSs might not be sufficient to eliminate earnings 
management due to the existence of high volumes of such transactions in China. This 
study helps to fill this void by investigating the effect of the 2001 RPT measurement 
regulation in RPS manipulation.
4 The Chinese title of this regulation is . The regulation
can be retrieved from the official website of the ministry of finance of China:
http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengwengao/caizhengbuwengao2002/caizhengbuwengao2002 
2/200805A20080519_21110.html
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Given that the 2001 RPT measurement regulation focuses mainly on RPT price inflation, 
I address two sets of research questions in this thesis:
1. I first evaluate the prevalence of price inflation in RPSs in the period before and 
after the regulatory change in 2001. The primary motivation for conducting this 
analysis is to investigate whether the period prior to the passage of the 2001 RPT 
measurement regulation was characterised by a widespread use of price inflation 
in RPSs, and whether the regulatory change affected the prevalence of price 
inflation in RPSs.
2. I then examine motivations for using RPSs to inflate earnings and the effect of 
regulatory change on the extent of earnings management activities for firms with 
incentives to inflate earnings. This investigation is motivated by the previous 
literature suggesting that non-recurring items are widely used in China to beat 
the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings or avoid delisting (e.g. Chen & 
Yuan 2004; Chen et al. 2008; Haw et al. 2005; Yu et al. 2006). I examine 
whether RPSs can also serve for these purposes and whether the degree of RPS 
manipulation has declined for firms having incentives to inflate earnings after 
the regulatory changes.
1.2 Price Inflation in Related Party Sales
The first research question of this thesis relates to the prevalence of price inflation 
activities in RPSs before and after the effect of the 2001 RPT measurement regulation. 
To examine this question, I estimate earnings management using RPSs in two ways. I 
first model the change measure, defined as a change in RPSs regarding the difference 
between RPSs in the current year and RPSs in the previous year. I decompose these
4
changes as positive changes in RPSs denoting income-increasing RPSs and negative 
changes in RPSs denoting income-decreasing RPSs. I then model the level measure, 
defined as the difference between a firm’s RPS and the mean RPS for all other listed 
firms in the same industry. I also deconstruct the industry-mean adjusted RPSs into 
positive and negative. I similarly measure the change in gross margins and industry- 
mean adjusted gross margins to proxy for transfer pricing manipulations.
The data of RPTs are manually collected from annual reports. Other accounting 
variables are collected from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research database 
(CSMAR). The final sample of RPS has 4,611 firm-year observations. To examine the 
effectiveness of the 2001 RPT regulation in reducing earnings inflation, I divide the 
sample period into three regulatory regimes.5 As the 2001 RPT regulation was effective 
from 21 December 2001 and had very limited effects in the 2001 reports, I define the 
years 1999 to 2001 as the pre-RPT regulation period, the year 2002 as the transition 
period and 2003 to 2005 as the post-RPT regulation period.6
I argue that, if the period prior to the regulatory change was characterised by a 
widespread use of transfer pricing techniques in RPSs to inflate earnings, then there 
should be a positive association between the change in gross margin and income- 
increasing RPSs before the regulatory change. If the regulation effectively reduced price
5 The first report period starts in 1999 because 1997 was the first year requiring disclosure of RPTs in 
China with poor compliance, and I use lagged data (starting in 1998) to calculate change measures.
6 The 2001 RPT regulation has very limited effects in 2001 because this regulation applies only to RPTs 
traded after 21 December 2001. Firms are not required to make adjustments for RPTs traded before the 
effective date. Therefore, I include the year 2001 in the pre-RPT regulation period, consistent with the 
requirement of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges that require Firms listed on these two stock 
exchanges adopt the 2001 RPT measurement regulation since 2002. This regulation was widely published 
and cited in the Chinese official media in January, 2002.Retrieved from the Shenzhen stock exchange 
website on 20 February 2014 (in Chinese):
http://www.szse.cn/szseWeb/FrontController.szse?ACTIONID=15&ARTICLEID=82&TYPE=0
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2002-01/14/content_237400.htm
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inflation in RPSs, then there should be no significant relationship between the change in 
gross margin and income-increasing RPSs after the regulatory change.
I regress the change in gross margin on income-increasing RPSs and a set of control 
variables. I found that the change in gross margin positively associated with income- 
increasing RPSs in the pre-regulation period, but the association is not significant in the 
post-regulation period. I then regress the level of gross margin on positive industry- 
mean adjusted RPSs. The results are consistent with the change model, providing 
further evidence for price inflation in the pre-RPT regulation period. I also conduct a 
series of robustness checks, and the results are qualitatively the same. Overall, the 
results provide evidence that transfer pricing techniques via income-increasing RPSs are 
used widely to inflate earnings in the pre-RPT regulation period, but income-increasing 
RPSs refer mainly to volumes inflation in the post-RPT regulation period.7
1.3 Earnings Management Incentives
The second research question examines motivations for using RPSs to inflate earnings, 
and the effect of regulatory change on the extent of earnings management activities for 
firms with incentives to inflate earnings. Previous research has concluded that the main 
earnings management incentive in China was to beat profitability requirements for share 
issuance or avoid special treatment and delisting policies (e.g. Chen et al. 2008; Chen &
7 In further tests, I use related party purchases (RPPs) as an alternative propping mechanism. For example, 
controlling owners can decrease their listed firms’ cost o f goods sold through a reduction in the purchase 
price or volumes. Because the 2001 RPT measurement regulation is applied to RPSs only and has no 
effect on the RPPs, I am motivated to examine the prevalence of purchase price deflation in RPPs before 
and after the effect of the 2001 RPT measurement regulation. Similar to RPSs, the change in RPPs is 
decomposed into a positive change in RPPs used as the proxy for income-decreasing RPPs, and a 
negative change in RPPs used as the proxy for income-increasing RPPs. I focus on the relation between 
the change in GM and the negative change in RPPs. If listed firms deflate the purchase price via income- 
increasing RPPs, there should be a negative association between the change in gross margin and income- 
increasing RPS. However, the results do not provide significant evidence for the use of transfer pricing 
techniques in RPPs to prop up earnings.
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Yuan 2004; Haw et al. 2005; Yu et al. 2006). Since 1994, the CSRC has used return on 
equity (ROE) benchmarks to evaluate whether a listed firm is qualified for new equity 
offerings and should be considered as potential delisting firms. To be permitted to make 
a public equity offer, firms usually have to achieve the required benchmark rate for 
reported ROE in each financial year of three years prior to the application of new equity 
offerings (the benchmark rates have varied from 6 to 10% in different years). To avoid 
delisting, firms have to avoid three consecutive annual losses.
To examine whether RPSs are used to beat the ROE thresholds of new equity offerings,
I identify firms with reported ROEs that satisfy the relevant regulatory threshold of new 
equity offerings, but do not satisfy the threshold when manipulated RPSs and associated 
cost of goods sold are excluded (referred to SUSPECT firms). To examine whether 
RPSs are used to avoid delisting, I identify firms with reported ROEs that are positive 
(but less than the regulatory threshold of new equity offerings), which become negative 
when manipulated RPSs and associated cost of goods sold are excluded (referred to ST 
firms). For each of these two types of suspected earnings management firms, I compare 
the extent of their RPS manipulation to other firms using different control samples. I 
argue that, if firms engage in RPS to beat the relevant ROE benchmarks, the extent of 
RPS manipulation would be higher for each of these suspected earnings management 
firms than other firms.
I regress earnings management proxies on incentive variables and a set of control 
variables. I find that the level of RPS manipulation is abnormally high for firms that 
have incentives to beat the ROE thresholds of new equity offerings, not only in the pre- 
RPT regulation period but also in the post-RPT regulation period. The results are 
consistent with previous earnings management literature in China (e.g. Chen & Yuan
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2004; Chen et al. 2008; Haw et al. 2005; Yu et al. 2006) that earnings management 
activities in China are driven by profitability regulations of new equity offerings and 
delisting.
To examine whether the regulation has reduced the extent of earnings inflation for 
suspected earnings management firms, I interact the earnings management incentive 
variables with the regulatory regime dummy variables. The results document that the 
magnitude of RPS manipulation for firms having incentives to manipulate earnings is 
less in the post-RPT regulation period than previously, suggesting that the 2001 RPT 
measurement regulation reduced earnings inflation via RPSs. In a further test, I also 
control for corporate governance characteristics in previous models. I find that the level 
of ownership concentration is positively associated with the extent of RPS manipulation, 
and the level of board independence is negatively associated with extent of RPS 
manipulation. The results indicate that ownership concentration contributes to the level 
of excess RPSs while the board independence might constrain the use of RPSs to some 
extent.
The final part of this thesis attempt to distinguish the use of RPSs from discretionary 
accruals. The examination is motivated by the findings of Jian and Wong (2010) that 
RPSs serve as a substitute to discretionary accruals to inflate earnings to beat the 
regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings. Because the 2001 RPT measurement 
regulation significantly increased the cost of price inflation in RPSs, I particularly 
examine the potential effects of 2001 RPT regulations on the trade-offs between these 
two earnings management tools. This study provides evidence that in the pre-regulation 
period firms use less discretionary accruals when they have opportunities to beat the
8
regulatory thresholds via RPSs. However, this substitution relation between RPSs and 
discretionary accruals becomes insignificant in the post-regulation period.
1.4 Contribution and Significance
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, this study 
contributes to the theoretical literature concerned with the role of RPTs. The U.S-based 
study suggests that RPTs represent a natural element of business, and firms with high 
volumes of these transactions might not necessarily commit financial fraud (Gordon et 
al. 2004). The results in this thesis highlight that in countries where most firms have 
concentrated ownership such as China, RPTs are not often conducted at arms’ length 
basis. This study provides empirical evidence for the argument of La Porta et al (1999) 
that RPTs can be used to transfer corporate resources to prop up earnings.
Second, this thesis links with previous literature concerned with the motivations behind 
RPTs. Previous literature suggests that RPTs can be used for both propping and 
tunnelling purposes. The results are aligned with the propping literature (Aharony et al. 
2010; Jian & Wong; 2010; Lo et al. 2010; Yeh et al. 2012) by documenting that RPSs 
are widely used to beat the regulatory benchmarks of new equity offerings and delisting 
in China.
Third, this study also extends the propping literature concerned with RPSs (Aharony et 
al. 2010; Jian & Wong 2010) by examining the effectiveness of the 2001 RPT 
regulations in restricting earnings management activities. 8 Moreover, this study
8 Aharony et al. (2010) and Jian and Wong (2010) use the data prior to the effect of the new RPT 
regulation in 2001, and do not address the issue that RPSs could be manipulated either from transaction 
prices or volumes.
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provides an original approach to examine whether RPSs are widely associated with 
transfer pricing techniques in China. Specifically, this thesis investigates the nature of 
earnings management via RPSs by investigating whether income-increasing RPSs are 
associated with price inflation in the period before and after the regulatory change. The 
results conclude that listed firms inflate RPS prices in the pre-RPT regulation period, 
but focus on volumes inflation in the post-RPT regulation period. To my best 
knowledge, this is the first study to consider the prevalence of price inflation versus 
volumes inflation in RPSs.
Fourth, by investigating the use of recurring RPSs before and after the 2001 regulatory 
change, this study substantially advances the literature on earnings management, which 
focused on non-recurring items prior to 2001 (e.g. Chen et al. 2008; Chen & Yuan, 2004; 
Haw et al. 2005; Yu et al. 2006). This thesis sheds light on the RPSs that listed firms 
could also use recurring items such as RPSs achieving the earnings targets of equity 
offerings.
Fifth, this study provides some insights into corporate governance proxies that affect the 
extent of earnings inflation via excess RPSs, which also links with prior corporate 
governance research (Gordon et al. 2004; Hwang et al. 2013; Lei & Song. 2011; Ye et 
al. 2012). This thesis provides evidence that ownership concentration has positive 
effects on levels of RPS manipulation, and that increased board independence can 
somewhat limit earnings inflation in RPSs.
Finally, Jian and Wong (2010) demonstrate that RPSs work as a substitute other than a 
complement to accruals-based manipulation. I extend their analysis by incorporating the 
effect of 2001 RPT regulations on the trade-offs between RPSs and discretionary
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accruals. I document that the substitution effect between discretionary accruals and 
RPSs is only significant in the pre-regulation period. The results suggest that the 2001 
RPT measurement regulation has significantly increased the cost of using RPSs to beat 
the regulatory thresholds.
The results have important policy implications for regulators in China. The results 
reveal that the 2001 RPT regulations were somewhat effective in reducing price 
manipulations for RPS but did not eliminate earnings inflation via RPSs. This might be 
because firms can still rely on sales volume inflation. The results also contribute to the 
debate on the costs and benefits of the profitability regulations. Regulators in China 
should be aware that the extent of RPS manipulation is significantly associated with the 
profitability regulations of new equity offerings and delisting.
1.5 Organisation of the Thesis
The rest of this thesis is organised in the following way. Chapter Two discusses the 
regulations, theoretical framework and prior empirical studies of RPTs. Chapter Three 
discuss prior earnings management studies conducted in China. Chapter Four outlines 
the research methodology. Chapter Five describes the sampling procedures, 
characteristics and descriptive statistics. Chapter Six presents the hypothesis testing. 
Finally, Chapter Seven provides a summary of the study findings and its contributions 
to the research. It also outlines suggestions for future research.
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Chapter 2: Related Party Transactions in China
2.1 Introduction
Related party sales (RPSs) have been a primary means of earnings management in 
China (e.g. Aharony et al. 2010; Jian & Wong 2010; Lei & Song 2011; Noronha et al. 
2010). The series of corporate scandals occurring in late 1990s and early 2000s 
involved a widespread use of inflated RPTs. To reduce earnings inflation through RPTs, 
the MOF promulgated the 2001 RPT measurement regulation. To better understand the 
reasons leading to the passage of this regulation, I first describe the institutional 
background prior to the effect of this regulation and how regulators in China. I next 
review the definitions and disclosure requirements of related parties and related party 
transactions in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 discusses prior theoretical and empirical studies 
concerned with the role of RPTs, and also develops the first hypothesis of this thesis. 
Section 2.5 provides a summary.
2.2 Institutional Background
In late 1978, China commenced economic reforms that introduced aspects of a capitalist 
economic system. To facilitate the process of economic liberalisation, China opened its 
own stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 1990. The establishment of stock 
exchanges was an experimental step to shift state-owned enterprise (SOE) financing 
from the government to the market. A typical former Chinese SOE was generally 
comprised of three components: profitable units, unprofitable units and not-for-profit 
units. Most listed companies in China were spun off from the profitable units of former
12
SOEs under the dedication of the central government through its initial public offering 
(IPO) quota system.9 To keep the pace of privatisation and decentralisation under 
control, newly listed firms are required to remain part of the SOE group in the post-IPO 
period, with an unlisted parent firm holding the majority of total outstanding common 
shares. The partially privatised listed companies typically share some personnel, brand 
names and other assets with their parent in the post-IPO period (Aharony et al. 2010). 
This practice allows considerable opportunities for listed firms to engage in related 
transactions with their parent and other related parties.
Substantive anecdotal evidence in China suggests that the abuse of RPTs was associated 
with a number of highly publicised corporate failures in the late 1990s. These scandals 
resulted in a huge decline in investor confidence at that time, with much criticism 
regarding the lack of RPT transparency and the self-dealings of such transactions as 
masking financial performances. In particular, the scandal of Qiong Minyuan in 1996 
led to a public discussion regarding the disclosure, governance and auditing of RPTs. 
According to the investigation by the CSRC, 94 per cent of Qiong Minyuan's revenues 
were from inflated RPSs or fake RPSs. Prior to its collapse, Qiong Minyuan's share 
price increased by 1,059 per cent during 1996, due to its abnormal increase in operating 
revenues. The case of Qiong Minyuan reflects the market’s misunderstanding of the 
underlying implications of RPTs at that time. Qiong Minyuan collapsed in 1997, and the 
chairman was sentenced to three years in prison.10
9 The IPO quota system was created by the central government in the early 1990s to ensure a stable 
market in the transitory period. The central government set a fixed quota for the value of shares to be 
issued. The annual quota is allocated through provincial and municipal governments to identify potential 
listing candidates and distribute the quota to these SOEs in their jurisdictions. Local bureaus usually first
restructure local SOEs systems and grant the profitable units of large SOEs the privilege of going public. 
Each approval process for public listing and IPO involves a complicated administrative review process 
with an emphasis on the prospective profitability. The IPO quota system was formally abandoned in 2001. 
lu Retrieved from http://stock.hexun.com/2008/qmv30/index.html on 30 December 2012 (in Chinese).
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As an additional anecdotal example of a highly publicised accounting fraud involving 
RPSs, GuangXia Industry manipulated both RPS transaction price and volumes to 
inflate earnings. There were around 784 million sales from 26 related parties that should 
have been consolidated, but were not, from 1999 to 2001. The gross margin of 
GuangXia Industry 2000 was 46 per cent, but only a few firms in the same industry 
report gross margins higher than 15 per cent. GuangXia Industry inflated earnings of 
17.76 million in RMB in 1998, 177.81 million in 1999, 567.04 million in 2000 and 8.94 
million of the first half of 2001 through RPTs. The auditing firm of Zhong tianqin was 
liquidated because of material audit deficiencies.11 Other scandals of the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, such as Green-Land Biological Technology and ZiXin Pharmaceutical 
Industrial, used similar methods to Qing Minyuan and GuangXia Industry to inflate 
earnings. These scandals were highly publicised and eroded trust in financial reports.
Following these accounting scandals, regulators in China implemented accounting 
regulations aimed at reducing earnings manipulation through these transactions. On 21 
December 2001, the MOF in China promulgated the Provisional Regulation on the 
Accounting for Sales of Assets and Other Transactions between Related Parties. The 
primary aim of this regulation is to reduce earnings inflation via income-increasing RPS 
of goods and services, assets and equities. The stated motivation of this regulation is as 
follows:
In recent years, some listed firms obviously utilise unfair transactions with 
related parties to inflate earnings. Such transactions violate the fundamental 
accounting principles and are seriously against the three-gong principles of 
capital markets.12
11 Retrieved from http://123.125.! 15.53/view/1320425.htm on 20 February 2014 (in Chinese).
Retrieved from http://www.people.com.cn/GB/iinii/35/159/20020526/737124.html on 20. February 2014 
(in Chinese).
12 The three-gong principles (gong-ping, gong-zheng, gong-kai) in Chinese refer to fairness, justice and 
transparency.
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The 2001 RPT measurement regulation fundamentally changed the accounting 
treatment for RPTs by introducing a fair value measurement system.13 This regulation 
states that revenues from RPTs can only be recognised using fair values. Any part over 
the fair value, defined as the price differential in this regulation, cannot be recognised as 
current earnings. Instead, the price differential is credited to a Capital-Surplus Price 
Differential of RPT account. This account is notionally a capital reserve account, but it 
cannot be used to increase reported capital or offset future losses.14 However, a 
limitation of the 2001 RPT measurement regulation is that it applies only when the 
selling price of a product, service, asset or ownership sale is more than its fair value. 
Other potential earnings inflation techniques, such as RPP at lower prices, or sales 
volumes inflation are not considered. Additionally, this regulation does not mention the 
use of RPTs to understate earnings, although this is not the primary objective of this 
regulation.
In terms of sales of goods and provision of services, which is the primary interest of this 
study, this regulation requires that revenues from RPSs can only be recognised on their 
fair values. Any part over the fair value is required to increase the capital-surplus price 
differential of the RPT account, instead of current earnings.15 The general methods to 
determine the fair value of a RPS have been clearly stated within the regulation. A listed 
firm could choose: the weighted average selling price to non-related parties as the base 
of fair selling price to calculate the fair value (fair price times sale volumes), if the non- 
RPSs count for a relatively large percentage of current sales (usually no less than 20%);
13 The 2001 RPT measurement regulation has very limited effects in the 2001 annual reports because this 
regulation applies only to related party transactions traded after 21 December 2001. Firms are not 
required to make adjustments for any related party transactions traded before the effective date.
14 The 2001 RPT measurement regulation is a transitory regulation, which lost effect in 2006. The newly 
issued accounting standards no longer requires listed firms to calculate the price differential required in 
the 2001 RPT measurement regulation. The previous price differential account is required to be credited 
to other capital surplus account.
15 If the selling price of an asset is no more than the book value, the general revenue recognition 
principles identified in current accounting standard shall apply.
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or 120 per cent of the cost of goods sold at a maximum as total revenue, if the non-RPSs 
count for a relatively small percentage of current sales (usually less than 20%), or sales 
are only traded among related parties. Alternatively, listed firms can use the weighted 
average historical price to value the total fair value if there is authentic evidence 
showing that the margin of gross profit to cost of goods sold is higher than 20 per cent; 
or the market price if there is a more objective and explicit price of the same product in 
the market.
Although the 2001 RPT measurement regulation proposed sweeping regulatory changes 
to restore the integrity of financial statements by curbing inflated RPTs, several issues 
remain unexamined. Specifically, it is unclear whether there really was a widespread 
use of unfair RPSs to inflate earnings in the period before the regulatory change, or 
whether these highly publicised scandals were just isolated instances of financial 
manipulation. It is also unclear whether the 2001 RPT measurement regulation 
successfully reduced earnings inflation in RPSs. Therefore, the prevalence and extent of 
earnings inflation via RPSs prior to and post the regulatory change is an important 
research topic. This thesis contributes to the existing literature by addressing this issue.
2.3 Accounting Standards of Related Party Transactions in China
This section reviews accounting standards in relation to the definition and disclosure 
requirements of RPTs. The purpose of this review is to understand the definitions and 
disclosure requirements of related parties and RPTs in China. In 1997, the MOF which 
sets accounting standards in China promulgated its first standard for RPTs: Disclosure 
of Related Party Relationships and Transactions (the ‘1997 RPT standard’ hereafter). In 
2006, the MOF issued the new accounting standard that made several modifications
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regarding the definition and disclosure policies of related parties and RPTs. Appendix 
One compares and contrasts the definitions and disclosure requirements between these 
two accounting standards.
2.3.1 Definition of Related Parties and Related Party Transactions
According to the 1997 RPT standard, a related party relationship is constituted if one 
party has the ability to control the other party or exercise significant influence over the 
other party in making financial and operating decisions, or two parties are controlled by 
one party. In addition, the 2006 accounting standard further recognises parties as related 
if two parties (or more) are controlled, jointly controlled, or influenced by one party 
directly or indirectly.16 More importantly, the 2006 accounting standard addressed the 
principle of substance over form in considering each possible related party relationship, 
requiring attention be directed to the substance of the related party relationship and not 
merely the legal form.
The 1997 and 2006 standards define related parties to include parent companies; 
subsidiaries; parent firms’ other affiliates; joint ventures; associate companies; major 
investors and their immediate family members; key managers and their immediate 
family members; and other companies directly controlled by major investors, key 
managers or their immediate family members.17 Enterprises are not regarded as related 
parties simply because they are all under state control.18
16 The definitions of control, Joint control and significant influence are clearly stated in the 1997 and 
2006 standards. Control is the power to govern the financial and operating policies of an entity so as to 
obtain benefits from its activities. Joint control, sated in the 1997 RPT standard, is the contractually 
agreed sharing of control over an economic activity. The 2006 RPT standard states joint control existing 
only when investing parties that need to share the power of control in financial and operating decision 
unanimously. Significant influence is the power to participate in the financial and operating policy 
decisions of an entity, but is not control over those policies.
17 There are also some exemptions including capital providers, public utility units, government 
departments and organs which have normal dealings; a single customer, supplier, franchiser, distributor or
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The definition of RPT is essentially same in both the 1997 and 2006 standards. A RPT 
refers to an activity or event whereby a transfer of resources, labour services or 
obligations takes place between related parties, irrespective of whether momentary 
consideration is involved. The examples listed in these accounting standards refer to 
purchases or sales of goods; purchases or sales of assets other than goods; rendering or 
receiving services; guarantee; transfers under finance arrangements through loans or 
equity contributions; leasing; agency; transfer of research and development projects; 
license agreements; settlement of debts on behalf of an entity or by the entity on behalf 
of another party; and the emoluments for key managerial personnel.
2.3.2 Disclosure Requirements of Related Party Transactions
The 1997 RPT standard requires that, irrespective of whether there have been 
transactions between related parties, listed firms must disclose related party 
relationships in the footnote to the financial statements where control exists. At a 
minimum, disclosures shall include: the related party’s name, place of registration, legal 
representative and registered capital; major operations of related parties; and the number 
of shareholdings and changes in the shareholdings. Further, the 2006 accounting 
standard requires listed firms to disclose the ultimate controlling shareholder if the 
parent company is not the ultimate controlling party.
The 1997 RPT standard requires that, where there have been transactions between an 
enterprise and its related parties, the reporting enterprise shall disclose the nature of
agent with whom an enterprise transacts a significant volume of business by virtue only of the resulting 
economic dependence; and two venturers simply because they share joint control over a joint venture.
18 This is because most listed firms in China are stated-owned. In contrary to this, the international 
accounting standard (IAS) treat these parties as related if they are controlled, or significantly influenced 
by the same government.
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related party relationships, as well as types of transactions and elements of transactions 
in annotations. Elements necessary to understand the financial statements in the 1997 
RPT standard must include: amounts of transactions or appropriate proportions; 
amounts or proportions of outstanding items; and pricing policies.19 According to the 
2006 accounting standard, two additional elements are required to be disclosed: details 
about the guarantees granted or obtained, and the amount of provisions for doubtful 
debts relating to the amount of outstanding balances. Neither of these two standards 
requires reporting firms to disclose transactions between enterprises that are eliminated 
during the consolidation. However, unconsolidated transactions must be disclosed.
2.4 Prior Studies of Related Party Transactions
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 reviewed accounting regulations and standards of RPTs in China. 
This section reviews prior theoretical and empirical studies concerned with the role of 
RPTs. I first discuss the nature of RPTs, from both the efficient transactions and the 
conflicts of interest perspectives in Section 2.4.1. In this subsection, I also review 
empirical studies concerned with the motivations behind RPTs: tunnelling and propping. 
I next discuss how RPTs are used to manage earnings, in particular, via transfer pricing 
techniques. I discuss the costs and benefits of using this tool in Section 2.4.2. Section 
2.4.3 outlines the advantages and disadvantages of earnings management via RPSs. 
Finally, I develop the first hypothesis, based on the theoretical framework and existing 
evidence in Section 2.4.4. In the final section, I discuss the potential effect of the 2001 
RPT measurement regulation on price inflation in RPSs.
19 Based on my data collection, nearly all firms disclose the raw amounts of related party transactions. 
Only very few firms disclose the proportions alone without indicating amounts. For those firms who do 
not provide raw amount numbers, I reinstated proportions into amounts by multiplying the deflators 
(usually total sales) used.
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2.4.1 Theoretical Perspectives of Related Party Transactions
Two competing theoretical views of RPTs are the ‘efficient transactions’ view and the 
‘conflicts of interest’ view. The efficient transactions view emphasises that RPTs can 
satisfy the underlying economic needs of a company and minimise transaction costs 
between related parties. From the efficient transactions’ perspective, RPTs represent a 
natural element business to not harm shareholders’ interests. Thus, firms with high 
volumes of RPTs might not necessarily commit financial and accounting fraud (Gordon 
et al. 2004; Gordon & Henry 2007; Kohlbeck & Mayhew 2010; Henry et al. 2010). The 
conflicts of interest view of RPTs emphasises the potential conflict of interests raised by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and La Porta et al. (2000). Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
discuss potential conflicts of interest between a manager and shareholders that may 
result in the manager expropriating the firm’s resources for personal gains. La Porta et 
al. (2000) discuss potential agency conflicts existing between controlling and minority 
shareholders.
From the efficient transactions view, RPTs represent a natural part of business and firms 
with high volumes of such transactions might not commit financial fraud (Gordon et al. 
2004). In contrast, RPTs can also fulfil the underlying needs of a company, improve 
cooperation between related parties, allocate resources efficiently, reduce information 
asymmetries, minimise transactions costs and enhance contracting (Gordon et al. 2004; 
Gordon & Henry 2007; Kohlbeck & Mayhew 2010; Henry et al. 2012). Since related 
parties generally share the same expertise and skills, transactions between related parties 
might involve less information asymmetry, thereby reducing transaction costs 
(Kohlbeck & Mayhew 2010).
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Gordon and Henry (2007) suggest that, if a non-executive director has the skills and 
knowledge of firm-specific activities, as well as an expertise that the company demands 
such as accounting, it would be more effective and efficient for the company to contract 
the related party to provide the service than an outsider who has the same expertise. 
Because the non-executive director possesses in-depth skills in the firm, information 
asymmetries are reduced and contracting is enhanced.
From a conflict of interest perspective, RPTs represent a potential for agency problems 
and conflict of interests. Prior studies demonstrate that RPTs can be used for tunnelling 
or propping purposes. Tunnelling refers to transfers of resources from firms usually to 
the controlling shareholders through various forms of transactions. Propping refers to 
transfers of resources from the controlling shareholders to the firm requiring assistance 
(Johnson et al. 2000). In firms with concentrated ownership, controlling shareholders 
are able to tunnel wealth from the controlled firm via various types of RPTs (Cheung et 
al. 2006; Berkman et al. 2009; Cheung et al. 2009a; Cheng et al. 2009b; Jiang et al. 
2010; Peng et al. 2010; Lei & Song 2011), but can also use their private wealth or 
transfer resources from other controlled entities to prop up firms in distress or planning 
to issue new equity offerings (Cheung et al. 2009b; Aharony et al. 2010; Jian & Wong; 
2010; Lo et al. 2010; Yeh et al. 2012). Previous propping and tunnelling studies 
concerned with RPTs are summarised in Appendix Two.
Tunnelling studies have examined different types of RPTs that can be used as proxies 
for expropriating resources from listed firms to their parents (e.g., Cheung et al. 2006; 
Berkman et al. 2009; Cheung et al. 2009a; Cheng et al. 2009b; Jiang et al. 2010; Peng et 
al. 2010; Lei & Song 2011). Cheung et al. (2006) examine asset sales, purchases, swaps, 
equity sales and joint ventures between firms listed in Hong Kong and their controlling
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owners. They have found that firms announcing tunnelling transactions exhibit 
significant negative excess returns at the initial announcement and during the 12-month 
period after the announcement. Based on a sample of 254 related party and arms’ length 
acquisitions and sales of assets in Hong Kong during 1998 to 2000, Cheung et al. 
(2009a) found that asset sales to related parties were conducted at unfavourable prices 
compared to similar arms’ length deals. Meanwhile, asset purchases from related parties 
were carried out at a higher price than similar arms’ length deals.
Some studies use related party loans and loan guarantees as proxies for tunnelling. 
Based on a sample of 88 Chinese listed firms issuing loan guarantees in 2009, Berkman 
et al. (2009) found that firm value and operating performances are lower for firms that 
issue related guarantees, compared to firms without such guarantees. Based on a sample 
of Chinese listed firms during 1996 to 2006, Jiang et al. (2010) found that loans made to 
related parties, typically reported as part of other receivables in the balance sheet of 
listed firms, represented a large portion of assets and market values. They demonstrated 
that firms having large other receivables balances had worse operating performances in 
the next year, and market participants did not seem to fully anticipate the consequences 
of tunnelling via corporate loans.
In contrast to tunnelling studies focusing on non-recurring items, propping studies tend 
to focus on examining RPSs. Using a sample of 185 IPO firms listed on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange during 1999 to 2001, Aharony et al. (2010) found that RPSs of goods 
and services were used to prop up earnings in the period preceding IPOs. Jian and 
Wong (2010) provide evidence that listed firms propped up earnings via abnormal RPS 
to their controlling owners, to meet earnings targets of new equity offerings or listing 
requirements during 1998 to 2002. Yeh et al. (2012) examined a sample of firms listed
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in Taiwan. Their results provide a partial support for the propping-up hypothesis that 
firms use RPSs to inflate earnings to influence the price of new seasoned equity and to 
avoid earnings decline.
Some studies combine propping incentives and tunnelling incentives. Friedman et al. 
(2003) suggest that controlling shareholders sometimes engage in propping transactions 
because such actions are needed to sustain long-term tunnelling. In their framework, 
controlling shareholders can choose to prop up their firms, for example, when firms are 
in distress which may allow them to tunnel more in the future. Based on the framework 
of Friedman et al. (2003), Cheung et al. (2009b) examined a sample of 292 non­
recurring RPTs between listed firms in China and their controlling shareholders from 
2001 to 2002 and they found more instances of tunnelling than propping. Peng et al. 
(2010) provided evidence that the use of tunnelling or propping depends on the listed 
firm’s financial situation. Aharony et al (2010) found the extent of earnings 
management via RPSs in the pre-IPO period was associated with the level of post-IPO 
tunnelling via non-payment of corporate loans.
2.4.2 Transfer Pricing Through Related Party Transactions
As discussed in Section 2.4.1, previous studies have concluded that RPTs could be used 
for propping or tunnelling purposes (Cheung et al. 2006; Berkman et al. 2009; Cheung 
et al. 2009a; Cheung et al. 2009b; Aharony et al. 2010; Jian & Wong 2010; Jiang et al. 
2010; Lo et al. 2010; Peng et al. 2010; Lei & Song 2011; Yeh et al. 2012). Although 
many studies acknowledged that RPTs can be used for propping and tunnelling, they 
did not empirically examine how RPTs were managed to transfer corporate resources 
and manipulate reported earnings which will be addressed in this section.
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Transfer pricing through RPTs plays a central role in tunnelling and propping activities. 
Because the accounting recognition of a transfer of resources is normally based on the 
price agreed between transacting parties, related parties can set prices that are not 
equivalent to transactions between unrelated parties. With regard to tunnelling, sales of 
assets, ownership or products to a related party at the below-fair-price can transfer 
wealth from the firm to related parties. Similarly, purchases of assets, ownership or 
products from a related party at the above-fair-price can also transfer wealth from the 
firm to related parties. Such transactions understate earnings, particularly when 
controlling shareholders intend to expropriate minority shareholders’ interests (e.g., 
Cheung et al. 2006; Berkman et al. 2009; Cheung et al. 2009a; Cheng et al. 2009b; 
Jiang et al. 2010; Peng et al. 2010; Lei & Song 2011). The opposite of above 
transactions, like sales to a related party priced at more than the fair value, or purchases 
from a related party priced at less than the fair value would overstate earnings, 
transferring wealth from related parties to the listed firm. This can be used by firms to 
beat various earnings benchmarks (e.g., Lo et al. 2010; Yeh et al. 2012).
Transfer pricing via RPTs could very efficiently manipulate earnings. Firms just simply 
distort the transaction price with related parties. In contrast to accruals-based 
manipulations that shift earnings between periods for the entity concerned (e.g., 
Dechow 1994; Sloan 1996; Teoh et al. 1998), transfer pricing manipulations shift 
earnings between related parties during a single accounting period. Different with 
discretionary accruals that result in accrual reversions in future periods, transfer pricing 
via RPTs can permit managers to manipulate earnings permanently. Absent additional 
earnings management (earnings in the next period) are equal to actual earnings rather
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than earnings less the cost of earnings management in the prior period like discretionary 
accruals, greatly reducing the cost of this earnings management tool.
However, there are also costs of using transfer pricing between related parties. First,
transfer pricing via RPTs can significantly change the bottom-line earnings that will
draw the scrutiny of regulators. Regulators and accounting standard setters, in particular,
are concerned about RPTs traded above or below the fair price to manage earnings. To
address the concerns about RPTs not occurring at arm’s length, standard setters usually
highlight the potential for RPTs to be carried out under more favourable or
unfavourable terms than those available to unrelated third parties in the setting of
accounting standards. For example, the Internal Accounting Standards (2009) states:
A related party relationship could have an effect on the profit or loss and 
financial position of an entity. Related parties may enter into transactions that 
unrelated parties would not. For example, an entity that sells goods to its 
parent at cost might not sell on those terms to another customer. Also, 
transactions between related parties may not be made at the same amounts as 
between unrelated parties.
Similarly, the newly issued Chinese accounting standards in 2006 state that, if an entity 
makes disclosures that a RPT is carried out at arm’s length, such representations must 
be substantiated. The Chinese regulators’ concern about RPTs clearly focuses on the 
non-arms-length nature of the transactions. For example, as discussed in Section 2.2, 
Chinese regulators issued the 2001 RPT measurement regulation, attempting to restore 
the fair value of RPTs and reduce earnings inflation. This regulation outlines the 
principles and rules for auditors to compute the fair value of RPTs, increasing the 
scrutiny of transfer pricing via RPTs.
Second, although transfer pricing through RPTs might not immediately affect the next 
period’s earnings, earnings reversion can incur in the future and the reversion can be
25
even more severe than accrual manipulation. This is because if a firm inflates RPSs (or 
other types of RPTs) to its parent at an earlier time, it increases reported earnings and 
the accounts receivables (or other receivables) in its balance sheet. If the related party is 
not able to pay their debts in time or even refuses to pay, the possibility of write-offs of 
these receivables significantly increases in the future. Tan (2004) found that nearly 70 
per cent of listed firms in China who reported two consecutive years of losses had 
receivables unpaid by related parties. The related party that fails to pay their debts was a 
major reason for the operational failure of 15 delisted companies.20
2.4.3 Earnings Management Through Related Party Sales
Previous subsection discusses the benefits and costs of transfer pricing techniques in 
RPTs. In this subsection I specifically focus on the discussion of earnings management 
through related party sales (RPSs). Because the 2001 RPT measurement regulation is 
mainly designed to reduce the inflated RPTs and the primary objective of this research 
is to investigate the effect of this regulation, the following discussions are mainly 
aligned with the propping side of RPSs.
Unlike non-recurring items focusing primarily on the use of transfer pricing techniques, 
RPSs can be manipulated from price, volumes or a combination of price and volumes. 
The manipulation of RPS volumes is feasible because the high frequency and volumes 
of these transactions allows the firm to inflate earnings simply by over production and 
selling current period RPSs, or shifting the next period’s RPSs to the current period
20 As anecdotal evidence, the HanQi that is the ultimate controlling shareholder of FengHua have 
accumulated debts equalling 198.6 million RMB from FengHua until 2002. In 2004, 52.2 million 
receivables had to be written off because of the HanQi’s bankrupcy. FengHua was subsequently treated as 
special treatment firms (Jiang et al. 2010). Similarly, the parent firm of Monkey King was sued in 2000 
because it failed to pay outstanding loans totalling 890 million RMB owned by Monkey King (Berkman 
et al. 2009).
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(Jian and Wong 2010). Sales volumes manipulation is supposed to bear a lower risk of 
detection, because the manipulation of volumes is not a violation of regulations. 
However, transfer pricing is less costly than inflating volumes as price inflation does 
not require unnecessary production and transfer costs.
Prior empirical evidence supports the viability of propping through RPSs. Khanna and 
Yafeh (2005) show that RPSs are the most frequent type of RPTs for propping. Aharony 
et al. (2010) found that firms used RPSs to control shareholders in the period prior to 
IPO. Jian and Wong (2010) support the use of RPS volumes inflation to prop up 
earnings and meet the thresholds of new equity offerings and delisting. Also, as 
illustrated in Section 2.2, many financial scandals of late 1990s and early 2000s in 
China were associated with price inflation in RPSs, a combination of price and volumes 
inflation or even fake RPSs.
Following Khanna and Yafeh (2005), Aharony et al. (2010) and Jian and Wong (2010), 
this thesis focuses on earnings management using RPSs. There are several reasons for 
this approach. First, as discussed in Section 2.4.2, unlike discretionary accruals that 
borrow earnings from the next period, and suffer future earnings reversion, price 
inflation in RPSs can permit firms to inflate earnings permanently. In China, the major 
earnings incentive is to meet the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings and 
delisting (Chen & Yuan, 2004; Haw et al. 2005; Yu et al. 2006; Chen et al. 2008). As 
the CSRC uses the three-year ROE as the base for qualification of share issuance, 
manipulating accruals is less likely to provide the sustained inflated earnings needed for 
the objective to beat the regulatory benchmarks. Because the price manipulation with 
related parties does not need to sacrifice the listed firms’ future earnings, managers can 
better handle major earnings targets, such as the ROE for three years. Jian and Wong
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(2010) demonstrate that listed firms are less likely to use discretionary accruals to beat 
the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings and delisting when they have 
opportunities to inflate sales volumes.
Second, compared with other infrequent RPTs, RPSs are highly recurring and persistent. 
In the period prior to the effect of the 2001 RPT measurement regulation, it was very 
difficult for regulators and auditors to determine whether RPSs were part of normal 
business or were manipulated for various targets. I note that firms could use other types 
of RPTs such as asset transfers as an alternative way to achieve propping, but such 
transactions were much more infrequent and more easily detected. Although previous 
literature based on data prior to 2001 shows that non-recurring items were widely used 
to beat the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings and delisting in China (Chen & 
Yuan 2004; Haw et al. 2005; Yu et al. 2006), the CSRC had limited the use of non­
recurring items to inflate earnings since 2001. The 2001 profitability regulation of new 
equity offerings and delisting required companies applying to make new equity 
offerings to report two ROE measures: one based on bottom-line earnings, and the other 
based on core earnings (excluding non-recurring items). The lower of the two measures 
was used as the test for qualifying equity offerings and identifying potential delisting 
firms.
Third, compared with RPPs, RPSs have a full effect on earnings. The effect of RPPs on 
goods sold may be partial, depending on the inventory cost flow assumptions, as well as 
they provide a more timely and efficient way to inflate earnings (Jian & Wong 2010). 
The empirical results of Aharony et al. (2010) and Jian and Wong (2010) do not to 
support RPSs for propping. However, I include RPPs in the robustness checks.
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2.4.4 Hypothesis One
Section 2.4.3 discusses how RPSs are used to inflate earnings and the associated cost 
and benefits of this earnings management tool. This subsection discusses the prevalence 
of price inflation in RPSs in the period before and after the 2001 RPT measurement 
regulation. The investigation is very important. First, though there are many accounting 
frauds that shed the light on RPSs widely used to prop up earnings in China, there is 
lack of empirical evidence regarding whether income-increasing RPSs are associated 
with price inflation. Second, this study extends the propping literature concerned with 
RPSs (e.g., Aharony et al. 2010; Jian & Wong 2010) by examining the effectiveness of 
the 2001 RPT regulations in restricting earnings management activities.
To evaluate the prevalence of price inflation in RPSs, this thesis examines whether 
income-increasing RPSs are associated with the change in gross margin. 1 define the 
positive change in income-increasing RPSs between accounting periods as the proxy for 
income-increasing RPSs. Because I cannot identify the exact transaction price and gross 
margin for RPSs, I use the change in the average gross margin from both related and 
unrelated parties as the proxy for price manipulation.21 I argue that, if there is no price 
inflation via RPSs, then the positive change in RPSs should only capture volumes 
inflation. Consequently, the positive change in RPSs and the change in gross margin are 
two clearly distinct concepts, because the positive change in RPSs refers to volumes 
inflation, while the change in gross margin refers only to price inflation (assuming that 
cost margin is relatively constant). There would then be no relationship between 
income-increasing RPSs and the change in gross margin. However, if listed firms inflate
21 The use of average gross margin to capture price inflation requires the adequate control for other 
factors which will be discussed in Chapter Four in detail.
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the transaction price to some extent, the income-increasing RPSs will be positively 
associated with the change gross margin.
Built on previous studies concerned with propping or transfer pricing techniques 
through RPSs (Cheung et al. 2009b; Aharony et al. 2010; Jian & Wong; 2010; Lo et al. 
2010; Yeh et al. 2012), I hypothesise that firms inflate the transaction price of RPSs in 
China, and expect a positive association between the change in gross margin and 
income-increasing RPSs, leading to HI (stated in the alternative form):
HI: There is a positive association between the change in gross margin and income- 
increasing RPSs.
To reduce price inflation in RPTs, the 2001 RPT measurement regulation requires the 
part priced over fair value to be excluded from current earnings. This regulation has 
significantly increased the cost of price inflation in RPSs. Consequently, it is important 
to examine whether there is a difference in the prevalence of price inflation in RPSs 
prior and post the effect of the 2001 RPT measurement regulation. Linking with 
anecdotal evidence showing a widespread price inflation of RPSs in the period before 
2002, I predict that firms used price inflation in RPSs prior to the effect of the 2001 
RPT measurement regulation. If the 2001 RPT measurement regulation was effective in 
reducing price inflation, or firms just simply engaged in RPS volumes inflation in the 
period after the regulatory change, then there would be no association between the 
change in gross margin and income-increasing RPSs in the period after the regulation 
change. This leads to the following hypotheses:
HI (a): There is a positive association between the change in gross margin and 
income-increasing RPS prior to the effect of the 2001 RPT measurement 
regulation.
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H1 (b): There is no significant association between the change in gross margin and 
income-increasing RPS post to the effect of the 2001 RPT measurement 
regulation.
2.5 Chapter Summary
To summarise, Section 2.2 of this chapter reviewed the institutional background of 
RPTs in China. As most listed firms in China were carved from their parent SEOs, 
newly listed subsidiaries had considerable room to engage in RPTs with their parent 
SOEs. Many accounting frauds in late 1990s China involved RPTs, creating concerns 
among regulators and other market participants about appropriate governance and 
disclosure of these transactions. To address public concerns over earnings management 
via RPTs, the MOF subsequently implemented regulations aimed at reducing earnings 
inflation through RPTs in 2001. Section 2.3 reviewed definitions and disclosure 
requirements of related parties and RPTs, and the theoretical framework and empirical 
studies concerned with the motivations for the use of RPTs: tunnelling and propping. 
Linking with the existing theoretical and empirical literature, I developed the first 
hypothesis relating to whether listed firms inflated the transaction price of RPSs, and 
whether the 2001 RPT measurement regulation effectively reduced price inflation in 
RPSs.
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Chapter 3: Earnings Management Incentives in China
3.1 Introduction
Chapter Two reviewed the role of RPTs in earnings management. In Chapter Three, I 
review previous earnings management studies and link the use of RPSs with earnings 
management incentives. I first summarise general earnings management incentives and 
tools studies in the western world. The purpose of reviewing these studies is to compare 
earnings management incentives and tools in the setting of the western world with those 
in China. Next, I review prior earnings management studies in China and summarise the 
major earnings management motivations in China. Finally, building on previous 
empirical evidence, I develop the second hypothesis in this chapter.
3.2 Earnings Management Studies in Other Countries
Earnings, sometimes called net profits, net income or bottom-line, are viewed as the 
most important component of financial statements. Given the importance of earnings, it 
is not surprising that firms manipulate earnings to achieve various targets. Earnings 
management has been the subject of considerable academic research in the United 
States of America (USA) and other developed markets. Research on earnings 
management suggests this is a pervasive phenomenon (e.g., Healy & Wahlen 1999; 
McNichols 2000, 2002; Dechow & Skinner 2000; Rowchowdhury 2006).22 Healy and 
Wahlen (1999, p. 368) state:
22 Although earnings management raises public concerns about the reporting credibility, the general view 
of earnings management is that it is a reasonable and legal reporting technique within GAAP.
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Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either 
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying performance of the company 
or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting 
numbers.
In this section, I focus on two earnings management incentives that have been well 
examined in previous empirical studies, to gain a favourable market valuation (e.g., 
Rangan 1998; Teoh et al. 1998) and to influence contracts in terms of accounting 
numbers (DeAngelo 1988; Dechow & Sloan 1991; DeFond & Jianbalvo 1994; Sweeney 
1994).
With regard to capital market motivations, previous authors have examined earnings 
management behaviours during periods when capital market incentives to manage 
earnings were likely to be high; in particular, the periods surrounding important market 
events. Event-typed studies have documented that firms manage earnings upward in 
anticipation of capital raising events, such as IPOs or SEOs, and post-event stock 
returns and earnings performance are negatively associated with the magnitude of pre­
event earnings management activities (Rangan 1998; Teoh et al. 1998; Shivakumar 
2000; Cohen & Zarowin 2010). Other studies of earnings management for capital 
market incentives have examined earnings management behaviours when there is a gap 
between firm performance and market expectations. These studies have concluded that 
failure to meet analysts’ expectations will result in poor stock price performance; 
earnings are usually manipulated upwards to be higher than analysts’ expectations 
(Kasznik 1999).
With regard to contracting motivations, a number of studies have examined whether 
earnings management can be explained by incentives created by lending and 
compensation contracts. DeFond and Jianbalvo (1994) found that managers inflate
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earnings one year prior to potential lending covenant violations. Their results suggest 
that firms close to lending covenants manipulate earnings to mitigate the covenant 
violation. But the empirical evidence is mixed. Sweeney (1994) suggests that firms 
manipulate earnings typically after the covenant violation. In contrast to DeFond and 
Jianbalvo (1994), his results indicate that earnings are more likely to be managed to 
reduce the future covenant violation. Other studies have examined whether earnings 
management is affected by incentives created by managerial compensation contracts 
(DeAngelo 1988; Dechow & Sloan 1991). These studies, based on the agency theory 
developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), have concluded that compensation contracts 
induce at least some firms to inflate earnings to increase bonus awards.
Accruals manipulation has been the primary focus of the earnings management 
literature in the western world. Evidence of managers engaging in accrual manipulation 
has been discussed and explored in many contexts, for many accruals, and in response 
to many managerial incentives (e.g., Healy 1985; Jones 1991; Rangan 1998; Teoh et al. 
1998; Healy & Wahlen 1999; McNichols 2000, 2002; Dechow & Skinner 2000). Some 
accruals manipulation techniques (e.g., the premature recognition of revenues or 
deceleration of expenses) go beyond the requirements of generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP). These techniques, sometimes named as cooking books techniques, 
are considered illegal earnings management techniques, and a violation of GAAP. 
Aggressive reporting might involve accounting fraud that brings litigation risk to the 
firm and employment risk to the manager. In addition to the cost of detection and 
potential litigation risk, accruals manipulation results in future earnings reduction (e.g., 
Dechow 1994; Sloan 1996; Teoh et al. 1998).
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Different to accruals manipulation, real earnings management focuses on the 
manipulation of real economic variables, such as reducing discretionary expenditures or 
providing price discounts to inflate earnings. Roychowdhury (2006) defines real 
earnings management as a technique that departs from normal operational practices. 
Unlike accruals manipulation, real earnings management studies conclude this tool has 
cash flow consequences. Moreover, real earnings management is supposed to have a 
lower cost of detection than accruals manipulation, as the manipulation of real activities 
is not a GAAP violation.
3.3 Earnings Management Studies in China
Previous section summarises earnings management incentives and tools in the western 
world. As discussed, studies based on the USA, or other developed markets, have 
provided evidence that managers could manipulate earnings through accounting 
accruals or real economic transactions. These studies have empirically tested earnings 
management behaviours in many contexts, such as influencing stock prices or 
contractual outcomes. Nonetheless, inferences developed from the western literature do 
not necessarily apply to the Chinese market. This is because there is a huge difference in 
corporate ownership structures and market regulations between China and western 
countries. The principal-agent problems considered by the Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
are less significant in China because the ownership is concentrated and the information 
asymmetry between controlling shareholders and managers is low. La Porta et al (2000) 
suggest the primary agency conflict in East Asia where firms have concentrated 
ownership is that controlling shareholders take advantage of control to expropriate 
resources from minority shareholders.
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Noting a point made earlier, most listed Chinese firms are former SOEs restructured by 
local governments. Unlike privatisation in other institutions where governments sell 
ownership to the public, the Chinese government holds the majority of common shares 
in SOEs. As a controlling shareholder, the government holds the power to nominate 
representatives to sit on the board and sometimes directly appoints senior managers 
such as the chair and chief executive officer (CEO) in their controlled SOEs. As 
Chinese managers in listed SOEs are not permitted to own shares in the firm and have 
no stock options, they do not gain benefits from a high stock price. Thus, they may not 
have the same incentive to manipulate earnings as their counterparts in western 
companies (Aharoney et al. 2010). In this section, I discuss the earnings management 
incentives and tools in China.
3.3.1 Regulations and Earnings Management Incentives
A number of empirical studies conclude that the main earnings management incentive is 
to meet or beat the profitability requirements for share issuance or to avoid delisting 
(e.g., Yu et al. 2006; Chen & Wang 2007; Jiang & Wang 2008). To be permitted to 
make a public equity offer, listed firms usually have to achieve the required benchmark 
rate for reported ROE each financial year of the three years prior to the application of 
new equity offerings (the benchmark rates have varied from 6 to 10% in different years). 
To maintain the listing status, listed firms have to avoid three consecutive years of 
losses.
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There are two primary sources for Chinese listed firms to increase equity capital after 
going public: rights issue and seasoned equity offerings (Chen & Yuan 2004).23 Firms 
planning to issue new equities need to submit an application first to the CSRC and the 
application outcomes are subject to CSRC review. As noted in Section 2.2, China 
employed a restrictive IPO quota system to assign fixed shares to listing candidates 
nominated by local governments in the 1990s. Since the competition for limited IPO 
quota has been very intense, local governments usually distribute their shares to as 
many firms as possible. Consequently, the quota allocated to each firm is not enough to 
satisfy its capital needs. Due to the lack of other means for listed companies to raise 
capital and the huge demand from stocks, rights offerings were excessively used by 
listed companies to raise capital (Chen & Yuan 2004). To curb the excessive issuing 
activity and ensure that financially well-performing firms are selected for issuing, the 
CSRC implemented a series of guidelines governing new equity offerings in 1993. Each 
guideline imposed a minimum level of profitability requirements.
As summarised in Appendix Three, these restrictions were gradually tightened from
1993 to 1999, but lessened after 1999. In 1993, listed firms with two previous
successive years’ profits were eligible to apply for a rights issue offering. The threshold
became more stringent in 1994, when listed firms were required to have three
consecutive years’ positive earnings and a minimum average ROE of 10 per cent over
the prior three years. The regulation was further tightened in 1996, requiring an equity
offering candidate have ROE above 10 per cent of the last three successive years. In
1999, the profitability requirements for rights issuers was modified to a minimum
average ROE of 10 per cent over the past three years and not less than 6 per cent in any
of these years. From 2002, the profitability requirements have focused on the average
23 Rights issue focuses on the offer to existing shareholders at a discount, where SEO is directly open to 
the public without a discount. SEO is not allowed until 2001. Right issue is an experimental step for the 
following SEO (Chen et al. 2008).
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ROE instead of imposing specific requirements for each individual year. The threshold 
was modified to a minimum three-year average ROE of 10 per cent from 2002 to 2005, 
and then further softened to three years of positive earnings for 2006 to 2014.
The profitability threshold for new seasoned equity offerings (SEO) and delisting is 
defined in an identical manner to that of rights issues. SEOs are not allowed until 2001. 
The profitability threshold was an average ROE of 6 per cent over the previous three 
years. The regulation was modified in 2002, stating that SEO applicants must have 
achieved at least an average ROE of 10 per cent in previous three years, and a minimum 
ten per cent ROE in the years prior to application. This regulation was lessened in 2006 
to only requiring a three-year average ROE of 6 per cent being required for eligible 
SEO applicants.
No regulation was issued on delisting until 1998, when the CSRC introduced the special 
treatment (ST) and particular transfer (PT) policies. The ST regulation states that listed 
firms with two successive years of losses, or with an asset value per share less than the 
face value of the stock, would be identified as ST firms. Those firms with three 
consecutive losses are treated as PT firms, which would face delisting from the stock 
market.
Prior literature suggests that these profitability regulations have resulted in an excess 
use of non-recurring items, to beat the regulatory thresholds (e.g., Chen & Yuan, 2004; 
Haw et al. 2005; Yu et al. 2006; Chen et al. 2008).24 To address public concerns over 
the use of non-recurring items to beat regulatory thresholds for share issuance and
24 Since 1998, the CSRC have used the ST and PT policies for delisting firms. The ST regulation states 
that listed firms with two successive years of losses or with an asset value per share less than the face 
value of the stock will be identified as ST firms. Those firms with three consecutive losses are treated as 
PT firms and face the delisting thread.
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delisting, the CSRC modified its profitability requirements in 2001. The 2001 revised 
profitability regulation requires companies applying to make new equity offerings and 
delisting to report two ROE measures: one based on bottom-line earnings and the other 
based on core earnings, excluding non-recurring items. The lower of the two measures 
is used as the test for qualifying equity offerings. The CSRC also addressed the fair 
value measurement of RPTs in the revised profitability requirements for new equity 
offerings. To be eligible for a share issuance and maintain listing status, a listed firm 
must maintain their reported ROE as well as core ROE higher than the minimum 
regulatory threshold.
Six items were initially stated as non-recurring items in 2001: profits (or losses) from 
unfair RPT; disposal of subsidiaries and equity sales; gains (or losses) from asset swaps; 
tax returns and government subsidy; and other items recognised by the CSRC. This 
regulation was slightly modified in 2004, and increased to 14 items. The latest version 
of this regulation was issued in 2008, with twenty-one items, which have addressed the 
earnings management techniques that have emerged since 2004, such as: profits (or 
losses) from the disposal of fixed assets; asset or debt restructuring; asset impairment; 
reversals for provisions; changes in accounting methods; any non-operating items; 
trusteeships; and the use of financial derivatives. RPTs priced above fair value are 
classified as non-recurring items for the purpose of this regulation, and are thus 
excluded from the calculation of core ROE.25
25 As this regulation was implemented before the 2001 RPT measurement regulation, there were some 
regulatory conflicts with respect to the accounting treatment for RPTs. The CSRC recognised the part 
over fair value as one of non-recurring items while the MOF recognised that as capital reserve. To 
harmonise these two regulations, the MOF informed the CSRC to use the accounting treatment stated in 
the 2001 RPT regulation to compute the fair value for RPTs on 27 December 2001.
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3.3.2 Prior Earnings Management Studies and Hypothesis Two
The profitability regulations of share issuance and delisting in China have resulted in a 
cluster of firms that report ROEs just higher than the minimum regulatory threshold 
(e.g., Yu et al., 2006; Chen & Wang, 2007; Jiang & Wang 2008). For example, Yu et al. 
(2006), based on the truncated normal distribution method, noted the frequencies of 
Chinese listed firms’ ROEs in the actual distribution were significantly higher than the 
expected distribution at intervals just above regulatory hurdles of equity offerings and 
delisting. They also found that the pattern of Chinese firms’ ROEs change with 
profitability regulations.26
Previous earnings management literature in China focused mainly on the use of non­
operating items to beat regulatory benchmarks. These studies have concluded that 
earnings management arises particularly when a firm’s true financial performance is 
close to but less than the profitability threshold of share issuances or delisting (Chen & 
Yuan 2004; Haw et al. 2005; Yu et al. 2006; Chen et al. 2008). Chen and Yuan (2004) 
was the first study to conduct such research. Based on a sample of listed firms during 
1996 to 1998, their study shows that firms whose operating ROE (ROE excluding 
profits and losses from non-operating items) was less than the regulatory threshold of 
rights issue, had higher industry-median adjusted profits from below-the-line items and 
investment sales than those firms whose operating ROE was greater than the regulatory 
threshold.
26 For example, when the regulation sets 10% as the minimum threshold for new equity offerings, a great 
number of firms’ ROE is concentrated within the interval 10%-12%; the concentration moves to 6%-8% 
when the minimum requirements changes to 6%. Yu et al. (2006) suggest that listed firms changed their 
behaviour in response to changes in regulatory requirements.
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Consistent with Chen and Yuan (2004), Haw et al. (2005) also use the profits from 
below-the-line items to indicate earnings management. Based on a sample of Chinese 
listed firms from 1996 to 1998, their results support the major findings of Chen and 
Yuan (2004) that Chinese listed firms use below-the-line items to inflate reported ROE 
higher than the regulatory hurdle. Chen et al. (2008) examined a typical non-operating 
item to inflate earnings: the government subsidy. Their research showed that local 
governments in China grant the subsidy to listed firms when their reported ROEs are 
close to but lower than the minimum regulatory threshold.
To summarise, previous literature suggest that non-recurring or below-the-line items are 
commonly employed by listed firms in China to beat regulatory hurdles. Nevertheless, 
all these studies are based on a sample prior to 2001, and their results are not affected by 
recent regulatory changes also requiring that core ROE exclude excess profits from non­
recurring items. Since 2001, regulatory changes have been aimed at reducing the 
likelihood of using excessive non-recurring items to gain share issuance approval.27
As discussed in Chapter Two, RPTs have been considered one of the most commonly 
employed earnings management techniques in China (e.g., Noronha et al. 2010). The 
survey-based research conducted by Noronha et al. (2010) documents that managers and 
accountants in China rank RPT as the most frequently used earnings management 
technique.28 Although there is much anecdotal evidence associated with the abuse of 
RPSs, only a few academic studies empirically examine this issue. Aharony et al. (2010) 
examined earnings management behaviours through RPSs in the Chinese IPO setting.
27 A non-recurring item is a gain or loss found on a company’s income statement that is not expected to 
occur regularly. The portion of an organisation’s income or loss that is derived from activities not related 
to its core operations.
28 In fact, earnings management through RPTs partially overlap with the use of non-recurring items. For 
example, the asset or equity sales at distorted prices should be more easily traded with the parent or other 
related parties.
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Despite a relatively small sample, is comprised of 185 IPO firms listed on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange during 1999 to 2001, their results are consistent with the prediction that 
RPS of goods and services were used to inflate earnings in the pre-IPO period. Jian and 
Wong (2010) provided empirical evidence that listed firms propped up earnings via 
abnormal RPS to their controlling owners in a sample of Chinese listed firms from 1998 
to 2000.
Following previous earnings management literature in China (e.g., Chen & Yuan 2004; 
Haw et al. 2005; Yu et al. 2006; Chen et al. 2008; Jian & Wong 2010), I hypothesise 
that listed firms use RPS to inflate earnings to meet or beat regulatory thresholds for 
issuing new shares or to avoid delisting. If so, there should be an association between 
the level of RPS manipulation and earnings management incentive variables. I focus on 
two extensively studied earnings benchmarks: first, meeting the regulatory thresholds of 
new equity offerings; and second, avoiding ST and delisting policies. Specifically, I 
define SUSPECT firms as those that satisfy the regulatory thresholds of new equity 
offerings, but do not satisfy them without manipulated RPSs and associated cost of 
goods sold. I define ST firms as those whose earnings are positive but negative after 
excluding manipulated RPSs and associated cost of goods sold. Thus, I compare the 
level of RPS manipulation of suspected earnings management firms to those of certain 
non-suspect firms. The second hypothesis (H2a) stated in the alternative form is:
H2a: There is greater use of RPSs for firms that satisfy the regulatory thresholds of 
new equity offerings and delisting but do not satisfy these thresholds without 
RPS management, compared to other firms.
As presented and discussed previously, the 2001 RPT measurement regulation limited 
income-increasing RPS. I argue that if these regulations were fully effective after the
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passage of 2001 RPT regulations, there should be no association between earnings 
management via RPS and firms with incentives to meet or beat the regulatory thresholds 
of new equity offerings and delisting in the post-regulatory regime, leading to a 
rejection of H2a in this regulatory regime. If regulations cannot be fully effective in 
eliminating earnings inflation, but somewhat reduce RPSs, I expect at least a reduction 
in the extent of RPSs for firms with incentives to inflate earnings after the 2001 RPT 
measurement regulation when compared to similar firms before the effect of this 
regulation. This leads to H2b, stated in the alternative form:
H2b: There is less use of RPS for firms that have incentives to inflate earnings after 
the effect of the 2001 RPT measurement regulation, compared to those before 
the 2001 RPT measurement regulation.
3.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter reviewed major earnings management studies conducted in western 
countries and China. Studies in western countries examined two types of earnings 
management tools: accruals manipulation and real earnings management to inflate the 
stock price or to fulfil contracts written in terms of accounting numbers. However, 
studies in China have focused more on the use of real non-recurring transactions. The 
primary earnings management incentive is to meet or beat the regulatory thresholds of 
new equity offerings, or avoid delisting. In this chapter, I developed two hypotheses: the 
first relates to the prevalence of RPSs to meet or beat the ROE benchmarks of new 
equity offerings and delisting; and the second relates to the effectiveness in reducing the 
extent of earnings management for firms with incentives to inflate earnings to beat the 
ROE benchmarks of new equity offerings and delisting.
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Chapter 4: Research Design
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I document the research method used to test the hypotheses, and explain 
the test variables, control variables, and their operation. First, I discuss the measurement 
of earnings management proxies. Second, I present the empirical models to test the 
hypotheses:
H1: There is a positive association between the change in gross margin and income- 
increasing RPSs.
HI a: There is a positive association between the change in gross margin and 
income-increasing RPS prior to the effect of the 2001 RPT measurement 
regulation.
Hlb: There is no significant association between the change in gross margin and 
income-increasing RPS post the effect of the 2001 RPT measurement regulation.
H2a: There is greater use of RPS for firms that satisfy the regulatory thresholds of 
new equity offerings and delisting, but do not satisfy these thresholds without 
RPS management, compared to other firms.
H2b: There is less use of RPS for firms that have incentives to inflate earnings after 
the effect of the 2001 RPT measurement regulation, compared to those before 
the 2001 RPT measurement regulation.
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4.2 Measuring Earnings Management
To proxy for earnings management using RPS, Aharony et al. (2010) use the change in 
ratio of RPS to total assets. Jian and Wong (2010) adopt a different approach. They 
identify abnormal RPS as the residual from a cross-sectional regression of RPS on 
leverage, assets and market-to-book ratio and industry dummies. Following Aharony et 
al. (2010), I model the change measure of earnings management via RPS. In calculating 
this proxy, I assume that the level of RPS for a firm is proportional to its sales in year ‘f . 
I model RPS as:
Where a = RPSJSALE,. SALEt is the total sales revenue. I argue that a relatively stable 
ratio of RPS to sales should be observed if there is no earnings management. Any 
fluctuation in RPS captures earnings management to some extent. However, there 
would be less fluctuation in RPSs if the proportion of RPSs to total sales revenues is 
consistently high for each year. To address potential earnings management activities in 
firms that have high RPSs for each year, I next model the cross-sectional proxy which is 
based on the industry-mean adjusted model in a common three-digit CSRC code. For 
each physical year, I calculate the mean level of the ratio of RPSs to sales (RPSJSALE,), 
excluding the own observation for which I calculate the measure. The deviation from 
the industry mean is used as the proxy for industry-mean adjusted RPSs, referred to as 
excess RPS (ERPS,). The change measure (ARPSt) and cross-sectional measure (ERPSt) 
of RPSs are stated as the Equation (la) and (lb):
RPSt = a SALE,
A RPSt =
RPSt RPSt_x
SALE, ~ SALE,.-! ^
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Where, RPSt is the RPS in the current year; SALEt donates the total sales revenue in the 
current year; ARPS, is the change in RPS, using Equation (la). ERPSt is the industry- 
mean adjusted RPSs, using Equation (lb).
These models differ from Aharony et al. (2010) and Jian and Wong (2010) in three 
ways. First, Aharony et al. (2010) use assets as the main deflator, and Jian and Wong 
(2010) use owner’s equity as the deflator in their tests, respectively. I deflate RPSs by 
total sales revenues, as the measure allows me to focus on the analysis of the proportion 
and the change in the proportion of RPS to total sales revenues. Second, the measure of 
earnings management via RPSs in Aharony et al. (2010) and Jian and Wong (2010) did 
not address that RPSs could be manipulated either from sales prices or volumes. Jian 
and Wong (2010) base their empirical analyses on the assumption that the residual term 
use in their study captures sales volumes manipulation only. However, Jian and Wong 
(2010) do not explain why the residual captures volumes manipulation instead of a joint 
effect of price and volumes inflation.29 Therefore, the analysis of Jian and Wong (2010) 
focuses on one side of manipulation that does not provide a full picture of the nature of 
earnings inflation via RPS. The measure used in this study does not make such an 
assumption. The measures of A RPSt or ERPSt in this study refer to the jointed effect of 
price and volume manipulation of RPSs.
Moreover, the pattern of RPS manipulation studies in Jian and Wong (2010) is quite 
similar to accruals manipulation. For example, Jian and Wong (2010) argue that the 
high frequency of these transactions allows firms to inflate earnings simply by shifting
29 Because Jian and Wong (2010) base their empirical analyses on the assumption that the residual term 
that only capture sales volumes inflation, when they examine whether related sales and the associated 
operating margins are high for firms that have incentives to inflate earnings, they times the average 
operating margin with the residual as the explained variable in their models. In this approach, they have 
clearly separated the proxy from price manipulation. Therefore, the primary analysis of Jian and Wong 
(2010) is based on assumption that the residual term generated by their cross-sectional regression captures 
volumes inflation only.
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the next period’s related sales to the current period, accelerating RPSs are likely to be 
less costly than other real earnings management tools as discussed in Roychowdhury 
(2006). As I argued previously, RPSs can also be manipulated through transfer pricing 
that should be distinct from accruals manipulation. Transfer pricing shifts earnings 
between related parties, while accruals manipulation shifts earnings between periods. 
Therefore, the issue of whether these income-increasing RPSs are associated with price 
inflation in China remains unclear. This study provides a novel and original approach to 
examine the prevalence of price inflation in RPSs. I attempt to establish the association 
between the change in gross margin and income-increasing RPSs that will be discussed 
in following sections.
To capture price manipulation via RPSs, I develop the models of the change in GMs 
(AGM,) and industry-mean adjusted gross margins (EGM,). AGM, is defined as the 
difference in gross margins for a firm between two accounting periods. EGM, is defined 
as the deviation from the industry mean of gross margin, excluding the own observation 
for which I calculate the measure. This thesis focuses on average gross margins 
generated from both RPS and non-RPS because I cannot identify the exact transaction 
price for RPS. Using A GM, and EGM, as the proxies for price manipulation requires an 
adequate control for changes in cost of goods sold, which will be discussed in Section 
4.3.1. The change measure (AGM,) and cross-sectional measure {EGM,) are stated as the 
Equations (2a) and (2b):
GrossProfitt GrossProfitt 
A GMt = ----——----------------- ———--------- (2a)
SALEt SALEt - 1
GrossProfitt
EGM, = ---- — —---------mean
1 SALEt
(GrossProfitt\
SALEt j  (2 b
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Where: GrossProfit, is the gross profits in the current year; SALE, donates the total sales 
revenue in the current year; AGM, is the change in gross margin, using Equation (2a). 
ERPSt is industry-mean adjusted gross margin, using Equation (2b).
4.3 Empirical Models to Test Hypotheses
This section discusses the empirical models to examine the hypotheses. Section 4.3.1 
presents the empirical models to test HI, Hla and Hlb. Section 4.3.2 presents the 
empirical models to test H2a and H2b.
4.3.1 Empirical Models to Test HI, Hla and Hlb
HI examines the propping nature of RPS by establishing the relation between price 
inflation and income-increasing RPS. Hla and Hlb examine the effect of the 2001 RPT 
measurement regulation on the prevalence of price inflation in RPSs. This section 
develops the empirical models to test HI, Hla and Hlb. AGMt, the main dependent 
variable in the model to test HI, is measured as gross margin in the current year less the 
previous year. As HI is concerned with firms attempting to prop up their earnings, I 
focus on income-increasing RPS, where the reported RPS figure in the current year is 
greater than that of the previous year. The change in RPS is decomposed into the 
positive change in RPS (PARPSt) and negative change in related parties (NARPSt). The 
main test variable PARPSt, is equal to the difference in RPS between the current 
previous year, if there is an increase in RPS between these two years and zero otherwise.
HI predicts that, if listed firms inflate the transaction price via income-increasing RPSs, 
there should be a positive association between the change in gross margin and income-
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increasing RPS. If there is no price inflation, PARPSt captures volume inflation. 
Because the change in gross margin captures price inflation, it should be distinct from 
PARPSt, and there should be no significant relationship between these two variables.
The change in gross margin is expressed as a function of: income-increasing RPSs; the 
lagged gross margin; the lagged change in gross margin; the change in cost of goods 
sold; the lagged market-to-book ratio; the lagged property; plant and equipment; the 
change in property, plant and equipment; the lagged intangible assets; the change in 
intangible assets; the lagged selling expense; the lagged size; the lagged leverage; 
industry membership and year dummies. To test HI, the following equation is estimated 
as:
a rM = f (P*RPSt, GMt- 1,M M t- 1,*COGSt,MTBt- 1,PPEt- 1,APPEt,\ n  , 
1 1 V INTANt_1; AI NT AN t, EXPt_lt LEVt_v SIZEt. x, IND, YEAR ) 1 }
Where:
A GMt 
PARPS,
GMt-i 
A GMti 
ACOGSt
MTBt-i
PPEti
APPEt
INTANt-i
AINTAN,
EXP,-i
LEVti
SIZEt-i
IND
YEAR
the change in gross margin from year t-1 to year t, measured
as GrossProfitt/SALEt - GrossProfitt-i/SALEt-i
the positive change in RPS from year t-1 to year t, calculated
as RP St/S ALE t - RPSti/SALEti, when
(RPSr/SALEt - RPSt i/SALE,-i) is positive and 0 otherwise
gross margin measured as GrossProfitt/SALEt in year t-1
the change in gross margin from year t-2 to year t-1
the change in cost of goods sold from year t-1 to year t,
calculated as (COGSt -  COGSt-i)/COGSt.i
the lagged market-to-book ratio
the log form of property, plant and equipment (PPE) in year 
t-1
the change in the log form of PPE from year t-1 to year t 
the log form of intangible assets (INTAN) in year t-1 
the change in the log form of intangible assets from year t-1 
to year t
the lagged selling expenses (EXP), measured by 
EXP t-i/SALEt-i
the long-term debt deflated by total assets in year t-1 
the log form of market value in year t-1 
dummy variables indicating industry sector membership 
dummies for years
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So that the models are dynamically complete, the control variables include both lagged 
gross margin (GM, i) and the lagged change in gross margin (AGM,-i) in the model. This 
approach is consistent with the models used in previous studies concerned with changes 
in profitability and core earnings margin (Fama & French 2000; Penman & Zhang 2002; 
McVay 2006; Fan et al. 2010). Specifically, Fama and French (2000) found that the 
lagged profitability and the lagged change in profitability are negatively associated with 
the current change in profitability. Consistent with Fama and French (2000), McVay 
(2006) found that both lagged core earnings margin and the lagged change in core 
earnings margin are negatively associated with the current change in core earnings 
margin. Thus, the coefficients on GMm and AGM,-i are expected to be negative.
The change in cost of goods sold (ACOGSt) is included as an explanatory variable to 
control for the potential effect of changes in costs on gross margins and other earnings 
management tools on the change gross margin. The change in cost of goods sold is 
expected to be negatively associated with the change in gross margin. Moreover, firms 
can manipulate the price and timing of RPP or to increase production to lower the fix 
costs allocation to inflate gross margin. Controlling for changes in costs and the effects 
of other earnings management tools allows the model to focus on predicting the 
association between the change in gross margin and income-increasing RPS. The 
coefficient on A COGS, is expected to be negative.
Simon and Sullivan (1993) found that the financial market value of a firm incorporates 
the effect of a brand value. They refer brand value to the capitalised value of profits 
resulting from a brand name. Because the market valuation for a firm incorporates the 
expected value of future returns and profitability, if a distinctive brand value increases 
future returns, the increase is impounded into the security price. Keller (1997) suggested
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that firms having a more distinctive brand value are usually associated with a larger 
operating margin, more inelastic consumer response to price increases and a more 
elastic response to price decreases. Therefore, the brand value denoted by MTBt-i, is 
included as an explanatory variable to control for future growth opportunities and the 
market recognition of a brand name.
The lagged property, plant and equipment (PPEt-i) is included to control for the effect 
of fixed assets on gross margin generated. The PPE,-i should be positively related to 
gross margin because investments in PPE reflect managers’ expectations for product 
quality and future returns. Firms might increase gross margins to accelerate cash 
inflows to cover the initial investment. APPEt is included to control for the effect of the 
change in PPE on gross margin generated in the current year.
Simon and Sullivan (1993) indicated that intangible assets like patents, copyrights, 
trademarks, and franchises have more earning power than physical assets such as PPE. 
This is because intangibles represent a firm’s competitive advantages and specialised 
resources that permit the firm to generate margins and earn cash flows in excess of the 
return on fixed tangible assets. Therefore, the INTAN,-i is included to control for the 
effect of past intangibles on the gross margin generated in the current year. A INTANt is 
included to control for the effect of the change in intangibles on the change in gross 
margin in this period. The coefficients on INTAN,./ and A INTAN, are expected to be 
positive.
The lagged selling expense (EXP, i) is included to control for the effect of past 
advertising, exhibition and other marketing expenditure on the change in gross
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margin.30 EXP,i is included for several reasons. First, prior studies explore the relation 
between lagged advertising expense and current sales, and demonstrate that lagged 
advertising expenses have a long-term effect on sales that is carried across periods 
(Thomas 1989). Second, past advertising has an effect on market recognition of the 
brand name (Keller, 1997). A brand name largely influences consumers’ willingness to 
pay higher than average prices, or buy more frequently than other similar products. The 
coefficient on EXP,i is expected to be positive.
Finally, the model includes several other control variables that might be associated with 
the change in gross margin. The lagged logarithm of the market value of equity (SIZEt i) 
controls for size effects. The lagged leverage (LEVt-i) is measured as the long-term debt 
scaled by total assets controls for the financial leverage. IND and YEAR dummies are 
included to control for industry and fixed year effects. For all the tests, the standard 
errors are clustered by firm to correct for serial correlation and heteroscedascity.
To examine the potential effect of the 2001 RPT measurement regulation on earnings 
management behaviours via RPS, the investigation divides the sample period into three 
regimes. AS the 2001 RPT measurement regulation was effective from 21 December 
2001 and had very limited effects in the 2001 reports, I define the years 1999 to 2001 as 
the pre-RPT measurement regulation period, 2002 as the transition period and 2003 to 
2005 as the post-RPT measurement regulation period.31
30 According to the Chinese accounting standard, the expenses incurred by an enterprise in the sales of 
products such as advertising, exhibition, insurance, packaging and transportation expenses are included in 
the selling expense account.
31 The 2001 RPT measurement regulation applies only to RPTs traded after 21 December 2001. Firms are 
not required to make adjustments for related party transactions traded before the effective date. Therefore, 
I include the year 2001 in the pre-RPT regulation period as this regulation has only a 10-day effect on 
related party transactions in 2001. The first report period of related party transactions starts in 1999 
because 1997 was the first year requiring disclosure of RPTs in China with poor compliance, and I use 
lagged data (starting in 1998) to calculate change measures.
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I ran the model (3a) in different regulatory regimes respectively to observe whether 
there is a difference in earnings management behaviours. If firms inflated the 
transaction price of RPS, there should have been a positive coefficient on PARPSt in the 
pre-RPT measurement regulation period. However, if listed firms were not involved in 
price inflation or focused on RPS volume inflation in the post-RPT measurement 
regulation period, the positive association between the change in gross margin and 
income-increasing RPSs should become insignificant.
In further analysis, the level of industry-mean adjusted RPS (ERPSt) is decomposed into 
positive ERPS (PERPSt) and negative ERPS (NERPSt). I conducted a level test by 
examining the association between industry-mean-adjusted gross margin (EGMt) and 
PERPSt. Although the positive level of ERPS does not necessarily mean income- 
increasing RPSs, it is still worthwhile to examine the relation between EGM, and 
PERPSt in different regulatory regimes to see whether the level model provides further 
evidence regarding the price inflation via RPSs. If firms inflated the transaction price 
via RPSs, the level of industry-mean adjusted gross margins (EGMt) would be 
positively correlated with the level of positive industry-mean adjusted RPS. If the high 
level of industry-mean adjusted RPSs is not associated with price inflation, then there 
should no association between these two variables. The level model is stated in the 
following Equation (3b):
EGM. PERPSt, EGMt- v  ACOGSt, MTBt_ ~~~ ,INTANt_lt EXPt_1, LEVt_1, S\ZEt_x,
Where:
EGMt = the difference between GrossProfitt/SALEt for firm i and the 
industry-mean level of GrossProfitt/SALE, excluding the own 
observation for which I calculate the measure
PERPSt -  the positive difference between RPSt/SALEt for firm i and the 
industry-mean level of RPSt/SALEt excluding the own
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A COGS,
MTBt-i
PPEti
lNTANti
EXPti
LEVt-i 
SIZEt-i 
IND 
YEAR
observation for which I calculate the measure and 0 
otherwise
the change in cost of goods sold from year t-1 to year t,
calculated as (COGSt -  COGS,-i)/COGS,-i
the market-to-book ratio in year t-1
the log form of PPE in year t-1
the log form of intangible assets (INTAN) in year t-1
the lagged selling expenses (EXP), measured by
EXP t-i/SALEi-i
the long-term debt deflated by total assets in year t-1 
the log form of market value in year t-1 
dummy variables indicating industry sector membership 
dummies for years
4.3.2 Empirical Models to Test H2a and H2b
This section describes the empirical models used to test H2a. H2a relates to whether 
RPSs are used by firms to meet or beat the regulatory thresholds of new equity offering 
and delisting. The ARPSt and ERPS,, defined in Section 4.2, are used as the dependent 
variables to test this hypothesis. Following previous literature (Chen & Yuan, 2004; 
Haw et al. 2005; Yu et al. 2006; Chen et al. 2008), I define firms with earnings 
management incentives as those likely to use RPS to beat the regulatory benchmarks of 
new share issuance or avoid delisting. The variables SUSPECT, and ST, are used to 
proxy for firms with incentives to meet the ROE benchmark of new share issuance and 
delisting respectively. The measure of SUSPECT, must satisfy two conditions.32 First, 
the reported ROEs of these firms are required to be more than the minimum regulatory 
thresholds of new equity offerings. Second, the pre-managed ROEs (PROE,), defined as 
ROEs excluding manipulated RPSs and associated cost of goods sold, are lower than 
the thresholds. The equation to calculate the PROE, is stated as following:
32 The methodology of identifying earnings management firms is consistent with previous literature (Chen 
and Yuan 2004; Chen et al. 2008; Cohen et al. 2011). For example, Chen and Yuan (2004) focused on the 
use of non-recurring items to manipulate earnings, and identified firms where reported ROE is greater 
than the thresholds but ROE excluding non-recurring items is less than the regulatory thresholds as 
suspected earnings management firms. Cohen et al. (2011) focused on the use of warranty expenses as an 
indicator of earnings management, and defined suspected earnings management firms as those whose 
earnings are greater than relevant benchmarks but pre-managed earnings are lower than the benchmarks.
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PROEt = ROEt -
PROEt = ROEt -
ARPSt x (SALEt -  COGSt) 
0Et
(4a — change model)
(ERPSt) x (SALEt -  COGSt) 
0Et
(4b — level model)
Where ROEt is the firms’ return on equity, calculated as net earnings after tax divided 
by total owners’ equity in the current year; SALE, donates the sales revenue in the 
current year; COGS, denotes the firms’ cost of goods sold in the current year; and OE, 
denotes total owners’ equity in the current year.33
In the terms of the cross-sectional model, the lagged excess RPS (ERPS,i) is included to 
control for the persistence of ERPS,. The coefficient on ERPSt i is expected to be 
positive. Several firm-specific control variables, such as firm size {SIZE,), leverage 
{LEV,), and the lagged market-to-book {MTB,-j) are also included. The lagged market- 
to-book value {MTB,-i) is included to control for future growth opportunities. Financial 
leverage {LEV,) increases the pressure for a firm to present stable earnings, providing 
incentives for firms to manage earnings (DeFond & Jiambalvo 1994; Sweeney 1994; 
Healy & Wahlen 1999). When a firm is highly leveraged, listed firms might also have 
incentives to avoid violating debt covenants via earnings management (DeFond & 
Jiambalvo 1994). The firm size {SIZE,) is included to control for the size effect. Larger 
firms might have more related parties and more easily manipulate earnings via RPS. In 
contrast, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) suggest that larger firms may receive more 
attention from the government, thereby reducing incentives to manipulate earnings.
33 Depending on the CSRC profitability regulations of new equity offerings and delisting, for years 1999— 
2005, I calculate SUSPECT as a dummy variable where 1 equals if (1) ROE is more than 10% while 
PROE is less than 10% but not less than 6%, or (2) ROE is more than 6% while PROE is less than 6%. I 
require the ROE of ST firms to be positive and not more than 6%, but PROE to be negative.
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In terms of the change model, the lagged RPS (RPS,i) and the lagged change in RPS
from year t-2 to year t-1 (ARPS,-i) are included, allowing the model to vary the degree
of RPS reversion, based on the level in the previous year. The coefficients on ERPS,-i
and ARPS,.] are expected to be negative. I replace the level of firm size and leverage
with the change in size (ASIZE,), the change in leverage (ALEVt). I retain the lagged
market-to-book ratio (MTB,i) in the model. Final, the industry and year dummies are
included to control for industry and year effects. The change model (5a) and cross-
sectional model (5b) to test H2 are presented as following:
SUSPECTt, STt, RPSt - ARPSt_lt ASIZEt,\ , ,
A LEVt. M TB^'lN D .YEAR  (ba)
. _  f  (SUSPECTt,STt,ERPSt-i, SIZEC,\
1 'V  L£Vt, MT Bt_1,
(
ARPSt = f
Where:
A RPS, 
ERPS,
SUSPECT,
ST,
SIZE,
ASIZE,
LEV,
ALEV,
MTB,-i
IND
YEAR
the change in RPS, measured as RPS,/SALE, - RPS, i/SALE, i 
the difference between RPS,/SALE, for firm i and the 
industry-mean level of RPS,/SALE, excluding the own 
observation for which I calculate the measure 
calculated as 1 if ROE, is more than the regulatory thresholds 
of new equity offerings and
(1) PROE, (ROE, excluding ARPS, and its associated COGS,) 
is less than the regulatory thresholds for the change model;
(2) PROE, (ROE, excluding ERPS, and its associated COGS,) 
is less than the regulatory thresholds for the cross-sectional 
model;
and 0 otherwise
calculated as 1 if ROE, is positive but less than the regulatory 
thresholds of new equity offerings and
(1) PROE, (ROE, excluding A RPS, and its associated COGS,) 
is negative for the change model;
(2) PROE, (ROE, excluding ERPS, and its associated COGS,) 
is negative for the cross-sectional model,
and 0 otherwise
the log form of market value in year t
the change in the log form of market value from year t-1 to 
year t
the long-term debt deflated by total assets in year t
the change in leverage from year t-1 to year t
the market-to-book ratio in year t-1
dummy variables indicating industry sector membership
dummy variables for years
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I examine H2a in different regulatory regimes to investigate the effectiveness of the 
2001 RPT regulation in reducing RPS inflation. I argue that, if these regulations are 
fully effective after the passage of the 2001 RPT measurement regulation, there should 
be no association between earnings management and incentive variables in the post- 
RPT measurement regulation regime. The coefficient on SUSPECT, and ST, should be 
not significant in the post-RPT regulation period. However, if regulations are not fully 
effective in eliminating earnings inflation via RPSs, I expect at least a reduction in 
earnings inflation for SUSPECT and ST firms after the introduction of the 2001 RPT 
measurement regulation, when compared to similar firms before the effect of the 2001 
RPT measurement regulation.
To provide further evidence regarding the effectiveness of 2001 RPT measurement 
regulation in reducing earnings inflation via RPSs, I add the regulatory dummy variable 
to Equation (2), and interact them with earnings management incentive variables. The 
variable TRAN, refers to the transitory period, which is defined as ‘ 1’ if the year is 2002 
and ‘O’ otherwise. The variable POST, refers to the post-regulation period, which is 
defined as ‘1’ if years are 2003, 2004, 2005 and ‘O’ otherwise. ARPS and ERPS are 
predicted to be lower for SUSPECT and ST firms than in the post-regulation period 
(2003-2005), when compared to SUSPECT and ST firms in the pre-regulation period 
(1999-2001). The coefficients on the interaction between regulatory regime dummy 
variables and earnings management incentive variables are expected to be negative. The 
empirical models for H3 are stated as:
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A RPSt = f
ERPSt = f
Where:
ARPS,
ERPS,
SUSPECT,
ST,
TRAN,
POST,
SIZE,
A SIZE,
LEV,
ALEV,
MTB,-i
IND
YEAR
SUSPECTt,STt,SUSPECTt x TRANt,SUSPECTt x POSTt 
STt x TRANt,STt x POSTt,TRANt, POSTt,
ASlZEt, ALEVt, MTBt_v IND, YEAR
SUSPECTt, STt, SUSPECTt 
ST. x TRAN.. ST. )
v T E A M
= the change in RPS, measured as 
RPSi/SALE, - RPS,.i/SALE,-i
= the difference between RPS,/SALE, for firm i and the 
industry-mean level of RPS,/SALE, excluding the own 
observation for which I calculate the measure 
= calculated as 1 if ROE, is more than the regulatory
thresholds of new equity offerings and
(1) PROE, {ROE, excluding ARPS, and its associated
COGS,) is less than the regulatory thresholds for the change 
model;
(2) PROE, {ROE, excluding ERPS, and its associated
COGS,) is less than the regulatory thresholds for the cross- 
sectional model;
and 0 otherwise
= calculated as 1 if ROE, is positive but less than the
regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings and
(1) PROE, {ROE, excluding ARPS, and its associated
COGS,) is negative for the change model;
(2) PROE, {ROE, excluding ERPS, and its associated
COGS,) is negative for the cross-sectional model,
and 0 otherwise
= 1 if the year is 2002 and 0 otherwise
= 1 if years are 2003, 2004, 2005 and 0 otherwise
= the log form of market value in year t
the change in the log form of market value from year t-1 to 
year t
= the long-term debt deflated by total assets in year t 
the change in leverage ratio from year t-1 to year t 
= the lagged market-to-book ratio in year t 
= dummy variables indicating industry sector membership 
= dummy variables for years
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4.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter described the major variables used to test the hypotheses. First, the 
methods to measure earnings management were presented in Section 4.2. Then, the 
empirical models used in the study to test the hypotheses were discussed in Section 4.3. 
The first model examined the association between the change in gross margin and the 
income-increasing RPS, and the effect of the 2001 RPT measurement regulation on 
price inflation in RPSs. The second model examined earnings management incentives. 
The third model examined the effect of regulatory change on the extent of earnings 
management. The next chapter presents a description of the sampling process, data 
sources and univariate analysis.
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Chapter 5: Data and Descriptive Statistics
5.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the sampling procedures, data sources and 
descriptive statistics. Section 5.2 provides an insight into the characteristics of the 
sample. Section 5.3 presents the descriptive statistics for variables defined in Chapter 
Four. Section 5.4 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables, and Section 
5.5 summarises.
5.2 Sample and Data
The population of interest for this study is all Chinese firms listed on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, from 1 January 1999 to 31 December 
2005. I require firms to be consistently listed from 1999 to 2005.34 The data of 
accounting and corporate governance were obtained for the years 1998 to 2005 from the 
CSMAR database. The data of RPTs were hand-collected from company annual reports. 
Following the 1997 RPT standard, listed companies have to report the identity of their 
related parties, the nature of their relations with these related parties, and the types and 
amounts of RPTs in a special footnote to their financial statements. Most listed firms 
also disclose a summary of their RPT issues and data in the section ‘Announcement of 
Material Matters' in their annual reports. The footnote disclosure and the section of 
material matters announcement are primary sources for the RPT variables.
34 I do not include observations after 2006, as the institutional background changes significantly in 2006. 
The 2006 version of Chinese accounting standards exhibits several differences in terms of the definition, 
disclosure requirement and accounting treatment for RPTs.
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The first reporting period for RPTs starts in 1998, as 1997 was the first year requiring 
disclosure of RPTs in China with poor compliance. The data in 1998 are used only to 
calculate change measures of RPS and gross margins. The initial sample yielded 5,815 
year observations. Thirty-five observations with missing, negative or zero sales are 
deleted because sales are used as a main deflator for the majority of variables. To 
construct the sample of RPS, firms reporting at least one RPS during 1998 to 2005 are 
required. This step yields 4,629 year observations. Finally, a minimum of five 
observations per industry per fiscal year is required to ensure a reliable benchmark 
against which to evaluate each firm’s RPS. The final sample of RPS has 4,611 year 
observations used to calculate the measures of manipulated RPS. However, the number 
of observations in some tests may be smaller, depending on model-specific variable 
requirements. Table 5.1 describes the sample selection procedures.
Table 5.1: Sample Selection Procedures
Procedure Observations
Observations listed during 1999 to 2005
5,815 firm-year 
observations
Observations with no missing, negative or 5,780 firm-year
zero sales observations
Observations report at least one RPS during 4,629 firm-year
1998-2005 observations
A minimum of five observations per 4,611 firm-year
industry per year is required observations
Note: This table presents the sample selection procedures.
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The sample composition by industry, classified based on the three-digit CSRC code, is 
described in Table 5.2. The sample of RPS originates from several industries, but they 
are concentrated in a number of groups. As reported in Table 5.2, about 34.96% of the 
sample belongs to three industry groups: machinery, equipment and instrument (693 
observations: 15.03%); petroleum, chemical, plastics and rubber products (529 
observations: 11.47%); and real estate (390 observations: 8.46%). Not surprisingly, 
banking and financial institution (35 observations: 0.76%) constitute the smallest part of 
our sample. On average, about 79.8% of firms report at least one RPS during the sample 
period, which suggests that RPSs are very prevalent in China.
The last column reports the industry-mean ratio of RPSs, scaled by total sales revenues. 
The statistic shows that six industries rely heavily on RPSs in which more than ten per 
cent of sales are related. As shown in the last two columns of Table 5.2, about 25.25% 
of sales in public utilities are RPSs; 16.74% for mining and related support services; 
13.54% for metal and non-metallic mineral products; 11.76% for electronics; 11.57% 
for petroleum, chemical, plastics and rubber products; and 11.44% for machinery, 
equipment, and instrument.
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Table 5.2: Sample Composition
CSCR
code
Industry
Full
Sample
Sample of 
RPS
n/N
(%)
RPS 
ASALE
(N) n (%)
A01-A09
Farming, Forestry, Animal 
husbandry, and Fishing
96 89 1.93 92.71 4.37
B01-B09
Mining and -Related Support 
Services
97 90 1.95 92.78 16.74
C01-C05 Food and Beverage 272 224 4.86 82.35 5.28
C11-C21
Textile, Apparel, Fur, and 
Leather
181 161 3.49 88.95 5.03
C31-C37
Paper, Printing, Culture and 
Education Goods
83 70 1.52 84.34 9.83
C41-C47
Petroleum, Chemical, Plastics 
and Rubber Products
578 529
11.4
7
91.52 11.57
C51-C57 Electronics 175 154 3.34 88.00 11.76
C61-C69
Metal and Non-metallic 
Mineral Products
406 371 8.05 91.38 13.54
C71-C78
Machinery, Equipment, and 
Instrument
875 693
15.0
3
79.20 11.44
C81-C85
M edicine and Biological 
Products
322 245 5.31 76.09 7.46
D01-D05 Public Utilities 280 231 5.01 82.50 25.25
E01-E05 Construction 42 42 0.91 100 5.84
F01-F21
Transportation and 
W arehousing
189 140 3.04 74.07 5.34
G81-G87 Information Technology 329 315 6.83 95.74 9.91
H01-H21 W holesale and Retail Trades 546 301 6.53 55.13 1.48
101-131
Banking and Financial 
Institution
77 35 0.76 45.45 8.11
J01-J09 Real Estate 537 390 8.46 72.63 5.52
K01-K99
Public Facilities and Other 
Services
214 161 3.49 75.23 5.04
L01-L99
Communication and Cultural 
Industrials
63 63 1.37 100 8.56
M Conglomerates 418 307 6.66 73.44 3.74
Total 5780 4611 100 79.78
Note: this table reports the sample distribution by industry. N is the number of observations of a 
particular two-digit CSRC industry in the full sample; n is the number of observations of sample of 
RPSs; n/N donates the coverage of related party sale sample to the full sample. The column reports the 
mean ratio of RPSs scaled by total sales.
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5.3 Descriptive Statistics
This section presents the summary statistics for the sample of RPSs during 1999 to 2005. 
Panel A of Table 5.3 presents descriptive statistics of general variables. Panel B 
presents descriptive statistics of major earnings management variables. Panel C presents 
descriptive statistics of control variables.
5.3.1 Statistics of Continuous Variables
The descriptive statistics of general variables are presented in the Panel A of Table 5.3. 
The mean (median) total asset of sample firms is 2,350 (1,400) in millions. The mean 
(median) market value is 2,800 (1,890) in millions. The mean (median) sales of sample 
firms is 1,600 (1,310) in millions. The mean (median) cost of goods sold is 1,310 (490) 
in millions. The mean (median) gross profits is 93 (42) in millions. The mean (median) 
RPS is 212 (8) in millions.
Descriptive statistics of earnings management variables during 1999 to 2005 are 
reported in the penal B. The variable RPS/SALE indicates that on average, RPSs count 
for 11.1% of total sales. The mean A RPS is -0.006. The variable A RPS indicates that on 
average, there is a negative change in RPS/SALE.
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Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics and Variable Definitions
N Min Mean
Panel A General Variables (1999-2005)
Median Max SD
Total Asset (in million) 4611 27 2,350 1,400 57,600 3,230
M arket Value (in million) 4611 53 2,800 1,890 52,900 3,220
Sales (in million) 4611 0.001 1,600 650 66,600 3,390
Cost o f  Goods Sold (in million) 4611 0.002 1,310 490 64,600 2,980
Gross Profit (in million) 4611 -3,680 93 42 5,590 312
RPS (in million) 4611 0 212 8 23,700 969
Panel B Earnings Management Variables (1999-2005)
RPS/SALE 4611 0.000 0.111 0.014 1.000 0.215
A RPS 3950 - 1.000 -0.006 0,000 1.000 0.164
AbsARPS 3950 0.000 0.072 0.013 1.000 0.148
Positive ARPS 1673 0.000 0.091 0.027 1.000 0.158
Negative ARPS 1680 - 1.000 -0.099 -0.031 0.000 0.169
PARPS 4611 0.000 0.033 0.000 1.000 0.105
NARPS 4611 - 1.000 -0.039 0.000 0.000 0.116
ERPS 4611 -0.351 0.000 -0.058 0.986 0.212
AbsERPS 4611 0.000 0.137 0.090 0.986 0.161
Positive ERPS 1174 0.000 0.269 0.172 0.986 0.258
Negative ERPS 3437 -0.351 -0.092 -0.083 0.000 0.065
PERPS 4611 0.000 0.069 0.000 0.986 0.175
NERPS 4611 -0.351 -0.068 -0.058 0.000 0.069
Gross Margin 4611 -0.872 0.237 0.209 0.963 0.159
A G M 4611 -3.973 -0.009 -0.008 1.731 0.121
EGM 4611 -4.005 -0.001 -0.013 0.678 0.161
Panel C Control Variables (1999-2005)
A COGS 4608 -0.707 0.235 0.144 3.243 0.534
M TB 4611 0.704 1.426 1.253 4.687 0.555
PPE 4611 12.707 19.654 19.651 24.312 1.290
A PPE 4608 -5.872 0.097 0.031 3.511 0.460
INTAN 4611 0.000 15.426 17.166 21.187 5.408
AINTAN 4608 -18.75 0.334 -0.019 18.997 3.436
EXP 4611 0.000 0.057 0.037 0.599 0.071
LEV 4611 0.073 0.503 0.488 3.179 0.274
A LE V 4608 -1.443 0.028 0.016 2.580 0.156
SIZE 4611 17.776 21.393 21.362 24.692 0.811
A SIZE 4607 -3.017 0.047 0.017 1.646 0.277
ROE 4611 -1.858 0.013 0.063 0.313 0.263
OWNCON 4564 0.031 0.433 0.422 0.886 0.170
BORDIND 4597 0.000 0.191 0.222 0.727 0.160
This table presents the descriptive statistics of continuous variables during 1999-2005. See Appendix 
Five for variable definitions.
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The ARPS is decomposed into the Positive ARPS and Negative ARPS, and PARPS and 
NARPS respectively. The variables Positive ARPS and Negative ARPS denote the 
positive change in RPS/SALE, and the negative change in RPS/SALE. The variables 
PARPS and NARPS are used as the main independent variables in the test of H1. The 
PARPS denotes income-increasing RPS, defined as the positive change in RPS/SALE 
and zero otherwise, while the NARPS denotes income-decreasing RPS, defined as the 
negative change in RPS/SALE and zero otherwise.
The difference between these two sets of variables is that the measures of PARPS 
(NARPS) set non-positive (non-negative) A RPS as zeroes, whereas the measures of 
Positive ARPS (Negative ARPS) refer only to positive (negative) A RPS. The statistics of 
both sets of variables are presented because PARPS (NARPS) is used as the main test 
variable in the model to test HI, but Positive ARPS (Negative ARPS) provides 
information regarding comparison of the frequency of the income-increasing RPSs with 
income-decreasing RPSs.
The variables Positive ARPS and Negative ARPS indicate that the frequency of positive 
change in RPS/SALE (1673 times) is slightly lower than the frequency of negative 
change in RPS/SALE (1680 times) during the sample period. The mean of Positive 
ARPS (0.091) is lower than the absolute value of Negative ARPS (0.099), suggesting 
that on average, the extent of positive change in RPS/SALE is lower than that of 
negative change in RPS/SALE. The standard deviation (SD) of Positive ARPS (0.158) is 
lower than the Negative ARPS (0.169), suggesting that on average the variation of 
positive change in RPS/SALE is lower than that of negative change in RPS/SALE. The
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results for PARPS and NARPS are consistent with findings of the Positive ARPS and 
Negative ARPS.
The variable ERPS is the difference between RPS/SALE, for the own firm and the 
industry-mean level of RPS,/SALEt excluding the own observation for which I calculate 
the measure. The variable AbsERPS is absolute value of ERPS. The level measure ERPS 
is decomposed into Positive ERPS and Negative ERPS, and PERPS and NERPS 
respectively. The maximum of ERPS is 0.986 and the minimum is -0.351, showing that 
the extent of some extreme positive ERPS is higher than that of negative NRPS. 
Consistent with this finding, it can be seen that the mean (median) value of Positive 
ERPS is 0.269 (0.172) is higher than the absolute mean (median) value of Negative 
ERPS, 0.092 (0.083). The results for PERPS and NERPS are consistent with the finding 
of Positive ERPS and Negative ERPS. However, the number of Positive ERPS is 
significantly less than that of Negative ERPS.
The mean (median) gross margin is 0.237 (0.209). The SD of gross margin is 0.159, the 
minimum value is -0.872 and the maximum is 0.963. The mean (median) AGM is - 
0.009 (-0.008). The minimum AGM is -3.973 and the maximum is 1.731. This indicates 
that on average, there is a negative change in gross margin. The mean (median) EGM is 
-0.001 (-0.013), the minimum EGM is -4.005 and the maximum is 0.161, indicating that 
the extent of negative EGM is higher than that of positive EGM.
Summary statistics of control variables (1999-2005) are reported in Panel C. The mean 
(median) A COGS is 0.235 (0.144). The mean (median) MTB is 1.426 (1.253). The mean 
(median) PPE is 19.654 (19.651). The mean (median) APPE is 0.097 (0.031). The mean 
(median) INTAN is 15.426 (17.166). The mean (median) AINTAN is 0.334 (-0.019). The
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mean (median) EXP is 0.057 (0.037). The mean (median) LEV is 0.503 (0.488). The
mean (median) ALEV is 0.028 (0.016). The mean (median) SIZE is 21.393 (21.362). 
The mean (median) ROE is 0.013 (0.063). The minimum ROE is -1.858 and the 
maximum ROE is 0.313. The SD of ROE is 0.263. It is interesting to note that the 
average ROE is just higher than the minimum profitability requirement of delisting, and 
the median ROE is just higher than the minimum profitability requirement of new 
equity offerings. The mean (median) OWNCON is 0.433 (0.422). This indicates that in 
China, ownership is highly concentrated. On average, nearly 43.3% of shares are owned 
by the controlling shareholders. The mean (median) BOARDIND is 0.191 (0.222). The 
variable BOARDIND suggests that, on average, 19.1% of board members in Chinese 
firms are independent directors during the sample period.
5.3.2 Descriptive Statistics by Regimes
This section presents the descriptive statistics of continuous variables of firms having 
RPSs by regulatory regimes. Statistics of earnings management variables of firms 
having RPSs by regulatory regimes are reported in Panel A of Table 5.4. The gradual 
decrease in the mean and the SD of RPS/SALE and absARPS suggests earnings 
management in the post-RPT regulation period might be less aggressive, which can also 
be evidenced by a reduction in the SDs of ARPS. It is not surprising to observe a 
gradual and significant decrease in Positive ARPS (PARPS), and an increase in Negative 
ARPS (NARPS). Consistent with the change measures, the SD of ERPS decreases.35 The 
mean and SD of AbsERPS decreased across the regulatory regimes. Moreover, there is a 
significant decrease in Positive ERPS (PERPS) and an increase in Negative ERPS
35 This is not surprising: I do not find any significant change in terms of the level of ERPS, because this 
variable is an industry-mean adjusted measure and the mean of ERPS must be zero.
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(NERPS). The results suggest that the 2001 RPT measurement regulation might be 
effective in reducing earnings inflation via RPSs to some extent.
With regard to the price inflation proxies, there is a significant decrease in gross margin 
throughout the regulatory regimes. The mean and SD of AGM in the pre-regulation 
period is significantly higher than that of A GM in the post-regulation regime (PRE: 
mean = -0.005, SD = 0.125; POST: mean = -0.010, SD = 0.174). There is no significant 
change in the level of EGM, but the SD of EGM decreases.
Descriptive statistics of control variables used in this study by regulatory regimes are 
reported in Panel B. Compared with firms in the pre-regulation period, firms in the 
transitory period have higher PPE, INTAN, AINTAN, EXP, LEV, and BOARDIND, but 
lower MTB, ASIZE, ROE and OWN CON. Compared with firms in the pre-regulation 
period, firms in the post-regulation period have higher PPE, INTAN, EXP, LEV, ALEV, 
SIZE, and BOARDIND, but lower MTB, A PPE, AINTAN, ASIZE, ROE and OWN CON. 
The significant decrease in OWNCON and increase in BOARDIND across the regulatory 
regimes suggests increased emphasis on corporate governance mechanisms.
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Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics by Regulatory Regimes
VARIABLES
PRE
(1999-2001) 
Mean SD
TRAN
(2002)
Mean SD
POST
(2003-2005) 
Mean SD
T-Test
TRAN POST 
- PRE - PRE
Panel A Earnings M anagement Variables
RPS/SALE 0.127 0.233 0.111 0.216 0.094 0.195 -1.551 -5.280
ARPS -0.005 0.181 -0.009 0.169 -0.005 0.144 -0.393 0.070
AbsARPS 0.085 0.160 0.074 0.152 0.057 0.132 -1.586 -5.957
Positive ARPS 0.119 0.176 0.087 0.161 0.067 0.135 -2.507 -6.262
Negative ARPS -0.120 0.180 -0.110 0.175 -0.076 0.153 0.769 5.154
PARPS 0.040 0.116 0.033 0.107 0.026 0.090 -1.418 -4.199
NARPS -0.045 0.125 -0.041 0.120 -0.031 0.104 0.748 3.887
ERPS 0.000 0.229 0.000 0.212 0.000 0.192 -0.018 -0.019
AbsERPS 0.156 0.168 0.137 0.162 0.117 0.152 -2.621 -8.504
Positive ER PS 0.298 0.259 0.272 0.261 0.237 0.252 -1.140 -4.224
Negative ERPS -0.106 0.067 -0.091 0.065 -0.078 0.060 4.205 13.36
PERPS 0.078 0.187 0.068 0.176 0.059 0.162 -1.195 -3.893
NERPS -0.078 0.074 -0.068 0.068 -0.059 0.062 2.973 9.954
Gross Margin 0.253 0.161 0.242 0.149 0.217 0.184 -2.365 -6.510
AGM -0.005 0.186 -0.009 0.174 -0.010 0.125 -0.273 -2.425
EGM 0.006 0.177 0.000 0.150 -0.004 0.142 -1.047 -0.993
Panel B Control Variables
A COGS 0.234 0.575 0.253 0.560 0.214 0.491 0.841 -1.295
MTB 1.695 0.627 1.420 0.471 1.157 0.326 -10.15 -34.25
PPE 19.475 1.180 19.676 1.232 19.827 1.387 3.713 11.88
A PPE 0.116 0.483 0.093 0.384 0.069 0.434 1.236 -3.618
INTAN 14.867 5.825 15.604 5.221 15.927 4.968 2.772 8.174
AINTAN 0.400 3.907 0.587 3.366 0.124 2.673 1.236 -2.895
EXP 0.054 0.067 0.063 0.078 0.059 0.072 2.250 3.431
LEV 0.447 0.195 0.498 0.230 0.560 0.336 5.022 16.05
A LE V 0.023 0.129 0.020 0.155 0.034 0.178 -0.550 2.651
SIZE 21.398 0.711 21.416 0.745 21.381 0.919 0.559 3.324
ASIZE 0.160 0.299 -0.066 0.203 -0.033 0.239 -20.23 -24.97
ROE 0.036 0.238 -0.005 0.267 -0.004 0.284 -4.084 -6.434
OW N CON 0.456 0.172 0.431 0.168 0.412 0.164 -4.084 -8.255
BORDIND 0.029 0.079 0.238 0.080 0.338 0.054 62.92 150
Note: This table presents the descriptive statistics of continuous variables and t-test of differences of these 
variables by regulatory regimes. The t-test of difference at 5% significance level is bolded. See Appendix 
Five for variable definitions.
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The time trends of the level of earnings management proxies across the regulatory 
regimes are summarised in Table 5.5. To summarise the data, the regression of earnings 
management variables (RPS/SALE, ARPS, AbsARPS, Positive ARPS, Negative ARPS, 
PARPS, NARPS, AbsERPS, Positive ERPS, Negative ERPS, PERPS, NERPS, Gross 
Margin, AGM, EGM) is run on regulatory dummies (TRAN, POST). TRAN takes the 
value of ‘ 1 ’ in the transitory period (year 2002) and ‘O’ otherwise. POST takes the value 
of ‘T in the post-regulation period (years 2003-2005) and ‘O’ otherwise.
I choose this procedure to describe the variables because many RPS variables exhibit 
significant time trends. The purpose of these regressions is to examine whether the 2001 
RPT measurement regulation has reduced the extent of earnings management. The 
constant of earnings management proxies in Table 5.5 must equal the mean value of 
these variables in the pre-regulation period in Table 5.4. For example, Table 5.5 shows 
that the constant for RPS/SALE is 0.127, which equals the mean value of RPS/SALE in 
the pre-regulation period in Table 5.4. The sum of the constant and coefficients of 
earnings management proxies on TRAN and POST in Table 5.5 must equal the mean 
values of these variables in TRAN and POST in Table 5.4. For example, the sum of the 
constant and the coefficient on TRAN for RPS/SALE is 0.111, which equals the mean 
value of RPS/SALE in the transitory period.
The results in Table 5.5 suggest the magnitude of RPS/SALE decreased significantly 
throughout the regulatory regimes. The coefficients on AbsARPS in the transitory and 
post-regulatory period are -0.011 and -0.028 respectively. The coefficients on positive 
ARPS (income-increasing RPSs) in the transitory and post-regulatory period are -0.032 
and -0.052, while the coefficients on negative ARPS (income-decreasing RPSs) are 0.01
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and 0.044. The results suggest that the magnitude of AbsARPS decreased significantly 
throughout the regulatory regimes, with income-increasing RPSs contributing more to 
that decrease of AbsARPS than income-decreasing RPSs. The coefficients on PARPS 
and NARPS are consistent with positive ARPS and negative ARPS.
I also provide evidence that the magnitude of AbsERPS declined significantly in the 
transitory and post-regulation period. The magnitudes (absolute value) of the coefficient 
for Positive ERPS in the transitory and post-regulation period are larger than the 
coefficient for Negative ERPS, suggesting that most of this decline results from the 
reduction of the positive industry-mean adjusted RPSs. The results for PERPS and 
NERPS are consistent with Positive ERPS and Negative ERPS. The decline of gross 
margin and AGM provides support for the reduction in price inflation after the passage 
of the 2001 RPT measurement regulation. However, there is no significant reduction in 
EGM. Overall, the results are consistent with the t-test of differences in Table 5.4.
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Table 5.5: Descriptive Statistics of Earnings Management Proxies by Regimes
VARIABLES N CONSTANT
TRAN
(2002)
POST
(2003-
2005)
Adj. R2
RPS/SALE 4,611 0  127* * * -0.016* -0.033*** 0.005
AbsARPS 4,611 0.085*** -0.011* -0.028*** 0.007
Positive ARPS 1,673 0.119*** -0.032*** -0.052*** 0.022
Negative ARPS 1,800 -0.120*** 0.01 0.044*** 0.014
PARPS 4,611 0.040*** -0.007 -0.014*** 0.003
NARPS 4,611 -0.045*** 0.004 0.014*** 0.003
AbsERPS 4,611 0.156*** -0.020*** -0.039*** 0.012
Positive ERPS 1,174 0.298*** -0.026 -0.062*** 0.011
Negative ERPS 3,437 -0.106*** 0.015*** 0.028*** 0.039
PERPS 4,611 0.078*** -0.010 -0.020*** 0.002
NERPS 4,611 -0.078*** 0.010*** 0.020*** 0.017
Gross Margin 4,611 0.253*** -0.011 -0.036*** 0.009
A GM 4,607 -0.005* -0.004 -0.005*** 0.001
EGM 4,611 0.006 -0.006 -0.010 0.000
Note: This table presents the change in the level of earnings management proxies across regulatory 
regimes using regression models. ******  signify statistical significance of two-tailed tests at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% respectively. See Appendix Five for variable definitions.
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5.3.3 Firm Characteristics by Related Party Sales
Firm characteristics by RPSs are reported in Table 5.6. Panel A in Table 5.6 compares 
firm characteristics of sample firms (RPS > 0 in one of sample years) with those never 
having RPSs (RPS = 0 in any sample year). The results show that a majority of firms 
had at least one RPS during the sample period (n =4611), making up 79.8% of the full 
sample observations. Consistent with Jian and Wong (2010), the results show that firms 
with RPSs have larger SIZE and lower LEV than firms with no RPSs. Further, firms 
having RPSs report higher ROE, PPE and INTAN, but there is a significant difference in 
MTB ratio. Regarding the corporate governance variables, the results show that firms 
with RPSs have a greater degree of ownership concentration, but there is no difference 
in board independence.
The frequency of RPS is presented in Panel B. For the sample firms with RPSs during 
the period 1998 to 2005, about 62.1% of the sample firms had more than five (over 
eight) times of RPSs, and about 24.6% of the sample had RPSs for each fiscal year. This 
indicates that RPSs are persistent and the manipulation of RPSs could be recurring. 
Firm characteristics by the frequency of RPSs are presented in Panel C. The results 
show that firms with a high frequency of RPSs (more than five times) tend to have 
higher SIZE, ROE, PPE, but lower LEV, EXP and MTB ratios than low frequency firms. 
The results also show that high frequency firms have a higher degree of ownership 
concentration.
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Table 5.6: Firm Characteristics by RPS
Panel A Firm Characteristics by RPS
(1) RPS = 0 
in any sample year 
(n = 1169)
(2) RPS > 0
in one of sample years
(n = 4611)
T-Test
(2) - (1)
Variables Mean SD Mean SD
M TB 1.426 0.586 1.426 0.555 0.043
P P E 19.502 1.301 19.654 1.290 3.601
IN T A N 15.032 5.842 15.426 5.408 2.191
E X P 0.079 0.107 0.057 0.071 0.448
L E V 0.543 0.337 0.503 0.274 -4.246
SIZ E 21.331 1.032 21.393 0.811 2.193
R O E -0.005 0.300 0.013 0.263 1.978
O W N C O N 0.265 0.198 0.433 0.170 28.954
B O A R D IN 0.191 0.162 0.191 0.160 0.017
Panel B Frequency of RPS during 1998-2005
Number of RPS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Frequency of RPS (%) 8.90 10.32 10.30 8.35 9.35 12.28 15.90 24.59
Low v.s High Fre. (%) 37.87 62.13
Panel C Firm Characteristics by the Frequency of RPS
Low High T-Test
Variables Mean SD Mean SD High-Low
M TB 1.522 0.626 1.386 0.494 -8.396
P P E 19.143 1.297 19.788 1.225 17.155
IN T A N 15.402 5.310 15.125 5.703 -1.645
E X P 0.071 0.093 0.050 0.056 -10.047
L E V 0.539 0.310 0.471 0.241 -8.502
SIZ E 21.127 0.787 21.434 0.802 12.787
R O E -0.019 0.335 0.035 0.219 6.707
O W N C O N 0.368 0.162 0.467 0.166 19.841
B O A R D IN 0.188 0.162 0.193 0.160 0.918
Note:This table presents the descriptive statistics of firm characteristics and t-test of differences of these 
variables by RPSs. The t-test of difference at 5% significance level is bolded. See Appendix Five for 
variable definitions.
75
5.4 Correlation Tables
The Pearson correlation matrix for the dependent and independent variables used in the 
empirical models discussed in Chapter Four is presented in Table 5.7. This table only 
tabulates the results using the full sample. For brevity of presentation, the results based 
the sub-period analysis are not tabulated but have been checked. There are two reasons 
for examining the correlation matrix. First, it provides insights into the multicollinearity 
issue, caused by the high correlations among independent variables. In particular, this 
thesis is interested in the correlation between PARPSt and other control variables 
(Column 2), using the model (la) defined in Section 4.1. There are no significant 
correlations between PARPSt and control variables. An examination of the correlation 
matrix reveals that the multicollinearity problem might not be an issue for the accuracy 
of the estimated coefficient on PARPSt using the model (la).36
Second, examining the correlations between variables provides initial insights into the 
association between the dependent and test variables in this study. In particular, I do not 
find a significant correlation between PARPS and AGMt. However, it is important to 
note this is a full sample correlation table, and my hypothesis deals particularly with a 
pre- versus post-regulation analysis. For H2(a) and H2(b), I find a positive association 
between ARPSt and ALEVt (p < 0.01), and a positive association between ERPS, and 
SIZEt-i (p<0.01).
36 For the regressions in the next chapter, this thesis also employs the variance inflation factor (VIF) to 
detect the multicollinearity issues. VIF provides an index that measures how much the variance of an 
estimated regression coefficient is increased because of collinearity. As a rule of thumb, if any of the VIF 
values are greater than 5, there is a problem of multicollinearity (Wooldridge 2009). The max of VIF 
values of variables in the following regressions is 3.35 generated by the INTANt-i in the model (la). That 
is the only value greater than 3. Other values are ranging from 1 to 2. Overall, the VIF test does not 
indicate that the models in this study suffer multicollinearity problems.
76
Ta
bl
e 
5.
7:
 P
ea
rs
on
 C
or
re
la
tio
n 
M
at
ri
x 
fr
om
 1
99
9-
20
05
oq
©© o \ o® © 
® d
©© ^ ©  ©  ©® © d d
© © © r- o CN ©
ON © © © © CN ©
© © © © © d
© 00 © © CO NO, CO NO
oc © © © © o © © o ©
© d © © © © © ©
r- © co g
vr.
© CN o © © ©©
© © © d © © d © © d
© © ao © © © ON o CO ■ct ©
nO © © © © O ON © © © o © ©
© d © © © d © © © © © ©
© l/v o o \ o © © © © o © CO CO co oc
>n q Tt © CN © l-H © CN © © ON © © © O
© © © © © © © © d d © © d d
© (N c o CN NO CN © CN CN CN © CN NO © © — 00
■ct © O CN O — © — © — o © *—• rH O © ■'fr
© © © © © © © © © © © d © © d ©
© »rj © o cO ■ct CN CN oo CO O' OC © CN NO
CO © © © © © o © © © CN q — © o © © © CN
'—i © © © © © © © © © © d © d d © © d ©
o CN © CN © CN © — V") CN r- OC — ON CO r-~ © CO ■ct
CN © w © «o © O CN © CO © CN © Tf- © ■'t o © © ON © lO
1 d © © © © © d © d © d © d © © © © © d ©
© © Tt © rf © r- o NO © _ CN I T ) © © CN _ 1 CO r-— © © ro © CO © o NO © ON © 00 © © © o © ON © © ir,
— © © © © © © © o' © © © d d © © © d © d d © ©
g<=3
<
£as
s
»2a.
GC
COa,a:aja. <
O
A
<
co"
§U
<
A
1
A
a.a.
A
a
a
<
13
 
IN
TA
N,
., 
-0
.0
2 
-0
.0
3 
-0
.1
0 
-0
.1
1 
-0
.0
3 
0.
00
 
0.
03
 
-0
.0
5 
0.
00
 
-0
.0
7 
0.
17
 
-0
.0
1 
1.
00
0.
28
 
0.
12
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
02
 
0.
86
 
0.
04
 
0.
00
 
0.
94
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
0.
49
14
 
M
N
TA
N
,.,
 
0.
01
 
0.
01
 
-0
.0
1 
0.
00
 
-0
.0
1 
0.
03
 
0.
05
 
0.
04
 
0.
03
 
-0
.0
1 
-0
.0
2 
0.
11
 
-0
.3
8 1
.0
0
0.
40
 
0.
57
 
0.
71
 
0.
76
 
0.
33
 
0.
04
 
0.
00
 
0.
02
 
0.
04
 
0.
51
 
0.
22
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
T
ab
le
 5
.7
 c
on
tin
ue
s
OS
oo
r-~
sO
m
■ct
oo
CN
©
©
t-l
« S
i n
c r - ©
x
© CN © "Oc
— © © CDo. .  ■ 
Q .
o OS © ao o <
© q © © © <D
© © © d 0)CO
o SC © o r - ©
<o
o
© o
©
©
© ®■
©
d ©■
©
©
£
©
oX)
oq © ©©
CN
©
CO IT,
© ©
©
o c
— © © © d ©i © © © <d
03
CN c o - r CO CN CN _ ao © t c
O q © q O © —* © © a>
d d © © d © © © © o ' -a
j d
OO o m © © CO o in © "3o © © o O s i-( © © © oo d © © © © © d © d £
m o © © ■of © in © CO o
03
q o © © O © —* o CN o c
d d © © © © © d © © 13
5
O s o ac o 00 o SC o *-* _q o © © © © sc © © ' t -p.
© d © © © © © d d ©
b
© 8
so© o©
(N© ©04
SC
CN 8
ao
q q a .m
® d © © © © © © © © a>
©
*n
c o
r-
© ©©
in
© © 8
©
©
3
•4—»
Ö d © © © d © © ® d c
o
(N _ © oo © s © © oo © ©r—q co © oc © o © OS © © ooq d © © © d © © © © ' S
c
oo 8
SC
CN 8 © 8 © 8 o
_o
3
© d © © © © © © © d 13
s
SC o © CO o T © -t © oQ
N o © © © © ©
© d ©■ © ©1 © © © © © _aj
a .
oo CO "t © © (N CO ao © £o3
© o © O © © © © C«
© d © © © © d © © © a)
SC o cn © CN 'It © CO in
i—
,c1-H o © © © © © ©
© d © © d © © d ® © c
_o
Tf o © © CN _ © CN oo 3
o © q —* © © O CN 33
©
1 d © © © © © d d ©
■—
Q
o
CN
o ©
CN
© CO
CN
© oo ©
>n
SO
CN
O
CN c
g
© d © © © © d © d © c3
CJ
CU
(N >n _ © © CN © CN O <D
O © © o © CO O CO •s
d d © © © © © d © © C/5 C/5
ts C
CL) .2C/5 w
•7 faj 2 c
<C kj jg D. ©
> < hJ < 1 co JD 7 3
< 1 Co < ■£ « 03
a> et
m © r- oo Os 'S •- 'S
Z  H >
00r-
5.5 Chapter Summary
Section 5.2 first described the population of interest and the criteria used to select the 
sample. The sample of RPSs in total has 4,611 observations, counting for 79.8% of the 
whole population. It provided detailed characteristics of the sample dispersed across 
industries. The descriptive statistics of continuous variables in this study were provided 
in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 provided summary statistics of variables by regulatory 
regimes; there was a decline in the magnitude of earnings management proxies across 
the regulatory regimes. Section 5.5 presented the firm characteristics by regulatory 
regimes. The results revealed that firms with RPSs had larger SIZE, ROE, PPE and 
INTAN and OWNCON than firms with no RPSs. The results also provided evidence that 
RPSs were very prevalent and frequent in China. Finally, the correlation matrix for 
variables used in the regression models was presented.
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Chapter 6: Results
6.1 Introduction
This chapter reports the results of the regressions that test the hypotheses developed in 
Chapters Two and Three. The regressions use the model described in Chapter Four and 
the data described in Chapter Five. The regressions for firms in the full sample (1999— 
2005), pre-regulation period (1999-2001), and the post-regulation period (2003-2005) 
are based on pooled-cross-sectional models.
Because pooled data are used in this thesis, heteroscedascity and autocorrelation might 
influence the ordinary least squares (OLS) results. I use White’s general 
heteroscedascity test and the Wooldridge test identify heteroscedascity and 
autocorrelation in all the multivariate analyses reported in this chapter. Petersen (2005) 
suggests that when residuals of the same firm are serially correlated, using the clustered 
standard errors method provides an unbiased estimate of standard errors. This is because 
the clustered standard error corrects for the correlations of residuals within clusters, i.e., 
the unobserved firm effect residuals by estimating the covariance between residuals 
within clusters (Petersen 2005). Therefore, all p-values for the regression coefficients 
reported in this chapter are based on robust t-statistics that have been adjusted to control 
for clustering by firm. Because there is only one year for the sample in the transitory 
period (2001), a White’s robust regression is employed.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 reports the regression 
results of the first hypothesis, which relates to the prevalence of price inflation in RPSs 
to prop up earnings, and the effectiveness of the 2001 RPT measurement regulation in
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reducing price inflation in RPSs. Section 6.3 reports the results of the second hypothesis, 
which relates to the use of RPSs to beat regulatory thresholds and the regulatory impact 
on the extent of RPS management. Section 6.4 conducts further tests regarding the 
regulatory impact on the substitution effect between discretionary accruals and RPSs. 
Section 6.5 provides a summary.
6.2 Price Inflation in RPSs (HI, Hla, Hlb)
This section presents the results of HI. Section 6.2.1 discusses the results based on the 
change model (3a) and Section 6.2.2 discusses the results based on the level model (3b).
6.2.1 The Change Model
H1 hypothesises that firms use income-increasing RPSs to inflate the transaction price. 
If so, there will be a positive coefficient on income-increasing RPSs (PARPSt). Hla and 
Hlb examine the effect of the 2001 RPT measurement regulation on price inflation in 
RPSs. If the income-increasing RPSs refer only to volumes inflation in the period post 
the 2001 RPT measurement regulation, there should be no significant relation between 
PARPSt and AGM,. HI is tested for the full sample period and each regulatory regime. 
The sample is divided into three regulatory regimes: the pre-regulation period (PRE, 
2000-2002), the transition period (TRAN, 2003) and the post-regulation period (POST, 
2003-2005). Table 6.1 presents the regression analysis of HI based on the change 
model.
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Table 6.1: The Use of RPS to Inflate Transaction Price 
Dependent Variable is AGMt
VARIABLES
PREDICTED
SIGNS
Full
(2000-2005)
PRE
(2000-2001)
TRAN
(2002)
POST
(2003-2005)
PARPS, + 0.007 0.045** 0.042 -0.055
(0.709) (0.016) (0.179) (0.316)
GM ,., - -0.276*** -0.264*** -0.300*** -0.272***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
AG M ,., - -0.050 -0.064** -0.052 -0.065
(0.193) (0.029) (0.426) (0.436)
A COGS, - -0.038*** -0.032*** -0.036*** -0.046***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
M TB,., + 0.006 0.007 0.005 -0.001
(0.298) (0.145) (0.549) (0.963)
PPE,.] + -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.797) (0.816) (0.890) (0.783)
A PPE, + 0.014** 0.014* 0.009 0.014*
(0.015) (0.077) (0.439) (0.074)
IN TAN,., + -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.240) (0.404) (0.943) (0.252)
A IN TA N , + -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.695) (0.219) (0.268) (0.427)
EXP,., + 0.249*** 0.201*** 0.220*** 0.291**
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.003) (0.014)
LEV,., ? -0.026 0.008 0.038 -0.039
(0.138) (0.573) (0.104) (0.125)
SIZE,., ? -0.003 -0.009** -0.017* -0.001
(0.324) (0.048) (0.080) (0.750)
Constant 0.099* 0.242*** 0.452*** -0.012
(0.063) (0.001) (0.001) (0.896)
IN D Y Y Y Y
YEAR Y Y N Y
n 3,947 1,316 659 1,972
Adj. R2 0.143 0.209 0.263 0.122
This table presents the results of the use of RPS to inflate the transaction price, based on the change 
model. AGM, is the change in gross margin from year t-1 to year t, measured as GrossProfit/SALE, - 
G ross Prof it t-i/SALE,-i. PARPS, is the income-increasing RPS, calculated as RPS,/SALE, - RPS,.,/SALE, .1  
when (RPS,/SALE, - RPS,.,/SALE,1) is positive and 0 otherwise. Other control variables are defined in the 
Appendix Five. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Two-tailed p-values 
are based on robust t-statistics that have been adjusted to control for the clustering by firm. ***,**,* 
signify statistical significance of two-tailed tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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For the full sample analysis, I do not find a significant relationship between price 
manipulation proxy (AGM,) and income-increasing RPSs (P A R P S indicating that 
overall during the sample period income-increasing RPS are not significantly associated 
with the increase in gross margin. For the period prior to the effect the 2001 RPT 
measurement regulation (2000-2001), the coefficient on PARPSi {coeff = 0.041, p = 
0.016) is positive and significant at the 0.05 level. The results indicate that, in the period 
before the introduction of the new RPT regulation, income-increasing RPSs are largely 
associated with price inflation activities. For the transitory period and the post­
regulation period, there is no significant association between PARPSt and A GM,. The 
results suggest that after the introduction of the new regulation in 2001, income- 
increasing RPSs do not involve price inflation and refer purely to volumes inflation.
Consistent with the models of change in profitability in previous research (Fama 
&French 2000; Penman & Zhang 2002; MacVay 2006), AGM?is negatively correlated 
with GMt i  at the significance level of 0.01 in all periods. The coefficients on GM,- i  are 
negative, but only significant in the pre-regulation period. With regard to other control 
variables, there is a negative and significant coefficient on ACOGSt at 0.01 levels for all 
regulatory regimes. There is no significant association between MTB,i and AGM,, 
suggesting that the past market-to-book value is not associated with the current change 
in GM. There is also no significant correlation between PPE,-i and AGMt, but a positive 
correlation between APPE, and A GM,, with an exception for the sample in the transitory 
period. There is also no significant association between A GM,, and either A INTAN,- i  or 
INTAN,.i .  Finally, the coefficients on EXP,i are positive and significant for each 
regulatory regime. The results indicate that the previous period’s advertising, exhibition 
and other marketing expenditure have a positive effect on the current change in gross
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margins, which are consistent with the prior marketing literature (Peles 1971; Thomas 
1989).
Four supplementary analyses based on the change model (3a) are conducted to assess 
the robustness of the results reported in the main analysis. For brevity, Table 6.2 
summarises the coefficients and p-values of the main testable variables. The detailed 
tests are reported in Appendices Six to Nine. Overall, the results of the main testable 
variables in the following robustness checks presented in Table 6.2 are consistent with 
the main analysis presented in Table 6.1. Further, the coefficients and p-values of 
control variables in the following robustness checks are consistent with those reported 
in Table 6.1, indicating that the model used in the main analysis is well specified.
First, the previous main analysis focused on the relationship between income-increasing 
RPSs and transfer pricing techniques. The first supplementary tests examines whether 
the actual change in RPSs (ARPSt) can be used as an alternative to explain the transfer 
pricing behaviours.37 If so, there should be a positive linear relationship between the 
actual change in RPSs and the change in gross margin. However, as presented in the 
Panel (1) of Table 6.2, there is no significant relationship between the change in RPSs 
and the change in gross margin. This might be because the linear relationship cannot be 
established between the negative change in RPSs and the change in gross margin. To 
provide further evidence regarding this issue, the income-decreasing RPS (NARPSt) is 
included in the model (3a) that is reported in the Panel (2) of Table 6.2.
37 A RPS, is calculated as the proportion of RPSs to total sales revenues in current year less previous year.
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Table 6.2: The Use of RPS to Inflate Transaction Price; Robustness Checks-Using 
the Change Model; Dependent Variable = AGMt
V A R IA B LES
FU LL PRE
(2000-2005) (2 0 00-2001)
TR A N
a (2002)
PO ST
(2003-2005)
(1) U sing the actual change in RPS  (ARPS,)
ARPS, -0.010 0.019 0.008 -0.035
(0.373) (0.186) (0.797) (0.169)
(2) C ontrolling  for incom e-decreasing RPS {NARPS,)
PARPS, 0.010 0.050*** 0.046 -0.053
(0.567) (0.008) (0.148) (0.119)
N ARPS, -0.026 -0.033 -0.032 -0.022
(0.103) (0.151) (0.201) (0.405)
(3) Excluding AGM,.i
PARPS, 0.011 0.042** 0.040 -0.055
(0.504) (0.023) (0.200) (0.310)
(4) RO E > thresholds o f  new  equity offerings
PARPS, 0.052** 0.075*** 0.086** -0.016
(0.047) (<0.001) (0.019) (0.782)
This tabic presents the robustness checks of the use of RPS to inflate transaction price, based on the 
change model. Observations with sufficient data to calculate the dependent or independent variables are 
included. AGM, is the change in gross margin from year t-1 to year t, measured as GrossProfit/SALE, - 
GrossProfit,-i/SALE, i. PARPS, is the income-increasing RPS, calculated as RPS/SALE, - RPS,.//SALE,., 
when (RPS/SALE, - RPS,./SALE,. 1 ) is positive and 0 otherwise. NARPS, is the income-decreasing RPS, 
calculated as RPS/SALE, - RPS,./SALE,., when (RPS/SALE, - RPS,./SALE,./) is negative and 0 otherwise. 
ARPS, is the change in RPS/SALE from year t-1 to year t calculated as RPS/SALE, - R P S ,./SA L E ,.Other 
control variables are defined in the Appendix Five. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 
99% levels. Two-tailed p-values are based on robust t-statistics that have been adjusted to control for the 
clustering by firm. ******  signify statistical significance of two-tailed tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively.
a PRE is defined as the years 1999-2001 for the test (3) excluding AGM, i.
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The income-decreasing RPS can be included in the model because firms with negative 
change in RPSs may differ systematically from firms with no change in RPSs. The 
variable NARPSt denotes income-decreasing RPS that is the negative change in 
RPS/SALE from year t-1 to year t, and 0 otherwise. The income-decreasing RPSs can be 
attributed to a reduction in RPS price, volumes or a combination. If the income- 
decreasing RPS is associated with the decrease in RPS price, there should be a negative 
association between income-decreasing RPS and the change in gross margin. If the 
income-decreasing RPS is only associated with the decrease in RPS volumes, there 
should be no significant association between income-decreasing RPS and the change in 
gross margin.
According to the results reported in the Panel (2) of Table 6.2, there is an insignificant 
correlation between income-decreasing RPSs and the price manipulation for each 
regulatory regime, suggesting that the income-decreasing RPSs primarily refer to 
volumes deflation. The results are also consistent with previous discussion that the 
linear relationship cannot be established between the negative change in RPSs and the 
change in gross margin. When adding the income-decreasing RPSs in model (3a), the 
coefficient on PARPSt is more positive and significant {coeff = 0.050, p = 0.008) in the 
period prior to the effect of the RPT regulation, than that in the main analysis presented 
in Section 6.1 (coeff = 0.041, p = 0.016).
In the third robustness check, the lagged AGM (AGMt-i) is excluded from model (la). 
The advantage of excluding AGM, j is that the sample size will increase, because 
observations in 1999 are included. This method includes every firm-year with necessary 
data to maximise the sample size and its representativeness. Consistent with the main 
analysis, the results present a significant and positive coefficient on PARPSt (coeff =
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0.042, p = 0.023) in the pre-regulation period, and a negative but not significant 
coefficient (coejf= -0.057, p =  0.323) in the post-regulation period. The results are also 
consistent after the inclusion of observations in the year 1999.
Finally, this section also runs model (3a) in the sample where a firm’s reported ROE is 
greater than the regulatory benchmarks of new equity offerings, which is consistent with 
Chen and Yuan (2004). The results show the coefficient on PARPSt (coeff= 0.075, p < 
0.001) in the pre-regulation period is more positive and significant than that of the main 
analysis as presented in Section 7.1 (coejf= 0.041, p = 0.016). I also find a positive and 
significant coefficient in the transitory period (coeff = 0.086, p = 0.019). Again, 
consistent with previous findings in the main analysis, the coefficient on PARPSt is 
negative and not significant in the post-regulation period.
6.2.2 The Level Model
The results of HI, based on the level model (3b), are presented in Table 6.3. The sample 
is divided into three regulatory regimes: the pre-regulation period (PRE, 2000-2002), 
the transition period (TRAN, 2003) and the post-regulation period (POST, 2003-2005). 
HI is tested for the full sample and each regulatory regime. The dependent variable is 
the industry-mean adjusted GM (EGMt), calculated as the difference between 
GrossProfiti/SALE, for the firm and the industry-mean level of GrossProfit/SALEt, 
excluding the own observation. The ERPS is decomposed into PERPS and NEPRS. This 
section examines whether the level of EGM is positively correlated with the level of 
PERPS.
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Table 6.3: The Use of RPS to Inflate Transaction Price 
Dependent Variable = EGM,
VARIABLES
PREDICTED
SIGNS
FULL
(1999-2005)
PRE
(1999-2001)
TRAN
(2002)
POST
(2003-2005)
PERPS, + 0.012 0.031*** 0.031 -0.019
(0.247) (0.003) (0.148) (0.338)
EG M ,., + 0.694*** 0.703*** 0.686*** 0.701***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
A COGS, - -0.035*** -0.030*** -0.037*** -0.044***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
MTB,-i + 0.007 0.010** 0.004 -0.001
(0.134) (0.042) (0.660) (0.933)
PPE,-i + -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003
(0.473) (0.928) (0.600) (0.411)
IN TAN,., + -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.216) (0.457) (0.545) (0.138)
EXP,., + 0.290*** 0.274*** 0.228*** 0.308**
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.005) (0.029)
LEV,., ? -0.030* -0.002 0.036 -0.043
(0.074) (0.858) (0.151) (0.109)
SIZE,., ? 0.001 -0.004 -0.015 0.002
(0.966) (0.376) (0.124) (0.721)
Constant -0.006 0.063 0.357*** -0.041
(0.912) (0.352) (0.010) (0.675)
IN D Y Y Y Y
YEAR Y Y N Y
n 4,606 1975 659 1,972
Adj. R2 0.483 0.584 0.532 0.392
This table presents the results of the use of RPS to inflate the transaction price, based on the level model. 
EGM, is the difference between GrossProfit,/SALE, for the firm and the industry-mean level of 
GrossProfit/SALE, excluding the own observation for which I calculate the measure. ERPS is the 
difference between RPS/SALE, for firm and the industry-mean level of RPS/SALE, excluding the own 
observation for which I calculate the measure. PERPS is the positive ERPS when ERPS is positive and 0 
otherwise. Other control variables are defined in the Appendix Five. All continuous variables are 
winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Two-tailed p-values are based on robust t-statistics that have been 
adjusted to control for the clustering by firm. ***,**,* signify statistical significance of two-tailed tests at 
1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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For the full sample analysis in column (1), the results do not provide a significant 
relationship between price inflation proxy (EGM,) and positive ERPS (PERPS,) that is 
consistent with the change model. However, for the period prior to the effect the 2001 
RPT measurement regulation, the coefficient on PERPSt (coeff = 0.031, p = 0.003) is 
positive and significant at the 0.01 level. For the post-regulation period, the association 
between PERPSt and EGM, is negative and not significant. Consistent with the analysis 
in the change model, the level model provides further evidence that in the period before 
the introduction of the new RPT regulation, RPSs are associated with price inflation. 
However, after the effect of the 2001 RPT measurement regulation, the price inflation in 
RPSs becomes not significant.
With regard to other control variables, EGM, is persistent. Note that the coefficients on 
EGM,- i  range from 0.686 to 0.703. As predicted, the coefficients on A COGS, are 
negative and significant at 0.01 levels for the full sample and each regulatory regime. 
The association between MTB,-i and EGM, is not significant, indicating that the past 
market-to-book value is not associated with the current level of GM. There is no 
significant relationship between relationship between PPE,-i and EGM, and between 
INTAN,- i  and EGM,. For the full sample, the variable LEV,-i is negatively associated 
with EGM,. The coefficients on EXP, i are positive and significant for each regulatory 
regime, indicating that the past advertising expenditure had a positive effect on the 
current level of gross margin.
Three supplementary analyses, based on the change model (3b), are conducted to assess 
the robustness of the results reported in the main analysis. Table 6.4 summarises the 
coefficients and p-values of the main testable variables. The results of the coefficients 
on the main testable variables in the pre-regulation period are robust when using the
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actual change in RPS (coeff= 0.022, p = 0.011), controlling for negative ERPS (coeff = 
0.041, p = 0.001), and using the sample with firms that beat the regulatory benchmarks 
of new equity offerings {coeff -  0.067, p <0.001). Consistent with the main analysis 
presented in Table 6.3, the coefficients on ERPS in post-regulation period are not 
significant. In sum, the pattern of statistical and economic significance for the 
coefficients of the test and control variables in the robustness checks is consistent with 
patterns in the previous analysis using the level model. The detailed tests are reported in 
Appendices Ten to Twelve.
Table 6.4: The Use of RPS to Inflate Transaction Prices; Robustness Checks Using 
the Level Model; Dependent Variable = ABGMt
VARIABLES
FULL
(1999-2005)
PRE
(1999-2001)
TRAN
(2002)
POST
(2003-2005)
(1) Using industry-mean adjusted R P S  {ERPS,)
ERPS, 0.007 0.022** 0.018 -0.018
(0.398) (0.011) (0.430) (0.276)
(2) Controlling for negative ERPS {NERPS,)
PERPS, 0.021* 0.041*** 0.058** -0.008
(0.097) (0.001) (0.031) (0.746)
N ERPS, -0.045 -0.051 -0.137* -0.058
(0.163) (0.168) (0.087) (0.245)
(3) ROE > thresholds of new equity offerings
PERPS, 0.050*** 0.067*** 0.073*** 0.016
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.009) (0.646)
This table presents the robustness checks of the use of RPS to inflate transaction price, based on the level 
model. All observations with sufficient data to calculate the dependent or independent variables are 
included. EGMt is the difference between GrossProfitt/SALEt for firm i and the industry-mean level of 
GrossProfitt/SALEt excluding the own observation for which I calculate the measure. ERPS is the 
difference between RPSt/SALEt for firm i and the industry-mean level of RPSt/SALEt excluding the own 
observation for which I calculate the measure. PERPS is the positive ERPS when ERPS is positive and 0 
otherwise. NERPS is the negative ERPS when ERPS is negative and 0 otherwise. Other control variables 
are defined in the Appendix Five. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. 
Two-tailed p-values are based on robust t-statistics that have been adjusted to control for the clustering by 
firm. ***,**,^Signify statistical significance of two-tailed tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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To summarise the previous discussion, both the change and level tests support Hla and 
Hlb. The results suggest that transfer pricing techniques via RPSs were widely used to 
inflate earnings before the introduction of the new RPT regulation. After the effect of 
the 2001 RPT measurement regulation, price inflation largely disappeared, suggesting 
that these income-increasing RPSs referred mainly to volumes inflation. The results 
indicate that the 2001 RPT measurement regulation has been somewhat effective in 
reducing price inflation in RPSs.
6.2.3 Alternative measure
In this section, I re-test HI by using related party purchases (RPPs) as an alternative 
mechanism for propping. The parent firm might grant more purchase discounts to listed 
firms, to reduce their cost of goods sold. Because the 2001 RPT measurement regulation 
only restricts income-increasing RPSs, I am further motivated to examine whether firms 
alternatively understate the purchase price of RPPs to inflate earnings in the period post 
to the effect of the 2001 RPT measurement regulation.
Similar to RPSs, the change in RPPs (ARPPi) is decomposed into a positive change in 
RPPs (PARPPt), used as the proxy for income-decreasing RPPs, and a negative change 
in RPPs (NARPPt), used as the proxy for income-increasing RPPs. I focus on the 
relation between the change in GM and the negative change in RPPs. If listed firms 
deflate the purchase price via income-increasing RPPs, there should be a negative 
association between the change in gross margin and income-increasing RPS. In the 
further analysis, the level of industry-mean adjusted RPP (ERPP,) is also decomposed 
into positive ERPP (PERPPt) and negative ERPP (NERPPt). I conduct a level test by 
examining the association between EGMt and NERPPt. I replace PARPSt and PERPS,
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with NARPP, and NERPP, respectively in models (3a) and (3b). I also replace ACOGSt 
with A SALE,. The models used to test price inflation in RPPs are stated in Equations 
(10a) and (10b):
ACM = f  ( NARPPt> ASALEt, MTBt_lf PPEt_v APPEt>\
1 1 V INTANt_lf AINTANt, EXPt_lt LEVt-.lt SIZEt_lt IND, YEAR ) U ;
EGMt =
Where:
A GM, 
EGM, 
NARPPt
NERPPt
GM,.! 
AGMt-i 
A SALE,
MTBt-i
PPEtI
APPEt
INTANt-i
A INTAN,
EXPti
LEV,-i
SIZEt-i
IND
YEAR
( NERPPt'EGM^ASALEt'MTBt.^PPE^ \ 
'  \INTANt_1, EXPt_i, L E V ^, SlZEt_r> IND, YEAR) (10O
= the change in gross margin from year t-1 to year t, measured as 
GrossProßtt/SALEt - GrossProßtt-i/SALEt.i.
= the difference between GrossProfitt/SALE, for firm i and the industry- 
mean level of GrossProfit/SALE, calculated omitting firm i.
= the negative change in RPP from year t-1 to year t, calculated as 
RPPt/SALEt - RPPt-i/SALEt-i, when (RPP/SALE, - RPP,.,/SALE,.!) is 
negative and 0 otherwise.
= the negative difference between RPPt/SALEt for firm i and the
industry-mean level of RPP,/SALEt excluding the own observation for 
which I calculate the measure and 0 otherwise.
= gross margin measured as GrossProfit,/SALE, in year t-1.
= the change in gross margin from year t-2 to year t-1 .
= the change in cost of goods sold from year t-1 to year t, calculated as 
(SALE, -  SALE,.D/SALE,.!.
= the lagged market-to-book ratio.
= the log form of PPE in year t-1.
= the change in the log form of PPE from year t-1 to year t.
= the log form of intangible assets (INTAN) in year t-1.
= the change in the log form of intangible assets from year t-1 to year t. 
= the lagged selling expenses (EXP), calculated as EXP,.i/SALE,.i.
= the long-term debt deflated by total assets in year t-1.
= the log form of market value in year t-1.
= indicator variables for industry sector membership.
= indicator variables for each year.
The results of the purchase price deflation in RPPs based on the change model are 
presented in Table 6.5. I do not find a strong negative association between A GM, and 
NARPP, in any regulatory regime. However, turning to the level associations presented 
in Table 6.6, there is a significant and negative relation between A GM, and NERPS, in 
all regulatory regimes, indicating that firms might deflate the purchase price of RPPs to
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inflate earnings. More importantly, the extent of the coefficient on NERPSt in the post­
regulation period (coeff = -0.240, p = 0.010) is greater than that in the pre-regulation 
period (coeff = -0.130, p = 0.001). The results indicate that firms might increase the use 
of income-increasing RPPs to deflate the purchase price. In summary, the change and 
level models provide conflicting results regarding the use of income-increasing RPPs to 
prop up earnings. Because the change model is supposed to be more persuasive than the 
cross-sectional model, the results should be interpreted as lack of robustness.
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Table 6.5: The Use of RPP to Deflate the Purchase Price 
Dependent Variable = AGM,
VARIABLES
PREDICTED
SIGNS
FULL
(2000-2005)
PRE
(2000-2001)
TRAN
(2002)
POST
(2003-2005)
P A R P P , 0.002 0.004 0.016 -0.011
(0.930) (0.845) (0.620) (0.686)
G M ,., - -0.293*** -0.282*** -0.339*** -0.291***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
A G M ,-i - -0.054 -0.074** -0.047 -0.060
(0.152) (0.020) (0.555) (0.463)
A S A L E , + 0.001 0.004 -0.001 -0.004
(0.925) (0.579) (0.923) (0.771)
M T B ,., + 0.003 0.006 0.004 -0.001
(0.510) (0.246) (0.683) (0.942)
P P E ,., + 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.001
(0.987) (0.578) (0.809) (0.820)
A  P P E , + 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.008
(0.242) (0.396) (0.810) (0.354)
IN T A N , + -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.233) (0.317) (0.886) (0.330)
A I  N T  A N , + -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.703) (0.248) (0.373) (0.494)
E X P ,., + 0.249*** 0.204*** 0.257*** 0.285**
(<0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.014)
L E V ,., ? -0.023 0.009 0.027 -0.035
(0.195) (0.525) (0.252) (0.180)
SIZ E ,., ? -0.004 -0.009* -0.019* -0.001
(0.317) (0.051) (0.056) (0.813)
Constant 0.089* 0.225*** 0.459*** -0.028
(0.099) (0.003) (0.001) (0.753)
IN D Y Y Y Y
Y E A R Y Y N Y
n 3,947 1,316 659 1,972
Adj. R 2 0.118 0.178 0.229 0.094
This table presents the results of the use of RPP to deflate the purchase price, based on the change model. 
Observations with sufficient data to calculate the dependent or independent variables are included. AGM, 
is the change in gross margin from year t-1 to year t, measured as GrossProfit/SALE, - GrossProfitt. 
l/SALEr i. NARPS, is the income-increasing RPP, calculated as RPP,/SALE, - RPP,.,/SALE,., when 
(RPP,/SALE, - RPP,-i/SALE, i) is negative and 0 otherwise. Other control variables are defined in the 
Appendix Five. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Two-tailed p-values 
are based on robust t-statistics that have been adjusted to control for the clustering by firm. * * ****  
signify statistical significance of two-tailed tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Table 6.6: The Use of RPP to Deflate the Purchase Price 
Dependent Variable = EGMt
V A R IA B L E S
P R E D IC T E D
S IG N S
F U L L
(1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 5 )
P R E
(1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 1 )
T R A N
(2 0 0 2 )
P O S T
(2 0 0 3 -2 0 0 5 )
PERPP, -0 .1 7 2 * * * -0 .1 3 0 * * * -0 .249** -0 .2 4 0 * * *
(< 0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 5 ) (0 .001 )
EGM ,., - 0 .7 0 8 * * * 0 .6 7 0 * * * 0 .6 4 5 * * * 0 .7 8 1 * * *
(< 0 .001 ) (< 0 .0 0 1 ) (< 0 .0 0 1 ) (< 0 .0 0 1 )
ASALE, + 0 .0 0 2 0 .007 -0.001 -0 .006
(0 .716 ) (0 .2 6 1 ) (0 .9 7 5 ) (0 .598 )
M TB,., + -0 .002 0 .003 -0.001 -0 .009
(0 .781 ) (0 .5 5 5 ) (0 .9 0 1 ) (0 .570 )
PPEt-i + -0.001 -0.001 -0 .008 -0 .002
(0 .678) (0 .8 9 3 ) (0 .3 6 1 ) (0 .606 )
IN TAN,., + -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0 .124 ) (0 .185 ) (0 .5 6 0 ) (0 .287 )
EXP,., + 0 .2 4 3 * * * 0 .2 9 3 * * * 0 .2 4 7 * * 0 .1 7 0 * *
(< 0 .0 0 1 ) (< 0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .0 1 8 ) (0 .014 )
LEV,., ? -0 .028 -0.011 0 .0 1 4 -0 .033
(0 .185 ) (0 .462 ) (0 .597 ) (0 .307 )
SIZE,., 7 0.001 -0 .002 -0 .008 0.001
(0 .985 ) (0 .7 0 6 ) (0 .5 0 1 ) (0 .964 )
C o n s ta n t -0 .015 0 .0 2 0 0 .2 7 2 * -0 .022
(0 .774 ) (0 .7 7 5 ) (0 .078 ) (0 .777)
IN D Y Y Y Y
YEAR Y Y N Y
n 4 ,6 0 6 1,975 659 1,972
A dj. R 2 0 .4 8 0 0 .5 5 9 0 .5 3 6 0 .427
This table presents the results of the use of RPP to deflate the purchase price, based on the level model. 
All observations with sufficient data to calculate the dependent or independent variables are included. 
EGM, is the difference between GrossProfitt/SALEt for the firm and the industry-mean level of 
GrossProfit/SALE, excluding the own observation for which I calculate the measure. ERPP is the 
difference between RPP/SALE, for firm i and the industry-mean level of RPP/SALE, excluding the own 
observation for which I calculate the measure. NERPP, is the negative ERPP when ERPP is negative and 
0 otherwise. Other control variables are defined in the Appendix Five. All continuous variables are 
winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Two-tailed p-values are based on robust t-statistics that have been 
adjusted to control for the clustering by firm. ******  signify statistical significance of two-tailed tests at 
1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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6.3 Using RPS to Beat Regulatory Thresholds (H2a, H2b)
H2a relates to whether RPSs are widely used by firms to beat the regulatory thresholds 
of new equity offering, and avoid delisting. H2a predicts that the extent of RPS 
manipulation is higher for firms with a propensity to use RPSs to meet or beat the 
regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings and delisting than other firms. I run the 
regression of earnings management proxies (ARPS, and ERPS,) on incentive variables 
(SUSPECT, and ST,) and several control variables. If firms manipulate RPSs to beat the 
regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings and delisting, the coefficients on A RPS, 
and ERPS, are expected to be positive. To investigate the effectiveness of 2001 RPT 
regulations in reducing earnings management via RPSs, the sample is divided into three 
regulatory regimes: the pre-regulation period, the transition period and the post­
regulation period. H2a are tested for each of these regulatory regimes.
6.3.1 The Change Model
The multivariate analysis of H2a, using the change model, is summarised in Table 6.7. 
The coefficients on SUSPECT, are positive and significant for each regulatory period at 
0.01 significance levels, suggesting that the extent of earnings management via RPSs is 
significantly greater for firms with incentives to beat the regulatory thresholds of new 
equity issuance than other firms. The results are also significant in the post-regulation 
period (2003-2005), suggesting that the 2001 RPT regulation might not be fully 
successful in eliminating the use of RPS to beat ROE thresholds of new equity offerings. 
However, the coefficients on SUSPECT, decline gradually across regulatory regimes, 
suggesting that the 2001 RPT measurement regulation has been somewhat effective in 
reducing earnings management via RPSs.
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The coefficients on ST, are also statistically significant at 0.01 levels for each regulatory 
period, providing evidence that RPSs are used to avoid delisting even in the period post 
the 2001 RPT measurement regulation. The coefficient on STt in the transitory period 
(coeff = 0.327) is higher than that in the pre-regulation period (coeff = 0.249), 
suggesting that in the period just after the passage of the new RPT regulation, the extent 
of manipulated RPSs increased for ST firms. However, ST firms used less RPSs in the 
post-regulation period (coeff = 0.228) when compared to those firms in the pre­
regulation period (coeff = 0.249).
With respect to other explanatory variables, the results provide evidence that ARPSt i is 
negatively correlated with RPSt-i and ARPSt-i at the significance level of 0.01 for each 
regulation period. The change in RPSs (APRSi) is negatively correlated with the change 
in size (ASIZE,) at a 0.1 significance level, when using the full sample (coeff = -0.017, p 
= 0.088), and using the sample in the post-regulation period (coeff = -0.023, p = 0.071). 
The change in RPSs (APRSt) is positively associated with the lagged market-to-book 
ratio (AMTBt i) at the 0.1 level, when using the sample in the post-regulation period 
(coeff = -0.015, p = 0.052).
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Table 6.7: Earnings Management Incentive; Dependent Variable = ARPSt
VARIABLES
PREDICTED
SIGNS
FULL
(2000-2005)
PRE
(2000-2001)
TRAN
(2002)
POST
(2003-2005)
SUSPECT, + 0.234*** 0.276*** 0.235*** 0.186***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) «0.001)
ST, + 0.258*** 0.249*** 0.327*** 0.228***
(<0.001) (<0.001) «0.001) «0.001)
RPS,-i - -0.294*** -0.312*** -0.319*** -0.263***
(<0.001) (<0.001) «0.001) «0.001)
ARPS,., - -0.110*** -0.113*** -0.040 -0.142***
(<0.001) (0.006) (0.417) «0.001)
AS1ZE, ? -0.017* -0.010 -0.019 -0.023*
(0.088) (0.596) (0.658) (0.071)
ALEV, ? -0.028 -0.023 -0.065 -0.026
(0.156) (0.386) (0.162) (0.339)
MTB ? -0.006 -0.009 0.009 -0.015*
(0.162) (0.138) (0.349) (0.052)
Constant -0.005 0.019 -0.033 -0.021
(0.630) (0.448) (0.221) (0.367)
IND Y Y Y Y
YEAR Y Y N Y
n 3,950 1,318 660 1,972
Adj. R2 0.373 0.398 0.436 0.329
This table reports regression results of whether firms inflate RPSs when there are earnings 
management incentives, based on the change model. ARPS, is the change in RPS/SALE from 
year t-1 to year t, calculated as RPS/SALE, - RPS,.i/SALE,.i. RPS,-i is defined as RPS,.i/SALE,.i. 
SUSPECT, takes 1 if ROE, is more than the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings but 
PROE, is less than the regulatory threshold and 0 otherwise. ST, takes 1 if if ROE, is positive 
and less than the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings but PROE, is negative and 0 
otherwise. Other control variables are defined Appendix One. All continuous variables are 
winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Two-tailed p-values are based on robust t-statistics that 
have been adjusted to control for the clustering by firm. ***,**,*Signify statistical significance 
of two-tailed tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Several supplementary tests are conducted, based on the model (5a), to examine the 
robustness of the previous main analysis. For brevity, Table 6.8 summarises the 
coefficients and p-values of the main testable and control variables. All the main results 
on earnings management incentive variables (SUSPECT, and ST,) remain qualitatively 
the same. The detailed results are reported in Appendices Thirteen to Sixteen.
Table 6.8: Earnings Management Incentive; Robustness Checks-Using the Change
Model; Dependent Variable = ARPSt
VARIABLES
FULL
(2000-2005)
PRE
(2000-200 l)a
TRAN
(2002)
POST
(2003-2005)
(1) ARPS>0
SUSPECT, 0.154*** 0.177*** 0.137*** 0.129***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
ST, 0.188*** 0.154*** 0.251*** 0.169***
(<0.001) (0.007) (<0.001) (<0.001)
(2) ROE > thresholds of new equity offerings
SUSPECT, 0.238*** 0.284*** 0.229*** 0.187***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) «0.001)
(3) Controlling for ROE
SUSPECT, 0.234*** 0.276*** 0.233*** 0.188***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) «0 .001)
ST, 0.259*** 0.249*** 0.327*** 0.228***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
(4) Excluding ARPS,.i
SUSPECT, 0.248*** 0.281*** 0.235*** 0.193***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) «0.001)
This table reports robustness checks of whether firms inflate RPSs when there are earnings management 
incentives, based on the change model. ARPS, is the change in RPS/SALE from year t-1 to year t, 
calculated as RPS/SALE, - RPS,i/SALE,i. RPS, i is defined as RPS,i/SALE,.i. SUSPECT, takes 1 if ROE, 
is more than the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings but PROE, is less than the regulatory 
thresholds and 0 otherwise. ST, takes 1 if if ROE, is positive but less than the regulatory thresholds of new 
equity offerings and PROE, is negative and 0 otherwise. Other control variables are defined Appendix 
Five. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Two-tailed p-values are based on 
robust t-statistics that have been adjusted to control for the clustering by firm. ***,**,* signify statistical 
significance of two-tailed tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
a PRE refers to years 1999-2001 for the test excluding ARPS, i
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First, because H2a deals with firms attempting to increase their reported earnings to beat 
regulatory benchmarks, I focus particularly on the sample of observations that report 
positive change in RPSs only (ARPS > 0). Not surprisingly, there is a decline in the 
magnitude of the coefficients on SUSPECTt and ST, in comparison with the previous 
analysis presented in Table 6.7, but the statistical significance presented in Panel (1) of 
Table 6.8 remains the same.
Second, the main analysis presented in Table 6.7 compares the extent of earnings 
management activity for firms that do not satisfy the regulatory thresholds of new 
equity offerings without RPS manipulation to other firms in the sample. In this section, 
I examine whether the level of RPS manipulation is abnormally high for firms that do 
not satisfy the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings without RPS manipulation 
than firms satisfying the regulatory thresholds. Consistent with the previous main 
analysis presented in Table 6.7, the coefficients on SUSPECT, are statistically 
significant.
Third, as the measures of SUSPECT, and ST, are based on ROE benchmarks, ROE is 
included in model (2a) to investigate whether the presence of ROE has squeezed out the 
effect of earnings management incentives. The results show the coefficients on 
SUSPECT, and ST, after controlling for ROE in the model.
Final, the lagged A RPS (ARPS,-i) is excluded from model (2a) to include the 
observations from 1999 and make full use of the sample. Consistent with previous 
findings, the coefficients on SUSPECT, and ST, are positive and significant at 0.01 
levels.
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6.3.2 The Level Model
The regression results based on industry cross-sectional models are reported in Table 
6.9. The dependent variable is ERPS,. The results provide evidence that SUSPECT and 
ST firms report significantly higher levels of industry-mean adjusted RPSs than other 
firms for each regulation period. This suggests that listed firms prop up earnings via 
RPSs to beat the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings and delisting.
Further, the coefficient on SUSPECT, in the post-regulation period (coeff = 0.246, p < 
0.001) is less than that in the pre-regulation period (coeff = 0.373, p < 0.001). This 
indicates that SUSPECT firms used less RPSs to beat the regulatory thresholds in the 
post-regulation period than firms in the pre-regulation period. A similar pattern is also 
found for ST firms. Specifically, the coefficient on ST, in the post-regulation period 
(coeff = 0.253, p < 0.001) is less than that in the pre-regulation period (coeff = 0.361, p 
< 0 .001).
The coefficients on ERPS,-i are positive and significant for all regulatory regimes. The 
results show that ERPSs are very persistent. Note that the coefficient on ERPS, i ranges 
from 0.335 to 0.506. The coefficient on ERPS,-i in the post-regulatory regime (coeff = 
0.506, p < 0.001) is higher than that in the pre-regulatory regime (coeff = 0.392, p < 
0.001), suggesting that the persistence of RPSs increases across these two regulatory 
regimes. With regard to other control variables, the coefficient on LEV, in the transitory 
period (coeff = -0.055, p = 0.012) is negative and significant. The results also suggest 
negative and significant coefficients on MTB,-i in the full sample period (coeff = -0.007, 
p = 0.051), the pre-regulation period (coeff = -0.011, p = 0.013) and the post-regulation 
period (coeff = -0.0157, p = 0.042).
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Table 6.9: Earnings Management Incentive; Dependent Variable = ERPSt
VARIABLES PREDICTED
SIGNS
FULL
(1999-2005)
PRE
(1999-2001)
TRAN
(2002)
POST
(2003-2005)
SUSPECT, + 0.322*** 0.373*** 0.352*** 0.246***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
ST, + 0.318*** 0.361*** 0.405*** 0.253***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
ERPS,., + 0.431*** 0.392*** 0.335*** 0.506***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
SIZE, ? -0.001 0.006 0.002 -0.005
(0.592) (0.243) (0.743) (0.101)
LEV, ? -0.011 -0.019 -0.055** -0.006
(0.130) (0.232) (0.012) (0.478)
MTB,.i ? -0.007* -0.011** 0.011 -0.015**
(0.051) (0.013) (0.197) (0.042)
Constant -0.009 -0.159 -0.063 0.099
(0.882) (0.132) (0.670) (0.210)
IND Y Y Y Y
YEAR Y Y N Y
n 4,607 1,975 660 1,972
Adj. R2 0.682 0.708 0.723 0.648
This table reports the results of whether firms inflate RPSs when there are earnings management 
incentives, using the level model. All observations with sufficient data to calculate the dependent or 
independent variables are included. ERPS, is the difference between RPS/SALE, for firm i and the 
industry-mean level of RPS/SALE, excluding the own observation for which I calculate the measure. 
SUSPECT, takes 1 if ROE, is more than the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings but PROE, is 
less than the regulatory thresholds and 0 otherwise. ST, takes 1 if if ROE, is positive but less than the 
regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings and PROE, is negative and 0 otherwise. Other control 
variables are defined Appendix One. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. 
Two-tailed p-values are based on robust t-statistics that have been adjusted to control for the clustering by 
firm. ***,**,*Signify statistical significance of two-tailed tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
Consistent with the change model, several robustness checks are reported in this section, 
using the level model. Table 6.10 summarises the coefficients and p-values of the main 
testable variables. The detailed tests are reported in Appendices Seventeen to Nineteen. 
The results of the earnings management incentive variables (SUSPECT, and ST,), and 
the main control variable (ERPS,) in previous main analysis—based on the level 
model— are robust in all regulatory regimes, when focusing on the sample where ERPS > 
0, using firms that have beaten the regulatory thresholds, and incorporating ROE into 
the model.
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Table 6.10: Earnings Management Incentive; Robustness Checks-Using the Level
Model; Dependent Variable = ERPSt
VARIABLES
FULL
(1999-2005)
PRE
(1999-2001)
TRAN
(2002)
POST
(2003-2005)
( \ )ERPS>0
SUSPECT, 0.168*** 0.217*** 0.190*** 0.101***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
ST, 0.172*** 0.202*** 0.255*** 0.102***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
(2) ROE > thresholds of new equity offerings
SUSPECT, 0.349*** 0.404*** 0.339*** 0.271***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
(3) Controlling for ROE
SUSPECT, 0.321*** 0.373*** 0.355*** 0.244***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
ST, 0.318*** 0.361*** 0.405*** 0.249***
(<0.001) (<0.00 i) (<0.001) (<0.001)
This table reports robustness checks of whether firms inflate RPSs when there are earnings management 
incentives, based on the change model. All observations with sufficient data to calculate the dependent or 
independent variables are included. ERPSr is the difference between RPS/SALE, for the firm and the 
industry-mean level of RPS/SALE, excluding the own observation for which I calculate the measure. 
SUSPECT, takes 1 if ROE, is more than the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings but PROE, is 
less than the regulatory thresholds and 0 otherwise. ST, takes 1 if if ROE, is positive but less than the 
regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings and PROE, is negative and 0 otherwise. Other control 
variables are defined Appendix Five. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. 
Two-tailed p-values are based on robust t-statistics that have been adjusted to control for the clustering by 
firm. ***,**,* signify statistical significance of two-tailed tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
In sum, both the change and level specifications show that the coefficients on 
SUSPECTt and STt are significantly positive, providing support for H2a. The results 
suggest that RPSs are widely used to beat regulatory thresholds, even in the period after 
the 2001 RPT regulations took effect. However, the coefficients on SUSPECTt and ST, 
in the post-regulatory regime are less than those in the pre-regulatory regime.
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6.3.3 The Effect of the 2001 Related Party Transactions Measurement Regulation
To test the effectiveness of the 2001 RPT regulations in reducing earnings inflation via 
RPSs to beat regulatory thresholds, the regulatory dummy variables are added to 
Equations (5a and 5b) and interacted with earnings management incentive variables. 
The magnitude of ARPS and ERPS is expected to be lower for SUSPECT and ST firms 
than in the post-regulation period, when compared to these firms in the pre-regulation 
period. Table 6.11 reports the results, based on the change model (6a), and Table 6.12 
reports the results based on the level model (6b). The first column reports the results 
based on the full sample, the second column reports the results based on the sample 
where firms report positive ARPS or ERPS, and the last column reports the results based 
on the sample where firms have beaten the regulatory thresholds.38
Consistent with the findings in Section 6.3.1 and 6.3.2, both the change and level model 
provide evidence that coefficients on SUSPECT, and ST, are positive and statistically 
significant at 0.01 levels. The results suggest that without considering regulatory regime 
factors, the magnitudes of ARPS and ERPS are greater for SUSPECT and ST firms than 
other firms. This provides further evidence for H2a, that firms use RPSs to beat the 
ROE thresholds of new equity offerings and delisting.
38 In the robustness checks, I also include the ROE into Models (3a) and (3b). All the main results remain 
qualitatively the same. The detailed results for this test are presented in the Appendices 19-20.
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Table 6.11: The Effect of Regulation (2000-2005); Dependent Variable = ARPSt
VARIABLES
PREDICTED
SIGNS
FULL A R P S > 0
ROE > 
thresholds
S U S P E C T , + 0.279*** 0.187*** 0.290***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
S U S P E C T , x 
T R A N ,
- -0.042 -0.028 -0.056
(0.303) (0.464) (0.168)
S U S P E C T , x 
P O ST ,
- -0.092*** -0.063** -0.100***
(0.004) (0.039) (0.001)
ST, + 0.249*** 0.155***
(<0.001) (0.004)
ST , x T R A N , - 0.073 0.091
(0.334) (0.239)
ST , x P O ST , - -0.020 0.015
(0.737) (0.805)
T R A N , ? -0.004 -0.030** 0.017
(0.659) (0.028) (0.130)
P O ST , ? 0.010 -0.020 0.032***
(0.290) (0.156) (0.005)
R P S,.i - -0.293*** 0.056** -0.290***
(<0.001) (0.036) (<0.001)
A R P S ,., - -0.110*** -0.179*** -0.138***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
A S IZ E , ? -0.015 -0.026 0.003
(0.110) (0.238) (0.782)
A L E V , ? -0.028 0.038 -0.017
(0.159) (0.444) (0.478)
M T B ,., ? -0.006 0.016* -0.002
(0.139) (0.054) (0.754)
Constant -0.009 0.013 -0.044***
(0.405) (0.575) (0.005)
IN D Y Y Y
Y E A R Y Y Y
n 3,950 1,442 2,005
Adj. R2 0.377 0.302 0.421
This table reports regression results of the impact of regulation on the extent of earnings management, 
based on the change model. ARPS, is the change in RPS/SALE from year t-1 to year t, calculated as 
RPS/SALE, - RPS, i/SALE,-i. RPS,-i is defined as RPS,.i/SALE,.i. SUSPECT, takes 1 if ROE, is more than 
the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings but PROE, is less than the regulatory thresholds and 0 
otherwise. ST, takes 1 if if ROE, is positive and less than the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings 
but PROE, is negative and 0 otherwise. Other control variables are defined Appendix Five. All continuous 
variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Two-tailed p-values are based on robust t-statistics 
that have been adjusted to control for the clustering by firm. ****** signify statistical significance of 
two-tailed tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Table 6.12: The Effect of Regulation (1999-2005); Dependent Variable = ERPSt
PREDICTED ROE >
VARIABLES SIGNS FULL ERPS > 0 thresholds
SUSPECT, + 0.360*** 0.209*** 0.389***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
SUSPECT, x 
TRAN,
“
-0.037 -0.026 -0.045
(0.184) (0.406) (0.107)
SUSPECT, x 
POST,
-
-0.093*** -0.094*** -0.098***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
ST, + 0.349*** 0.203***
(<0.001) (<0.001)
ST, x TRAN, - 0.015 0.027
(0.772) (0.597)
ST, x POST, - -0.069** -0.079**
(0.044) (0.025)
TRAN, ? 0.015*** -0.022 0.008
(0.010) (0.286) (0.215)
POST, ? 0.031*** 0.008 0.021**
(<0.001) (0.715) (0.015)
ERPS,.] + 0.428*** 0.407*** 0.371***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
SIZE, ? -0.001 -0.008 0.008**
(0.792) (0.395) (0.048)
LEV, ? -0.012* -0.003 0.005
(0.099) (0.927) (0.527)
MTB,.] ? -0.006* -0.006 -0.002
(0.066) (0.612) (0.608)
Constant -0.030 0.203 -0.236***
(0.626) (0.330) (0.005)
IND Y Y Y
YEAR Y Y Y
n 4,607 1,173 2,492
Adj. R2 0.686 0.561 0.732
This table reports regression results of the impact of regulation on the extent of earnings management, 
based on the level model. ERPS, is the difference between RPS/SALE, for the firm and the industry-mean 
level of RPS/SALE, excluding the own observation for which I calculate the measure. SUSPECT, takes 1 
if ROE, is more than the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings but PROE, is less than the 
regulatory thresholds and 0 otherwise. ST, takes 1 if if ROE, is positive but less than the regulatory 
thresholds of new equity offerings and PROE, is negative and 0 otherwise. Other control variables are 
defined Appendix Five. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Two-tailed p- 
values are based on robust t-statistics that have been adjusted to control for the clustering by firm. 
***,**,* signify statistical significance of two-tailed tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Both the change and level models show that coefficients on the interaction terms of 
SUSPECTt and POSTr are significantly negative, indicating SUSPECT firms used 
significantly less RPSs in the post-regulation period than firms in the pre-regulation 
period. Based on the level model, the coefficient on the interaction term with STt and 
POST, is significant and negative, suggesting there is a greater reduction in the extent of 
ERPS for ST firms in the post-regulation period than firms in the pre-regulation period. 
However, when focusing on the change model, the coefficient on the interaction term 
with ST, and POST, is not significant.
Consistent with previous findings, the change model shows that the ARPS, is negatively 
correlated with ARPS, i and ERPS,-i. The level model indicates that the ERPS is very 
persistent. With respect to other control variables using the change model, there is a 
positive and significant coefficient on MTB,-i {coejf = 0.016, p = 0.054) at 0.1 levels, 
when focusing on the sample of firms reporting positive ARPS. With respect to other 
control variables using the change model, there is a positive and significant coefficient 
on SIZE, at 0.05 levels {coejf = 0.008, p = 0.048), when focusing on the sample of firms 
that have beaten the regulatory thresholds. There is also a negative and significant 
coefficient on LEV, {coejf = -0.012, p = 0.099), and a negative and significant 
coefficient on MTB,-i {coejf = -0.006, p = 0.066) at 0.1 levels, when using the full 
sample.
In summary, both the change and level models provide evidence that firms used less 
RPS manipulation to beat the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings in the period 
post the effect of the 2001 RPT measurement regulation than before. This provides 
support for H2b. The level model also provides evidence that firms used less RPS 
manipulation to avoid delisting in the post-regulation period. The results are robust after
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Controlling for ROE, which is presented in Appendices Twenty to Twenty-One. Overall, 
the results indicate that the 2001 RPT measurement regulation has been somewhat 
effective in reducing earnings inflation via RPSs to beat the regulatory thresholds of 
new equity offerings and delisting.
6.3.4 Controlling for Corporate Governance Proxies
Prior literature suggests that good corporate governance mechanisms help mitigate 
earnings management via RPSs (Lo et al. 2010; Yeh et al. 2012; Hwang et al. 2013). To 
explore the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the level of RPSs, the 
corporate governance variables are added to the models 6a and 6b. The model to test the 
effect of corporate governance is stated as:
/ SUSPECTt, STt, SUSPECTt x TRANt,SUSPECTt x POSTt 
/ s Tt x TRANt,STt x POSTt,TRANt, POSTt, RPSt- lt ARPSt 
ARPSt -  /  1 bSiZEt, ALEVt, MTBt_1, AOWNCONt, FOREIGNt,
\  ABOARDINDt, BIG8t> CEODUALt, IND, YEAR
(ERPSt = f y
SUSPECTt> STt) SUSPECTt x TRANt,SUSPECTt x POSTt,' 
STt x TRANt,STt x POSTt,TRANt, POSTt, ERPSt-x 
SIZEt, LEVt, MTBt-i,  OWNCONt, FOREIGNt, 
BOARDINDt, BIGQt, CEODUALt, IND, YEAR
(7a)
(7b)
Where:
ARPS,
ERPS,
SUSPECT,
the change in RPS, measured as RPS/SALE, -  RPS,i/SALE,.i 
the difference between RPS,/SALE, for the firm and the 
industry-mean level of RPS,/SALE, excluding the own 
observation for which I calculate the measure 
calculated as 1 if ROE, is more than the regulatory 
thresholds of new equity offerings and
(1) PROE, {ROE, excluding A RPS, and its associated 
COGS,) is less than the regulatory thresholds for the change 
model;
(2) PROE, {ROE, excluding ERPS, and its associated 
COGS,) is less than the regulatory thresholds for the cross- 
sectional model; and 0 otherwise
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ST,
SIZE,
A SIZE,
LEV,
ALEV,
MTBti
OWNCON,
/SOWN CON,
FOREIGN,
BOARDIND,
BIG8,
CEODUAL,
IND
YEAR
calculated as 1 if ROE, is positive but less than the 
regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings and
(1) PROE, {ROE, excluding ARPS, and its associated 
COGS,) is negative for the change model;
(2) PROE, {ROE, excluding ERPS, and its associated 
COGS,) is negative for the cross-sectional model, 
and 0 otherwise
the log form of market value in year t
the change in the log form of market value from year t-1 to
year t
the long-term debt deflated by total assets in year t
the change in leverage from year t-1 to year t
the market-to-book ratio in year t-1
share owned by the largest shareholder scaled by total
shares
the change in the percentage of shares owned by the largest
shareholder from year t-1 to year t
1 if the firm has foreign ownership and 0 otherwise
number of independent directors divided by total directors
1 if there is a big-8 audit firm and 0 otherwise
1 if the CEO and chairman is the same person and 0
otherwise
dummy variables indicating industry sector membership 
dummy variables for years
Ownership concentration {OWNCON,) is included to examine whether the proportion of 
shares owned by the largest shareholder has an influence on the level of industry-mean 
adjusted RPSs {ERPS,). Prior studies suggest that in firms with concentrated ownership, 
controlling shareholders use RPTs to prop up a firm’s earnings (Cheung et al. 2009b; 
Jian & Wong; 2010; Lo et al. 2010; Yeh et al. 2012). The percentage of shares owned 
by the largest owner {OWNCON,) is used as the measure of ownership concentration. 
The coefficient on OWNCON, is expected to be positive. For the change model, the 
OWNCON, is replaced with AOWNCON,. To examine whether the presence of foreign 
shareholders reduces the level of ERPS, the presence of foreign ownership {FOREIGN,), 
measured as a dummy equalling ‘1’ if the firm issues foreign shares and ‘0’ otherwise, 
is added ton the model.
109
Previous literature suggests that board independence can improve corporate governance 
mechanism and reduce earnings manipulation (Cornett et al. 2009; Lo et al. 2012). 
Board independence (BOARD1ND,) is measured as the percentage of independent 
directors over total directors, to control for the influence of board independence on 
ERPS. The coefficient on BOARDIND, is expected to be negative. For the change model, 
the BOARDIND, is replaced with A BOARDIND,. Audit firms have a direct influence on 
the quality of accounting disclosure, and Big-N audit firms may enhance the credibility 
of financial statements to a greater extent than non-Big-N firms. Consistent with Jian 
and Wong (2010), Big-8 firms (BIG8,) in China, which takes ‘1’ if the audit firm 
belongs to the Big-8 and ‘O’ otherwise, are used to examine the effectiveness of big 
auditing firms in reducing manipulated RPSs. Finally, Jensen (1993) suggests that, 
when the CEO is chair of the board, the CEO has responsibility for making and 
monitoring decisions. Thus, the CEO has more power to pursue personal interests 
instead of shareholders’ interests. The CEODUAL, measured as ‘1’ if the CEO and 
chairman are different persons and ‘0’ otherwise, is added to the model to examine 
whether the presence of a CEO and chair duality (CEODUAL,) affects the level of 
ERPS. The coefficient on CEODUAL, is expected to be negative.
Tables 6.13 and 6.14 present the results, based on model (7a) and model (7b) 
respectively. The first column reports the results based on the full sample, the second 
column reports the results based on the sample of firms reporting positive ARPS, and 
ERPS,, and the last column reports the results based on the sample where firms have 
beaten the regulatory thresholds. Compared to the previous analysis using models 6a 
and 6b presented in Tables 6.11 and 6.12, the inclusion of these corporate governance 
variables does not increase the power of empirical models. In contrast, the adjusted R- 
square of the regression models decreases slightly due to a drop in observations. The
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results on earnings management incentives (SUSPECT, and STt), and the interaction 
between earnings management incentives and regulatory dummies remain qualitatively 
the same.
For the corporate governance variables, there is a significant and positive relationship 
between the change in and the level of ownership concentration and the change in and 
the level of RPS under all specifications. There is also a negative and significant 
association between the change in and the level of board independence and the change 
in and the level of RPS at 0.1 levels. The results suggest that ownership concentration is 
positively associated with RPS manipulation, and board independence can somewhat 
constrain RPS manipulation.
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Table 6.13: Corporate Governance and RPS manipulation (2000-2005);
Dependent Variable = ARPS,
PREDICTED ROE >
VARIABLES SIGNS FULL A RPS, > 0 th resh o ld s
SUSPECT, + 0.274*** 0.183*** 0.285***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
SUSPECT, x 
TRAN, - -0.037 -0.024 -0.050
(0.361) (0.541) (0.212)
SUSPECT, x 
POST, - -0.092*** -0.064** -0.099***
(0.003) (0.034) (0.001)
ST, + 0.248*** 0.155***
(<0.001) (0.004)
ST, x TRAN, - 0.073 0.087
(0.335) (0.258)
ST, x POST, - -0.016 0.019
(0.786) (0.748)
TRAN, ? 0.007 -0.024 0.026*
(0.468) (0.140) (0.080)
POST, ? 0.026** -0.010 0.047**
(0.027) (0.600) (0.020)
RPS,., - -0.302*** 0.050* -0.303***
(<0.001) (0.069) (<0.001)
ARPS,., - -0.107*** -0.181*** -0.134***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
ASIZE, ? -0.013 -0.024 0.009
(0.181) (0.274) (0.533)
ALEV, ? -0.025 0.045 -0.014
(0.241) (0.367) (0.599)
MTB,., ? -0.005 0.016* 0.001
(0.213) (0.059) (0.858)
AOWNCON, + 0.094** 0.150** 0.065*
(0.038) (0.015) (0.066)
FOREIGN, - 0.018 0.006 0.011
(0.331) (0.858) (0.715)
A BOARDIND, - -0.009* -0.019 -0.009
(0.074) (0.122) (0.258)
B/G8, - -0.017 -0.007 0.016
(0.178) (0.554) (0.252)
CEODUAL, - -0.047 -0.021 -0.034
(0.199) (0.643) (0.482)
C on stan t -0.001 0.030 -0.041**
(0.959) (0.244) (0.014)
IND Y Y Y
YEAR Y Y Y
n 3,894 1,421 1,972
Adj. R 2 0.381 0.304 0.427
This table reports results of the effect of corporate governance proxies on A RPS. A RPS, is the change in
RPS/SALE from year t-1 to year t, calculated as RPS,/SALE, - RPS,.,/SALE,.t. RPS,./ is defined as RPS,. 
i/SALE,.,. SUSPECT, takes 1 if ROE, is more than the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings but 
PROE, is less than the regulatory thresholds and 0 otherwise. ST, takes 1 if if ROE, is positive and less 
than the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings but PROE, is negative and 0 otherwise. 
AOWNCON, is shares owned by the largest shareholder scaled by total shares. FOREIGN, takes 1 if the 
firm has foreign ownership and 0 otherwise. BOARDIND, is number of independent directors divided by 
total directors. BIG8, takes 1 if there is a big-8 audit firm and 0 otherwise. CEODUAL, takes 1 if the CEO 
and chairman are different persons and 0 otherwise. Other control variables are defined Appendix Five. 
All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Two-tailed p-values are based on 
robust t-statistics that have been adjusted to control for the clustering by firm. ***5**5* signify statistical 
significance of two-tailed tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Table 6.14: Corporate Governance and RPS manipulation (1999-2005);
Dependent Variable = ERPSt
VARIABLES
PREDICTED
SIGNS FULL ERPS, > 0
ROE > 
thresholds
SUSPECT, + 0.356*** 0.210*** 0.386***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
SUSPECT, x TRAN, - -0.039 -0.029 -0.045
(0.174) (0.360) (0.113)
SUSPECT, x POST, - -0.098*** -0.103*** -0.101***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
ST, + 0.351*** 0.207***
(<0.001) (<0.001)
ST, x TRAN, - 0.013 0.023
(0.802) (0.652)
ST, x POST, - -0.071** -0.086**
(0.043) (0.017)
TRAN, ? 0.027*** -0.007 0.011
(0.001) (0.813) (0.337)
POST, ? 0.049*** 0.034 0.027
(<0.001) (0.380) (0.122)
ERPS,., + 0.420*** 0.398*** 0.359***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
SIZE, ? -0.002 -0.012 0.007*
(0.455) (0.191) (0.081)
LEV, ? -0.011 -0.001 0.006
(0.168) (0.973) (0.506)
MTB,., ? -0.004 -0.002 -0.001
(0.281) (0.882) (0.871)
OWNCON, + 0.040*** 0.055** 0.035*
(0.004) (0.029) (0.051)
FOREIGN, - 0.008 -0.005 0.020
(0.619) (0.950) (0.428)
BOARDIND, - -0.010* -0.012 -0.002
(0.087) (0.471) (0.715)
BIG8, - 0.001 -0.007 -0.005
(0.850) (0.692) (0.479)
CEODUAL, - -0.040 -0.040 -0.008
(0.102) (0.636) (0.846)
Constant -0.018 0.274 -0.230***
(0.771) (0.184) (0.007)
IND Y Y Y
YEAR Y Y Y
n 4,526 1,151 2,439
Adi. R2 0.681 0.566 0.725
This table reports results of the effect of corporate governance proxies on ERPS. ERPS, is the difference 
between RPS/SALE, for the firm and the industry-mean level of RPS/SALE, excluding the own 
observation for which I calculate the measure. SUSPECT, takes 1 if ROE, is more than the regulatory 
thresholds of new equity offerings but PROE, is less than the regulatory thresholds and 0 otherwise. ST, 
takes 1 if if ROE, is positive but less than the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings and PROE, is 
negative and 0 otherwise. OWNCON, is shares owned by the largest shareholder scaled by total shares. 
FOREIGN, takes 1 if the firm has foreign ownership and 0 otherwise. BOARDIND, is number of 
independent directors divided by total directors. BIG8, takes 1 if there is a big-8 audit firm and 0 
otherwise. CEODUAL, takes 1 if the CEO and chairman are different persons and 0 otherwise. Other 
control variables are defined Appendix Five. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% 
levels. Two-tailed p-values are based on robust t-statistics that have been adjusted to control for the 
clustering by firm. ***?**?* signify statistical significance of two-tailed tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively.
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6.4 Trade-Offs Between RPS and Discretionary Accruals
In this section, I distinguish the use of RPSs from discretionary accruals. Jian and Wong 
(2010) found that, when firms have options to use RPSs to inflate earnings, they are less 
likely to use discretionary accruals. I extend Jian and Wong (2010) by examining the 
effect of the 2001 RPT regulations on trade-offs between discretionary accruals and the 
level of industry-mean adjusted RPSs (ERPS). Discretionary accruals are calculated 
using the following modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995):
Accrualst
Assetst_1 =  ß i Assetst_±
(AREVt -  AARt) PPEt
By --------- ------------ --  +  /?3 ---------- —Assetst_1 Assetst_x + ft (8)
Where:
Accrualst = the difference between earnings before non-operating items 
and operating cash flows 
Assetst i = total assets in year t-1
A REVt = changes in sales revenue from year t-1 to year t
AARt = changes in accounts receivables from year t-1 to year t
PPEt = the original value of PPE
The cross-sectional model presented in Equation (8) is estimated for each year for each 
industry based on the three-digit CSRC codes. The residuals generated by these 
industry-year estimations are used as the measure of discretionary accruals. I then 
perform two tests to examine whether firms use discretionary accruals and RPSs as 
substitutes. The first test examines whether discretionary accruals are associated with 
ERPSs by regressing discretionary accruals on the industry-mean adjusted RPSs (ERPS) 
(Equation 9a). If the RPSs and discretionary accruals are substitute devices for earnings 
management, the level of ERPS will be negatively correlated with discretionary accruals. 
I then examine whether firms use less discretionary accruals when they can use RPSs to 
beat the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings by regressing discretionary
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accruals on SUSPECT (Equation 9b). Note that SUSPECT implies that firms have 
already used RPSs to beat the regulatory thresholds. If RPSs serve as substitutes to 
accruals management to meet or beat regulatory thresholds, a negative coefficient on 
SUSPECT, is expected. In both regressions, I control for firm size {SIZE,), leverage 
{LEV,), market-to-book (MTB,) and ROE,, as prior studies suggest these firm-specific 
factors affect discretionary accruals (Jones 1991; Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney 1995; 
Rangan 1998; Teoh et al. 1998).
To investigate the effect of regulations on the trade-offs between discretionary accruals 
and RPSs, I test models (9a) and (9b) in different regulatory regimes:
DAt = ß0 + ß1ERPSt + ß2SlZEt + ß3 LEVt + ß4MTBt 
+ß5ROEt + INDUSTRY + YEAR + £t (9a)
DAt = ß0 + ß1SUSPECTt + ß2 SIZEt + ß3LEVt + ß4MTBt 
+ßsROEt + INDUSTRY + YEAR + et (9b)
Where:
DA,
ERPS,
SUSPECT,
SIZE,
LEV,
MTB,
ROE,
discretionary accruals, calculated by the modified Jones model 
(Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney 1995)
the difference between RPS,/SALE, for firm i and the industry-mean 
level of RPSZSALE, calculated excluding firm i.
1 if ROE, exceeds the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings 
when PROE, is less than the regulatory thresholds and 0 otherwise 
the log form of market value in year t 
the long-term debt deflated by total assets in year t 
the market-to-book ratio in year t
the firms’ ROE calculated as net earnings after tax divided by total 
owners’ equity
The results Equation 9a are reported in Table 6.15 Panel A. The results provide 
evidence that the coefficients in the pre-regulation period {coeff= -0.013, p = 0.084) are 
significant and negative at 0.1 level, suggesting there is indeed a substitution effect 
between discretionary accruals and ERPSs in this regulatory regime. However, the 
substitution effects between ERPSs and discretionary accruals are not significant in the
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transitory and post-regulation periods. The results conclude that RPSs were a substitute 
to discretionary accruals during 1999 to 2001, consistent with Jian and Wong (2002). 
However, the substitution relationship is not significant in the post-regulatory regimes.
The results Equation 9b are reported in Table 6.15 Panel B. The coefficient on 
SUSPECT, is negative and significant at 0.05 level, based on the full sample during 
1999 to 2005. The coefficient is also significant and negative in the pre-regulation 
period {coejf = -0.012, p = 0.038), and in the transitory period {coejf = -0.010, p = 
0.013). This provides support for the Jian and Wong’s argument that when firms use 
RPSs to beat the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings, they use significantly 
less discretionary accruals. Nevertheless, the substitution effect between discretionary 
accruals and ERPS becomes not significant in the post-regulatory regime during 2003 to 
2005. This might be because the 2001 RPT measurement regulation largely increased 
the cost of price inflation in RPSs. Reliance solely on volumes inflation via RRSs in the 
post-regulation period might not have been sufficient to achieve earnings targets, and 
firms might have increased the use of other earnings management tools such as 
discretionary accruals.39
39 In further robustness checks for this test that is not tabulated, I investigate the relations of the change in 
discretionary accruals and the change in RPSs. The results of the tests between these two variables are 
negative but not significant, indicating that the change in RPSs is not significantly associated with the 
change in discretionary accruals. The level test should be interpreted as lack of robustness.
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Table 6.15: The Trade-Off between Discretionary Accruals and ERPS
Dependent Variable = DAt
PREDICTED FULL PRE TRAN POST
VARIABLES SIGNS (1999-2005) (1999-2001) (2002) (2003-2005)
Panel A The Relation Between DA, and ERPS,
ERPS, -0.006 -0.013* -0.001 -0.001
(0.198) (0.084) (0.953) (0.944)
SIZE, ? -0.004*** -0.003 -0.004** -0.004***
(0.010) (0.200) (0.043) (0.002)
LEV, ? 0.026*** 0.033*** 0.025*** 0.017**
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.001) (0.028)
MTB, ? 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.003
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.008) (0.411)
ROE, ? -0.001 0.003** -0.001 -0.001
(0.640) (0.023) (0.415) (0.130)
Constant -0.005 -0.035 0.004 0.014
(0.867) (0.436) (0.933) (0.638)
1ND Y Y Y Y
YEAR Y Y N Y
n 4,510 1,963 650 1,897
A d j.R 2 0.033 0.047 0.038 0.021
Panel B The Relation Between DA, and SUSPECT,
SUSPECT, -0.009** -0.012** -0.010** -0.003
(0.010) (0.038) (0.013) (0.324)
SIZE, ? -0.004** -0.003 -0.004* -0.004***
(0.012) (0.189) (0.064) (0.002)
LEV, ? 0.026*** 0.033*** 0.025*** 0.017**
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.001) (0.023)
MTB, ? 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.003
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.004) (0.385)
ROE, ? -0.001 0.003** -0.001 -0.001
(0.836) (0.010) (0.543) (0.131)
Constant -0.008 -0.031 -0.007 0.012
(0.792) (0.513) (0.876) (0.691)
IND Y Y Y Y
YEAR Y Y N Y
n 4,510 1,963 650 1,897
Adj. R2 0.037 0.051 0.044 0.021
This table reports the results of the trade-off between discretionary accruals and ERPS. All observations 
with sufficient data to calculate the dependent or independent variables are included. DA, is discretionary 
accruals, calculated by the modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney 1995). ERPS, is t the 
difference between RPS/SALE, for firm i and the industry-mean level of RPS/SALE, excluding the own 
observation for which I calculate the measure. SUSPECT, takes 1 if ROE, is more than the regulatory 
thresholds of new equity offerings but PROE, is less than the regulatory thresholds and 0 otherwise. Other 
control variables are defined Appendix Five. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% 
levels. Two-tailed p-values are based on robust t-statistics that have been adjusted to control for the 
clustering by firm. ***,**,* signify statistical significance of two-tailed tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively.
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6.5 Chapter Summary
The results for HI, HI (a) and Hl(b), as reported in Section 6.2, provide evidence of a 
positive and significant relation between price manipulation proxies and income- 
increasing RPSs in the pre-regulation period. There is no evidence of a significant 
relation in the post-regulation period.
The results for H2a and H2b were reported in Section 6.3. As predicted, the magnitude 
of earnings management via RPSs was abnormally higher for firms with incentives to 
inflate earnings than other firms. However, firms with incentives to beat the regulatory 
thresholds of new equity offerings used less RPS manipulation in the post-regulation 
period compared to firms in similar circumstances before the regulation. From tests of 
the effect of corporate governance characteristics, there was a positive and significant 
association between ownership concentration and the level of RPS manipulation, and a 
significant and negative association between board independence and the level of RPS 
manipulation.
Based on the further tests reported in Section 6.4, I conclude that RPSs served as a 
substitute to discretionary accruals in the pre-regulation period. This is consistent with 
Jian and Wong (2010). However, the substitution effect is not evident in the post­
regulation period. The implications of these results are discussed in the final chapter.
118
Chapter 7: Conclusion
7.1 Introduction
This chapter summarises the main findings of this thesis and discusses their 
implications and contributions. Section 7.2 summarises the results of hypotheses testing. 
Section 7.3 discusses the contribution and implications of the findings. Section 7.4 
discusses the research limitations and outlines issues that warrant future research.
7.2 Summary of Findings
RPSs have been regarded as a primary means of earnings management in China. The 
abuse of RPSs and other types of RPTs resulted in several corporate failures in the late 
1990s. The MOF issued the 2001 RPT measurement regulation, aimed at reducing 
earnings inflation via RPTs. The primary objective of this thesis is to examine the 
impact of the 2001 RPT measurement regulation on earnings management via RPSs in 
China. Specifically, I first investigated the effectiveness of this regulation in reducing 
price inflation in RPSs. I then examined the effectiveness of the RPT regulation in 
reducing the extent of earnings management via RPSs for firms with incentives to 
manipulate earnings.
To examine the first research question, I focused on the relationship between the change 
in gross margin and income-increasing RPSs. The results document that price 
manipulation activities are positively correlated with income-increasing RPSs in the 
pre-regulation period, but the association was not significant in the post-regulation 
period. The results suggested that transfer pricing techniques via RPSs were widely
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used to inflate earnings before the introduction of the 2001 RPT measurement 
regulation. However, after the regulation, income-increasing RPSs referred mainly to 
volumes inflation. The results concluded that the 2001 RPT measurement regulation 
was somewhat effective in reducing price inflation in RPSs.
To examine the second research question, I ran the regression of RPS manipulation 
proxies on earnings management incentive variables. The results provided evidence that 
the extent of earnings management via RPSs was abnormally higher for firms with 
incentives to inflate earnings than other firms for each of regulatory regimes. However, 
firms with incentives to beat the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings used 
significantly less RPS manipulation in the post-regulation period compared to these 
firms in similar circumstances before the regulation. The results suggested that the 2001 
RPT measurement regulation reduced the level of earnings inflation in RPSs for firms 
with incentives to manipulate earnings.
To examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the level of RPS 
manipulation, several corporate governance proxies were added to previous analyses. 
The results provided evidence that ownership concentration was positively correlated 
with the level of RPS manipulation, and board independence was negatively correlated 
with the level of RPS manipulation. To examine the effect of the 2001 regulatory 
change on the trade-offs between discretionary accruals and RPSs, I ran the model of 
discretionary accruals on the level of RPSs. The results provided evidence that RPSs 
served as substitutes to discretionary accruals in the pre-regulation period but the 
substitution effect is not significant in the post-regulation period.
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7.3 Contribution and Implications of Findings
This thesis contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the results contribute to 
the theoretical debate concerned with the role of RPTs in China. Prior literature 
proposed two alternative views of RPTs. The first view, referred to as the economic 
efficiency view, considers RPTs rationally fulfil the underlying economic needs of a 
company and minimise transaction costs between related parties. The second view, 
referred to as the conflicts of interests view, considers RPTs present agency issues as 
noted by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and La Porta et al (2000). The results support the 
conflicts of interest perspective, suggesting that RPTs are not usually conducted at arms’ 
length and represent an incorrect transfer of resources between corporate groups.
Second, this thesis links with previous literature concerned with the motivations behind 
RPTs. Propping studies suggest that RPTs are also used to prop up firms in distress or 
that are planning seasoned equity offerings (Aharony et al. 2010; Jian & Wong; 2010; 
Lo et al. 2010; Yeh et al. 2012). This thesis contributes to the propping literature by 
providing evidence that RPSs can be used to prop up earnings to beat the regulatory 
benchmarks of new equity offerings and delisting. More importantly, this study extends 
the general earnings management literature concerned with RPSs. This is the first study 
to consider the prevalence of price inflation in RPSs. Specifically, I examined whether 
income-increasing RPSs were associated with price inflation before and after the 
regulatory change. The results suggest that listed firms can either choose to inflate sales 
price or volumes in the pre-regulation period, but rely largely on volumes inflation in 
the post-regulation period.
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Third, this study links with prior corporate governance research (Gordon et al. 2004; Lei 
& Song. 2011; Ye et al. 2012; Hwang et al. 2013), and provides some insights into the 
association between corporate governance proxies and the extent of RPSs. In particular, 
this thesis provides evidence that RPS manipulation is positively related to ownership 
concentration, providing a support for La Porta et al’s (1999) theory that related party 
transactions are very prevalent in countries where ownership is concentrated. Consistent 
with Ye et al. (2012), the results also provides evidence that good board independence 
somewhat limits earnings inflation via RPSs.
The results reported in this thesis have important policy implications for regulators in 
China. The results reveal that the 2001 RPT regulations were effective in reducing price 
manipulations for RPS, but did not eliminate earnings inflation via RPSs. As Pan et al. 
(2006) suggested, this is largely because firms have alternatives to inflate RPS volumes. 
Regulators in China should be aware of this issue and make efforts to reduce RPS 
volumes in future policy development.
7.4 Limitations and Future Research
This research is not without its limitations. First, as actual transaction prices of RPSs are 
not observable outside a firm, this study uses average gross margins to proxy for price 
manipulations. Although the model includes many controls, the proxy may include price 
inflation for sales to non-related parties. However, I argue that this problem is unlikely 
to be substantial because it is much easier to manipulate transaction prices with related 
parties than non-related parties.
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Second, this thesis focuses on recurring related party transactions (using RPSs in the 
main tests and RPP in further tests). The results regarding price manipulations might not 
be generalisable to non-recurring related party transactions. The results regarding 
volume manipulations are not relevant to non-recurring items. This is left to future 
research to investigate how the regulations impact on the use of non-recurring items.
Third, the analysis in this thesis is based on two earnings management incentives that 
are concerned with propping: beating the regulatory thresholds for new equity offerings 
or to avoid delisting. Earnings management incentives concerned with tunnelling, such 
as avoiding dividend payments to minority shareholders, are beyond the scope of this 
thesis but and it is left to future research to reveal whether earnings management 
attributable to such incentives was also affected by the regulatory changes .
Fourth, the measure of earnings management incentive variables in this thesis have been 
based on ROE thresholds. Future research could use other potential methods to measure 
these earnings management incentives, for instance, whether there is an accrual 
application or issue of new equity offerings. Further research could also conduct event- 
typed research to investigate the level of RPS inflation in the period prior to the issue of 
new shares versus the period after issue.
Finally, the sample period in this study ends at the year 2005. In 2006, China issued its 
new accounting standards, which no longer requires listed firms to calculate the capital- 
surplus account of RPTs. Future research could examine whether the new accounting 
standard in 2006 again resulted in an increase in price inflation in RPSs.
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Appendices
Appendix One: Accounting Standards for Related Party Transactions
Issues
The RPT Standard The Accounting Standard
(1997-2005) (2006-current)
T h e  d e fin itio n  ad d resses  the  issue  o f
D e fin itio n  o f
re la ted
p a rtie s
T h e  re la ted  party  re la tio n sh ip  is 
co n s titu te d  if  one party  has the  ab ility  to  
co n tro l th e  o th e r party  o r  e x e rc ise  
s ig n ifican t in flu en ce  o v e r the  o th e r 
p a rty  in m ak in g  fin an c ia l and  o p e ra tin g  
d ec is io n s; o r tw o partie s  are  c o n tro lled  
by  one  party .
in d ire c t c o n tro l, s ta tin g  th a t a  re la ted  
party  re la tio n sh ip  is a lso  co n stitu ted  
if  one  p arty  has  th e  ab ility  to  
in d irec tly  co n tro l o th e r party  o r 
ex e rc ise  s ig n ific a n t in flu en ce  over 
the  o th e r p a rty  in m ak in g  fin an c ia l 
and  o p e ra tin g  d ec is io n s; o r tw o  
p artie s  are  in d irec tly  c o n tro lle d  by 
one party .
G en era l 
p rin c ip le s  in T h e  1997 a c c o u n tin g  s tan d a rd s  d id  no t A d d re sse d  the  p rin c ip le  o f  su b stan ce
rec o g n is in g m en tio n  the  p rin c ip le  o f  su b stan ce  o v e r o v e r fo rm  in c o n s id e rin g  each
re la te d  party  
re la tio n sh ip s
fo rm . p o ss ib le  re la ted  party  re la tio n sh ip .
P aren t c o m p an ie s , su b sid ia rie s , p a ren t
E x a m p le s  o f
re la ted
p a rtie s
f irm s ’ o th e r a ffilia tes , jo in t  v e n tu re s , 
a sso c ia te  c o m p an ie s , m a jo r in v es to rs  
an d  th e ir  im m ed ia te  fam ily  m em b ers , 
key  m an ag e rs  and  th e ir  im m ed ia te  
fam ily  m em b ers , and  o th e r  co m p a n ie s  
th a t a re  d irec tly  c o n tro lle d  by m ajo r 
in v es to rs , key  m an ag ers  o r th e ir  
im m e d ia te  fam ily  m em b ers .
T he  p aren t f irm 's  key  m an ag e rs  and  
th e ir  im m ed ia te  fam ily  m em b ers , o r 
o th e r co m p a n ie s  th a t are  d irec tly  o r 
in d irec tly  co n tro lle d  by key  
m an ag e rs  o r th e ir  im m ed ia te  fam ily  
m em b ers .
G o v e rn m e n t-
re la ted
E n te rp rise s  shall no t be re g a rd ed  as 
re la ted  p artie s  sim p ly  b e c a u se  they  are
S am e as th e  1997 A c c o u n tin g  
s tan d ard s
en titie s all u n d e r the  con tro l o f  th e  state .
A  re la ted  party  tra n sa c tio n  re fe rs  to  an 
e v e n t w hereb y  a  tra n sfe r  o f  reso u rces ,
D e fin itio n  o f la b o u r serv ices  o r o b lig a tio n s  takes S am e as th e  1997 A cco u n tin g
R P T p lace  b e tw een  a ffilia ted  p a rtie s , 
irre sp ec tiv e  o f  w h e th e r m oney  is 
ch arg ed .
s tan d ard s
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Scope of 
disclosure
It is not required to disclose the RPT 
that have been included in the scope of
consolidation, but it shall disclose the Same as the 1997 Accounting 
related party relationships and standards
transactions beyond the scope of 
consolidation.
Disclosure
requirements
Other
specific
requirements
Accounting
treatment
issued by the
MOF
(2001-
2005)a
The 1997 accounting standard did not 
mention the disclosure requirement of 
ultimate controlling party and its basic 
information
If the selling price of a related party 
transaction is higher than the fair value, 
the price differential (price less fair 
value) cannot be recognised as earnings.
The 2006 accounting standards 
require listed firms to disclose the 
basic information of the ultimate 
controlling shareholder if the parent 
company is not the ultimate 
controlling party, and the proportion 
of voting rights by the parent 
company in this enterprise or by this 
enterprise in its subsidiaries. 
Enterprise cannot state that related 
party transaction is fair unless it 
provides exact proofs.
Note:a The 2001 accounting treatment for RPT is a transitory regulation applying only when the 
selling price of a related party transaction is above its fair value. This regulation lost effect in 
2006. The 2006 accounting standard no longer requires listed firms report the price differential 
account of RPT.
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Appendix 3: The Regulation of Equity Offerings in China, 1993-current
Date of 
Guidelines
17 Nov. 
1993
Effective Profitability Requirements
Period Rights offering SEO
1993 Previous two years’ positive profits
30 Sep. 1994-
1994 1996
24 Jan. 1996-
1996 1998
17 Mar. 1999-
1999 2000
15 Mar. 
2001 2001
Previous three years’ positive 
profits and three-year average ROE 
>  10%
ROE > 10% in each of previous 
three years
Three-year average ROE > 
6%
Three-year average ROE > 10% 
and ROE > 6% in each of previous 
three years
Three-year average ROE > 
Three-year average ROE > 6% 10% and ROE > 10% in the
previous year
, _ Three-year average ROE >
Three years positive profits ^
This table presents the profitability regulation of new equity offerings during 1993 to 2010. 
From 2001 to current, SEO and right issue applicants are required to calculate ROE as well as 
core ROE excluding non-recurring items. The lower ROE will be used as the base by the CSRC 
for the approval of new equity offerings.
24 July. 2002-
2002 2005
6 May. 2006-
2006 current
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Appendix Five: Variable Definitions
Total Asset 
Market Value
SALE
Cost of Goods Sold 
Gross Profit 
RPS
RPS/SALE 
A RPS
AbsARPS 
Positive ARPS 
Negative ARPS 
PARPS
NARPS
ERPS
AbsERPS 
Positive ER PS 
Negative ERPS 
PERPS 
NERPS 
Gross Margin
A GM
EGM
A COGS
MTB 
PPE 
A PPE
INTAN 
A INTAN
EXP
LEV
ALEV
total assets measured in million RMB
the price per share times the number of shares
outstanding, measured in million RMB
sales measured in million RMB
cost of goods sold measured in million RMB
sales less cost of goods sold measured in million RMB
RPS measured in million RMB
RPS/SALE
the change in RPS/SALE from year t-1 to year t, 
calculated as RPS/SALE, - RPS,./SALE,.] 
the absolute value of A RPS 
the positive A RPS 
the negative A RPS
income-increasing RPS, defined as A RPS when A RPS is 
positive and 0 otherwise
income-decreasing RPS, defined as A RPS when A RPS 
is negative and 0 otherwise
the difference between RPS/SALE, for firm i and the
industry-mean level of RPS/SALE, excluding the own
observation for which I calculate the measure
the absolute value of ERPS
the positive ERPS
the negative ERPS
ERPS when ERPS is positive and 0 otherwise 
ERPS when ERPS is negative and 0 otherwise 
gross profits divided by sales, calculated as 
GrossProfit/SALE,
the change in gross margin from year t-1 to year t, 
calculated as GrossProfit/SALE, - GrossProfit,.,/SALE,.i 
the difference between GrossProfit/SALE, for the firm 
and the industry-mean level of GrossProfit/SALE, 
excluding the own observation for which the measure is 
calculated
the change in cost of goods sold form year t-1 to year t, 
calculated as (COGS, -  COGS,.,)/COGS,.i 
the market-to-book ratio 
the log form of PPE
the change in the log form of PPE from year t-1 to year 
t
the log form of intangible assets (INTAN) in year t-1 
the change in the log form of intangible assets from year 
t-1 to year t
the lagged selling expenses (EXP), measured by 
EXP,.VSALE,.,
the long-term debt deflated by total assets 
the change in LEV
133
SIZE
ASIZE
ROE
= the log form of market value
= the change in SIZE from year t-1 to year t
= the ROE ratio, calculated as earnings before tax divided
by ending equity
OWNCON = share owned by the largest shareholder scaled by total
shares
BORDIND = number of independent directors divided by total
directors
FOREIGN
BIG8
CEODUAL
= 1 if the firm has foreign ownership and 0 otherwise
= 1 if there is a big-8 audit firm and 0 otherwise
= 1 if the CEO and chairman is the same person and 0
otherwise
SUSPECT = calculated as 1 if ROE, is more than the regulatory
thresholds of new equity offerings and
(1) PROE, (ROE, excluding ARPS, and its associated 
COGS,) is less than the regulatory thresholds for the 
change model;
(2) PROE, (ROE, excluding ERPS, and its associated 
COGS,) is less than the regulatory thresholds for the 
cross-sectional model;
and 0 otherwise
ST = calculated as 1 if ROE, is positive but less than the
regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings and
(1) PROE, (ROE, excluding ARPS, and its associated 
COGS,) is negative for the change model;
(2) PROE, (ROE, excluding ERPS, and its associated 
COGS,) is negative for the cross-sectional model, 
and 0 otherwise
TRAN 
POST 
A RPP
= 1 if the year is 2002 and 0 otherwise
= 1 if years are 2003, 2004, 2005 and 0 otherwise
= the change in RPP from year t-1 to year t, calculated as
RPP,/SALE, - RPP,.,/SALE,.,
NARPP = income-increasing RPP, defined as A RPP when A RPP
is negative and 0 otherwise
ERPP = the difference between RPP,/SALE, for firm i and the
industry-mean level of RPP,/SALE, excluding the own 
observation for which I calculate the measure
NERPP 
A SALE
= ERPP when ERPP is negative and 0 otherwise
= the change in sales revenues form year t-1 to year t,
calculated as (SALE, -  SALE,.,)/SALE,.,
IND = dummy variables indicating industry sector membership
YEAR = dummies for years
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Appendix Six: The Use of RPS to Inflate Transaction Price Change Model; Using 
the Actual Change in RPS (ARPSt); Dependent variable = AGMt
VARIABLES
PREDICTED
SIGNS
FULL
(2000-2005)
PRE
(2000-2001)
TRAN
(2002)
POST
(2003-2005)
ARPS, ? -0.010 0.019 0.008 -0.035
(0.373) (0.186) (0.797) (0.169)
GM,., - -0.276*** -0.266*** -0.302*** -0.271***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
A GMt.i - -0.050 -0.062** -0.050 -0.066
(0.196) (0.037) (0.446) (0.433)
A COGS, - -0.038*** -0.032*** -0.036*** -0.047***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
MTBt-i + 0.006 0.008 0.005 -0.001
(0.296) (0.124) (0.575) (0.915)
PPEt-i + -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.810) (0.778) (0.905) (0.791)
A PPE, + 0.014** 0.014* 0.009 0.015*
(0.014) (0.080) (0.468) (0.067)
INTAN,., + -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.239) (0.338) (0.884) (0.278)
AINTAN, + -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.001
(0.690) (0.207) (0.270) (0.398)
EXP,., + 0.250*** 0.199*** 0.219*** 0.294**
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.004) (0.014)
LEV,., ? -0.026 0.007 0.038 -0.039
(0.136) (0.614) (0.105) (0.130)
SIZE,., ? -0.004 -0.009** -0.017* -0.002
(0.319) (0.049) (0.072) (0.709)
Constant 0.099* 0.240*** 0.463*** -0.009
(0.062) (0.001) (0.001) (0.922)
IND Y Y Y Y
YEAR Y Y N Y
n 3,947 1,316 659 1,972
Adj. R2 0.143 0.206 0.261 0.122
This table presents the results of the use of RPS to inflate the transaction price, based on the change 
model. AGM, is the change in gross margin from year t-1 to year t, measured as GrossProfit,/SALE, - 
GrossProfit,.,/SALE,.,. PARPS, is the income-increasing RPS, calculated as RPS/SALE, - RPS,i/SALE,., 
when (RPS/SALE, - RPS,.,/SALE,.,) is positive and 0 otherwise. Other control variables are defined in the 
Appendix Five. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Two-tailed p-values 
are based on robust t-statistics that have been adjusted to control for the clustering by firm. ******  
signify statistical significance of two-tailed tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Appendix Seven
Table A7: The Use of RPS to Inflate Transaction Price-Change Model; Control 
for Income-Decreasing RPS; Dependent Variable = AGMt
VARIABLES
PREDICTED
SIGNS
FULL
(2000-2005)
PRE
(2000-2001)
TRAN
(2002)
POST
(2003-2005)
PARPS, + 0.010 0.050*** 0.046 -0.053
(0.567) (0.008) (0.148) (0.119)
NARPS, ? -0.026 -0.033 -0.032 -0.022
(0.103) (0.151) (0.201) (0.405)
GM,.i - -0.275*** -0.264*** -0.300*** -0.271***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
AGM,.! - -0.051 -0.066** -0.052 -0.065
(0.190) (0.030) (0.427) (0.434)
ACOGS, - -0.038*** -0.032*** -0.037*** -0.046***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
MTB,.! + 0.005 0.007 0.005 -0.001
(0.315) (0.148) (0.549) (0.933)
PPE,.] + -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.794) (0.837) (0.873) (0.788)
A PPE, + 0.014** 0.014* 0.009 0.015*
(0.014) (0.081) (0.469) (0.067)
INTAN,., + -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.269) (0.466) (0.961) (0.259)
AINTAN, + - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 0.001
(0.724) (0.234) (0.299) (0.413)
EXP,., - 0.252*** 0.205*** 0.225*** 0.293**
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.003) (0.014)
LEV,., ? -0.026 0.009 0.038 -0.039
(0.144) (0.520) (0.104) (0.128)
SIZE,., ? -0.004 -0.009** -0.017* -0.002
(0.315) (0.049) (0.085) (0.726)
Constant 0.099* 0.240*** 0.447*** -0.010
(0.063) (0.001) (0.001) (0.913)
IND Y Y Y Y
YEAR Y Y N Y
n 3,947 1,316 659 1,972
Adj. R2 0.143 0.210 0.263 0.122
This table presents the results of the use of RPS to inflate the transaction price, based on the change 
model. AGM, is the change in gross margin from year t-1 to year t, measured as Gross Profit/SALE, - 
GrossProfit,./SALE,-l. PARPS, is the income-increasing RPS, calculated as RPS,/SALE, - RPS,./SALE,., 
when (RPS,/SALE, - RPS,./SALE,.,) is positive and 0 otherwise. NARPS, is the income-decreasing RPS, 
calculated as RPS,/SALE, - RPS,./SALE,.i when (RPS,/SALE, - RPS,./SALE,.,) is negative and 0 otherwise. 
Other control variables are defined in the Appendix Five. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 
1% and 99% levels. Two-tailed p-values are based on robust t-statistics that have been adjusted to control 
for the clustering by firm. ***,**,^Signify statistical significance of two-tailed tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively.
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Appendix Eight
Table A8: The Use of RPS to Inflate Transaction Price—Change Model; Excluding
AGMt-1; Dependent Variable = AGMt
VARIABLES
PREDICTED
SIGNS
FULL
(1999-2005)
PRE
(1999-2001)
TRAN
(2002)
POST
(2003-2005)
P A R P S , + 0.011 0.042** 0.040 -0.055
(0.504) (0.023) (0.200) (0.310)
G M ,.! - -0.300*** -0.282*** -0.311*** -0.294***
« 0 .0 0 1 ) « 0 .0 0 1 ) « 0 .0 0 1 ) « 0 .0 0 1 )
A C O G S , - -0.037*** -0.032*** -0.037*** -0.046***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) « 0 .0 0 1 )
M T B ,.i + 0.007 0.007 0.005 -0.001
(0.140) (0.180) (0.573) (0.969)
PPE,-! + - 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.931) (0.905) (0.871) (0.742)
A  P P E , + 0.013** 0.014* 0.009 0.014*
(0.013) (0.075) (0.433) (0.077)
IN T A N ,., + -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.140) (0.530) (0.975) (0.258)
A IN T A N , + - 0.000 - 0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.643) (0.225) (0.295) (0.439)
E X P ,! + 0.284*** 0.212*** 0.219*** 0.313**
« 0 .0 0 1) « 0 .0 0 1 ) (0.005) (0.027)
L E V ,., ? -0.029* 0.002 0.034 -0.042
(0.077) (0.883) (0.136) (0.108)
S IZ E ,., ? -0.002 -0.009* -0.016* -0.001
(0.515) (0.073) (0.091) (0.828)
Constant 0.074 0.238*** 0.448*** -0.010
(0.133) (0.001) (0.001) (0.909)
IN D Y Y Y Y
Y E A R Y Y N Y
n 4,606 1,975 659 1,972
Adj. R2 0.153 0.205 0.262 0.120
This table presents the results of the use of RPS to inflate the transaction price, based on the change 
model. AGM, is the change in gross margin from year t-1 to year t, measured as GrossProfit/SALE, - 
G ross Prof it,. i/SALE,, l. PARPS, is the income-increasing RPS, calculated as RPS/SALE, - RPS,i/SALE,i 
when (RPS/SALE, - RPS,-i/SALE,.i) is positive and 0 otherwise. Other control variables are defined in the 
Appendix Five. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Two-tailed p-values 
are based on robust t-statistics that have been adjusted to control for the clustering by firm. ***,**,* 
signify statistical significance of two-tailed tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Appendix Nine
Table A9: The Use of RPS to Inflate Transaction Price—Change Model; ROE ^
Thresholds; Dependent Variable = AGMt
VARIABLES
PREDICTED
SIGNS
FULL
(2000-2005)
PRE
(2000-2001)
TRAN
(2002)
POST
(2003-2005)
PARPS, + 0.052** 0.075*** 0.086** -0.016
(0.047) « 0 .0 0 1 ) (0.019) (0.782)
GM,.] - -0.323*** -0.303*** -0.374*** -0.324***
(<0.001) (<0.001) « 0 .0 0 1 ) « 0 .0 0 1 )
AGM,.i - -0.039 -0.074** -0.058 -0.061
(0.473) (0.047) (0.406) (0.629)
A COGS, - -0.040*** -0.037*** -0.032*** -0.045***
(<0.001) « 0 .0 0 1 ) (0.003) « 0 .0 0 1 )
MTB,.] + <0.001 0.010 0.004 -0.027
(0.955) (0.133) (0.670) (0.243)
PPE,-i + -0.003 0.002 -0.003 -0.010*
(0.359) (0.723) (0.692) (0.061)
A PPE, + 0.012 0.007 -0.016 0.026*
(0.105) (0.447) (0.185) (0.061)
INTAN,.] + -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002
(0.265) (0.585) (0.561) (0.209)
AINTAN, + -0.002** -0.002** -0.003 -0.002
(0.031) (0.037) (0.208) (0.469)
EXP,., ? 0.307*** 0.234*** 0.190** 0.362**
(0.008) (0.002) (0.045) (0.032)
LEV,., ? -0.045* 0.003 0.024 -0.058
(0.091) (0.840) (0.481) (0.108)
SIZE,., ? -0.005 -0.014** -0.013 -0.001
(0.302) (0.023) (0.214) (0.922)
Constant 0.099* 0.242*** 0.452*** -0.012
(0.063) (0.001) (0.001) (0.896)
IND Y Y Y Y
YEAR Y Y N Y
n 2,005 792 306 907
Adj. R2 0.157 0.313 0.423 0.113
This table presents the results of the use of RPS to inflate the transaction price, based on the change 
model. Observations with sufficient data to calculate the dependent or independent variables are included. 
A GM, is the change in gross margin from year t-1 to year t, measured as Gross Profit /SALE, - 
GrossProfitt-i/SALEt-i. PARPS, is the income-increasing RPS, calculated as RPS,/SALE, - RPS,.,/SALE,.i 
when (RPS,/SALE, - RPS,.i/SALE,.,) is positive and 0 otherwise. Other control variables are defined in the 
Appendix Five. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Two-tailed p-values 
are based on robust t-statistics that have been adjusted to control for the clustering by firm. ******  
signify statistical significance of two-tailed tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Appendix Ten
Table A10: The Use of RPS to Inflate Transaction Price—Level Model; Using
Actual Level of ERPS (ERPSt); Dependent Variable = EGMt
VARIABLES
PREDICTED
SIGNS
FULL
(1999-2005)
PRE
(1999-2001)
TRAN
(2002)
POST
(2003-2005)
ERPS, + 0.007 0.022** 0.018 -0.018
(0.398) (0.011) (0.430) (0.276)
EGMt-i + 0.694*** 0.703*** 0.685*** 0.701***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
A COGS, - -0.035*** -0.030*** -0.037*** -0.044***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) ( < 0 .001 )
MTB,.j + 0.007 0.010** 0.004 -0.001
(0.132) (0.041) (0.663) (0.934)
PPE,.i + -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003
(0.485) (0.940) (0.616) (0.417)
INTAN,.1 + -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.205) (0.439) (0.551) (0.134)
EXPtI + 0.289*** 0.273*** 0.228*** 0.307**
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.005) (0.029)
LEV,i ? -0.030* -0.003 0.035 -0.043
(0.072) (0.835) (0.161) (0.107)
SIZE,., 7 0.001 -0.004 -0.015 0.002
(0.978) (0.364) (0.120) (0.714)
Constant -0.005 0.066 0.360*** -0.042
(0.926) (0.329) (0.009) (0.665)
IND Y Y Y Y
YEAR Y Y N Y
n 4,606 1,975 659 1,972
Adj. R2 0.483 0.584 0.530 0.392
This table presents the results of the use of RPS to inflate the transaction price, based on the 
level model. EGM, is the difference between Gross Profit/SALE, for firm i and the industry- 
mean level of GrossProfit/SALEt excluding the own observation for which I calculate the 
measure. ERPS is the difference between RPS/SALEt for firm i and the industry-mean level of 
RPS/SALE, excluding the own observation for which I calculate the measure. PERPS is the 
positive ERPS when ERPS is positive and 0 otherwise. Other control variables are defined in the 
Appendix Five. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Two-tailed 
p-values are based on robust t-statistics that have been adjusted to control for the clustering by 
firm. ******  signify statistical significance of two-tailed tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively.
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Appendix Eleven
Table A ll: The Use of RPS to Inflate Transaction Price—Level Model
Controlling for Negative ERPS; Dependent Variable = EGMt
VARIABLES
PREDICTED
SIGNS
FULL
(1999-2005)
PRE
(1999-2001)
TRAN
(2002)
POST
(2003-2005)
PERPS, + 0.021* 0.041*** 0.058** -0.008
(0.097) (0.001) (0.031) (0.746)
NERPS, ? -0.045 -0.051 -0.137* -0.058
(0.163) (0.168) (0.087) (0.245)
EGM,., - 0.694*** 0.703*** 0.687*** 0.700***
(<0.001) (<0.001) «0.001) «0.001)
A COGS, - -0.034*** -0.030*** -0.037*** -0.044***
(<0.001) (<0.001) «0.001) «0.001)
MTB,., + 0.007 0.010** 0.004 -0.001
(0.135) (0.043) (0.648) (0.935)
PPE,.i + -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003
(0.491) (0.965) (0.662) (0.416)
INTAN,., + -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.214) (0.449) (0.580) (0.137)
EXP,., + 0.288*** 0.270*** 0.214*** 0.307**
(<0.001) «0.001) (0.009) (0.029)
LEV,., 7 -0.030* -0.003 0.035 -0.044
(0.073) (0.841) (0.156) (0.107)
SIZE,., 7 0.001 -0.004 -0.015 0.002
(0.933) (0.396) (0.134) (0.696)
Constant -0.013 0.053 0.324** -0.045
(0.812) (0.433) (0.017) (0.645)
IND Y Y Y Y
YEAR Y Y N Y
n 4,606 1,975 659 1,972
Adj. R2 0.483 0.584 0.532 0.392
This table presents the results of the use of RPS to inflate the transaction price, based on the 
level model. EGM, is the difference between GrossProfit/SALE, for firm i and the industry- 
mean level of GrossProfit/SALE, excluding the own observation for which I calculate the 
measure. ERPS is the difference between RPSt/SALE, for firm i and the industry-mean level of 
RPS,/SALE, excluding the own observation for which I calculate the measure. PERPS is the 
positive ERPS when ERPS is positive and 0 otherwise. NERPS is the negasitive ERPS when 
ERPS is negative and 0 otherwise. Other control variables are defined in the Appendix Five. All 
continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Two-tailed p-values are based on 
robust t-statistics that have been adjusted to control for the clustering by firm. ***,**,^Signify 
statistical significance of two-tailed tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Appendix Twelve
Table A12: The Use of RPS to Inflate Transaction Price—Level Model
ROE > Thresholds; Dependent Variable = EGMt
VARIABLES
PREDICTED
SIGNS
FULL
(1999-2005)
PRE
(1999-2001)
TRAN
(2002)
POST
(2003-2005)
PERPS, + 0.050*** 0.067*** 0.073*** 0.016
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.009) (0.646)
EGM,., + 0.654*** 0.649*** 0.568*** 0.680***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
A COGS, - -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.042***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.001) (<0.001)
MTB,., + 0.002 0.011* 0.008 -0.026
(0.690) (0.064) (0.435) (0.283)
PPE,.\ + -0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.011**
(0.364) (0.800) (0.944) (0.016)
INTAN,., + <0.001 <0.001 0.002* -0.001
(0.837) (0.345) (0.081) (0.385)
EXP,., + 0.351*** 0.348*** 0.290*** 0.378**
(0.001) (<0.001) (0.003) (0.045)
LEV,., ? -0.044* -0.005 0.022 -0.061*
(0.062) (0.775) (0.548) (0.088)
SIZE,., 7 -0.003 -0.008 -0.018* -0.001
(0.536) (0.203) (0.082) (0.989)
Constant 0.105 0.139 0.359* 0.171
(0.191) (0.124) (0.050) (0.240)
IND Y Y Y Y
YEAR Y Y N Y
n 2,491 1,278 306 907
Adj. R2 0.447 0.576 0.485 0.355
This table presents the results of the use of RPS to inflate the transaction price, based on the level model. 
EGM, is the difference between GrossProfit,/SALE, for firm i and the industry-mean level of 
GrossProfit/SALE, excluding the own observation for which I calculate the measure. ERPS is the 
difference between RPS/SALEt for firm i and the industry-mean level of RPS/SALE, excluding the own 
observation for which I calculate the measure. PERPS is the positive ERPS when ERPS is positive and 0 
otherwise. Other control variables are defined in the Appendix Five. All continuous variables are 
winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Two-tailed p-values are based on robust t-statistics that have been 
adjusted to control for the clustering by firm. ***,**,^Signify statistical significance of two-tailed tests at 
1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Appendix Thirteen
Table A13: Earnings Management Incentive—Change Model 
ARPS > 0; Dependent Variable = ARPSt
VARIABLES
PREDICTED
SIGNS
FULL
(2000-2005)
PRE
(2000-2001)
TRAN
(2002)
POST
(2003-2005)
SU SPECT, + 0.154*** 0.177*** 0.137*** 0.129***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
ST, + 0.188*** 0.154*** 0.251*** 0.169***
(<0.001) (0.007) (<0.001) (<0.001)
RPS'.i - 0.056** 0.129*** 0.004 0.029
(0.035) (0.006) (0.937) (0.274)
ARPS,., - -0.180*** -0.256*** -0.091 -0.167***
(<0.001) (0.001) (0.168) (0.003)
ASIZE, ? -0.027 -0.023 0.046 -0.047*
(0.227) (0.681) (0.371) (0.083)
ALEV, ? 0.037 -0.077 -0.078 0.094
(0.457) (0.296) (0.298) (0.158)
MTB,-i ? 0.016* -0.004 0.069*** 0.024
(0.053) (0.704) (0.002) (0.129)
Constant 0.020 0.112* -0.089** -0.053*
(0.384) (0.098) (0.024) (0.070)
IN D Y Y Y Y
YEAR Y Y N Y
n 1,442 433 248 761
Adj. R2 0.297 0.309 0.388 0.271
This table reports regression results of whether firms inflate RPSs when there are earnings management 
incentives, based on the change model. ARPS, is the change in RPS/SALE from year t-1 to year t, 
calculated as RPS/SALE, - RPS,i/SALE,.,. RPS,., is defined as RPS,./SALE,.,. SUSPECT, takes 1 if ROE, 
is more than the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings but PROE, is less than the regulatory 
thresholds, and 0 otherwise. ST, takes 1 if if ROE, is positive and less than the regulatory thresholds of 
new equity offerings but PROE, is negative, and 0 otherwise. Other control variables are defined 
Appendix Five. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Two-tailed p-values 
are based on robust t-statistics that have been adjusted to control for the clustering by firm. 
*** ** ^signify statistical significance of two-tailed tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Appendix Fourteen
Table A14: Earnings Management Incentive—Change Model 
ROE ^  Thresholds; Dependent Variable = APSt
VARIABLES
PREDICTED
SIGNS
FULL
(2000-2005)
PRE
(2000-2001)
TRAN
(2002)
POST
(2003-2005)
SU SPEC T, + 0.238*** 0.284*** 0.229*** 0.187***
(<0.001) « 0 .0 0 1 ) « 0 .0 0 1) « 0 .0 0 1 )
RPSt.i - -0.292*** -0.312*** -0.277*** -0.269***
(<0.001) (<0.001) « 0 .0 0 1 ) « 0 .0 0 1 )
ARPS,., - -0.139*** -0.192*** 0.003 -0.159***
(<0.001) (0.001) (0.962) (0.001)
A SIZE, - 0.003 0.026 -0.004 -0.025
(0.793) (0.304) (0.938) (0.195)
ALEV, ? -0.016 -0.017 -0.003 -0.033
(0.504) (0.538) (0.940) (0.334)
M TB,., ? -0.002 -0.005 0.020* -0.021*
(0.761) (0.543) (0.091) (0.058)
Constant -0.038** -0.025 -0.034 -0.033
(0.021) (0.471) (0.129) (0.455)
1ND Y Y Y Y
YEAR Y Y N Y
n 2,005 792 306 907
Adj. R2 0.414 0.486 0.399 0.356
This table reports regression results of whether firms inflate RPSs when there are earnings management 
incentives, based on the change model. ARPS, is the change in RPS/SALE from year t-1 to year t, 
calculated as RPS/SALE, - RPS,.,/SALE,i. RPS, i is defined as RPS,.,/SALE,i. SUSPECT, takes 1 if ROE, 
is more than the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings but PROE, is less than the regulatory 
thresholds, and 0 otherwise. ST, takes 1 if if ROE, is positive and less than the regulatory thresholds of 
new equity offerings but PROE, is negative, and 0 otherwise. Other control variables are defined 
Appendix Five. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Two-tailed p-values 
are based on robust t-statistics that have been adjusted to control for the clustering by firm. 
***,**,^signify statistical significance of two-tailed tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Appendix Fifteen
Table A15: Earnings Management Incentive—Change Model; Controlling For 
ROE; Dependent Variable = ARPSt
V A R IA B L E S
P R E D IC T E D
S IG N S
F U L L
(2 0 0 0 -2 0 0 5 )
P R E
(2 0 0 0 -2 0 0 1 )
T R A N
(2002)
P O S T
(2 0 0 3 -2 0 0 5 )
SU SPECT, + 0 .2 3 4 * * * 0 .2 7 6 * * * 0 .2 3 3 * * * 0 .1 8 8 * * *
« 0 .0 0 1 ) « 0 .0 0 1 ) « 0 .0 0 1 ) « 0 .0 0 1 )
ST, + 0 .2 5 9 * * * 0 .2 4 9 * * * 0 .3 2 7 * * * 0 .2 2 8 * * *
(< 0 .001 ) « 0 .0 0 1 ) « 0 .0 0 1 ) « 0 .0 0 1 )
RPS,.i - -0 .2 8 9 * * * -0 .3 1 2 * * * -0 .3 1 9 * * * -0 .2 5 1 * * *
« 0 . 0 0 1) « 0 .0 0 1 ) « 0 .0 0 1 ) (< 0 .0 0 1 )
ARPS,., - -0 .1 0 3 * * * -0 .1 1 3 * * * -0 .043 -0 .1 2 4 * * *
« 0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .0 0 6 ) (0 .3 8 1 ) « 0 .0 0 1 )
ASIZE, ? -0 .007 -0.011 0.001 -0 .0 0 6
(0 .5 1 8 ) (0 .6 0 5 ) (0 .981 ) (0 .642 )
ALEV, ? -0 .059** -0 .0 2 4 -0 .155* -0 .064**
(0 .0 1 4 ) (0 .5 0 3 ) (0 .0 5 2 ) (0 .018 )
M TB,., 7 -0 .005 -0 .0 0 9 0 .013 -0 .017**
(0 .2 1 2 ) (0 .1 4 4 ) (0 .2 4 2 ) (0 .041 )
ROE, -0.001 0 .0 0 3 0 .003 -0 .004
(0 .471 ) (0 .5 7 3 ) (0 .4 3 5 ) (0 .140 )
C o n stan t -0 .005 0 .0 1 9 -0 .033 -0.021
(0 .6 3 0 ) (0 .4 4 8 ) (0 .2 2 1 ) (0 .367 )
IND Y Y Y Y
YEAR Y Y N Y
n 3 ,950 1,318 660 1,972
A dj. R 2 0 .375 0 .3 9 8 0 .4 4 0 0.331
This table reports regression results of whether firms inflate RPSs when there are earnings management 
incentives, based on the change model. ARPS, is the change in RPS/SALE from year t-1 to year t, 
calculated as RPS/SALE, - RPS,.,/SALE,RPS,., is defined as RPS,.,/SALE,i. SUSPECT, takes 1 if ROE, 
is more than the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings but PROE, is less than the regulatory 
thresholds, and 0 otherwise. ST, takes 1 if if ROE, is positive and less than the regulatory thresholds of 
new equity offerings but PROE, is negative, and 0 otherwise. Other control variables are defined 
Appendix Five. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Two-tailed p-values 
are based on robust t-statistics that have been adjusted to control for the clustering by firm. 
***,**,^signify statistical significance of two-tailed tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Table A16: Earnings Management Incentive—Change Model; Excluding ARPSt-i;
Dependent Variable = ARPSt
WAT, TAT, T ™  PREDICTED 
VARIABLES
SIGNS
FULL
(1999-2005)
PRE
(1999-2005)
TRAN
(2002)
POST
(2003-2005)
SU SP E C T r + 0.248*** 0.281*** 0.235*** 0.193***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) « 0 .0 0 1 )
ST, + 0.257*** 0.248*** 0.327*** 0.230***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) « 0 .0 0 1 )
RPSt-i -0.320*** -0.326*** -0.333*** -0.302***
(<0.001) (<0.001) « 0 .0 0 1 ) (<0.001)
ASIZE, ? -0.013 -0.002 -0.021 -0.022*
(0.147) (0.868) (0.631) (0.087)
A LEV, ? -0.029 -0.038 -0.064 -0.023
(0.132) (0.168) (0.170) (0.395)
MTBt-i ? -0.006 -0.009* 0.008 -0.014*
(0.102) (0.066) (0.403) (0.055)
Constant -0.004 0.009 -0.032 -0.017
(0.652) (0.622) (0.255) (0.413)
1 N D Y Y Y Y
YEAR Y Y N Y
n 4,607 1,975 660 1,972
Adj. R2 0.373 0.402 0.436 0.308
T h is  ta b le  re p o r ts  re g re ss io n  re su lts  o f  w h e th e r  f irm s  in f la te  R P S s w h en  th e re  a re  e a rn in g s  m a n a g e m e n t
in cen tiv e s , b a se d  on  th e  c h a n g e  m o d e l. A R P S ,  is, th e  c h a n g e  in R P S / S A L E  fro m y e a r  t-1 to  y e a r  t,
c a lc u la te d  as  R P S / S A L E ,  - R P S ,  j/S A L E ,- j . R P S , . j  is  d e f in e d  as RPS,- i /SALE ,- i .  S U S P E C T ,  la k e s  1 if  R O E ,
is m o re  th an  the  re g u la to ry  th re sh o ld s  o f  n ew  e q u ity  o ffe r in g s  b u t P R O E ,  is le ss  th an  th e  re g u la to ry
th re sh o ld s  an d  0  o th e rw ise . S T ,  tak es  1 if  if  R O E ,  is p o s i tiv e  an d  le ss  th an  th e  re g u la to ry  th re sh o ld s  o f  n ew
eq u ity  o f fe r in g s  b u t P R O E ,  is  n e g a tiv e  an d  0  o th e rw ise . O th e r  c o n tro l v a r ia b le s  are; d e f in e d  A p p e n d ix
F ive . A ll c o n tin u o u s  v a r ia b le s  a re  w in so r ise d  a t th e  1% an d  9 9 %  lev e ls . T w o - ta ile d  p -v a lu e s  a re  b a se d  on
ro b u s t t- s ta tis tic s  th a t h a v e  b e e n  a d ju s te d  to  c o n tro l fo r  th e  c lu s te r in g  b y  firm . *** ,* * ,* S ig n ify  s ta tis tic a l
s ig n ific a n c e  o f  tw o - ta ile d  te s ts  a t 1% , 5 % , an d  10%  re sp e c tiv e ly .
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Table A17: Earnings Management Incentive—Level Model ERPS > 0; Dependent 
Variable = ERPSt
V A R IA B L E S
P R E D IC T E D
S IG N S
F U L L
(1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 5 )
P R E
(1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 5 )
T R A N
(2 0 0 2 )
P O S T
(2 0 0 3 -2 0 0 5 )
SU SPECT, + 0 .1 6 8 * * * 0 .2 1 7 * * * 0 .1 9 0 * * * 0 .1 01***
(< 0 .0 0 1 ) (< 0 .0 0 1 ) (< 0 .0 0 1 ) (< 0 .0 0 1 )
ST, + 0 .1 7 2 * * * 0 .2 0 2 * * * 0 .2 5 5 * * * 0 .1 0 2 * * *
(< 0 .0 0 1 ) (< 0 .0 0 1 ) (< 0 .0 0 1 ) (< 0 .0 0 1 )
ERPS,.j + 0 .4 0 9 * * * 0 .3 4 2 * * * 0 .3 4 9 * * * 0 .5 05***
(< 0 .0 0 1 ) (< 0 .0 0 1 ) (< 0 .0 0 1 ) (< 0 .0 0 1 )
SIZE, ? -0.011 -0 .0 0 6 -0.001 -0 .013
(0 .2 6 1 ) (0 .7 0 2 ) (0 .9 8 4 ) (0 .190 )
LEV, ? 0.001 -0 .0 5 2 -0 .1 0 0 0 .033
(0 .9 6 4 ) (0 .3 4 3 ) (0 .1 9 9 ) (0 .4 1 8 )
MTB,.! ? -0 .007 -0 .0 4 6 * * * 0 .0 5 0 -0 .013
(0 .5 4 3 ) (0 .0 0 7 ) (0 .1 1 4 ) (0 .5 4 6 )
C o n stan t 0 .2 8 2 0 .2 5 2 0 .1 5 4 0 .263
(0 .1 7 3 ) (0 .4 6 5 ) (0 .7 7 3 ) (0 .235 )
1 N D Y Y Y Y
YEAR Y Y N Y
n 1,173 518 166 48 9
A dj. R 2 0 .555 0 .5 0 9 0 .6 0 0 0 .609
T h is  tab le  re p o r ts  th e  re su lts  o f  w h e th e r  f irm s  iin fla te  R P S s  w h en  th e re  are  e a rn in g s  m a n a g e m e n t
in c e n tiv e s , u s in g  th e  lev e l m o d e l. E R P S ,  is th e  d if fe re n c e  b e tw e e n  R P S / S A L E ,  fo r  firm  i an d  the  in d u s try -
m e a n  le v e l o f  R P S / S A L E ,  e x c lu d in g  th e  o w n  o b se rv a tio n  fo r w h ic h  I  c a lc u la te  th e  m e a su re . S U S P E C T ,
tak es  1 if  R O E ,  is m o re  th an  th e  re g u la to ry  th re sh o ld s  o f  n ew  e q u ity  o ffe r in g s  b u t P R O E ,  is le ss  th an  the
re g u la to ry  th re sh o ld s  an d  0  o th e rw ise . ST ,  tak es 1 i f  i f  R O E ,  is p o s itiv e  b u t le ss  th an  th e  re g u la to ry
th re sh o ld s  o f  n ew  e q u ity  o f fe r in g s  an d  P R O E ,  is n e g a tiv e  an d  0  o th e rw ise . O th e r  c o n tro l v a ria b le s  a re
d e fin e d  A p p e n d ix  F iv e . A ll c o n tin u o u s  v a r ia b le s  a re  w in so r ise d  a t th e  1%  a n d  9 9 %  lev e ls . T w o - ta ile d  p-
v a lu es  a re  b a se d  o n  ro b u s t t-s ta tis tic s  th a t h a v e  b e e n  a d ju s te d  to  c o n tro l fo r  the  c lu s te r in g  by  firm .
*** ** * s jg n ify  s ta tis tic a l s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  tw o - ta ile d  te s ts  a t 1% , 5 % , an d  10%  re sp e c tiv e ly .
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Table A18: Earnings Management Incentive—Level Model; ROE ^  Thresholds;
Dependent Variable = ERPSt
VARIABLES
PREDICTED
SIGNS
FULL
(1999-2005)
PRE
(1999-2005)
TRAN
(2002)
POST
(2003-2005)
SU SPECT, + 0.349*** 0.404*** 0.339*** 0.271***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
ERPS,-i + 0.375*** 0.329*** 0.381*** 0.438***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
SIZE, ? 0.007* 0.013** -0.007 0.005
(0.066) (0.034) (0.432) (0.250)
LEV, ? 0.009 -0.012 -0.018 0.006
(0.295) (0.477) (0.456) (0.546)
MTB,.] 7 -0.003 -0.006 0.015 -0.013
(0.542) (0.232) (0.159) (0.242)
Constant -0.215*** -0.332** 0.129 -0.177
(0.009) (0.011) (0.499) (0.138)
IND Y Y Y Y
YEAR Y Y N Y
n 2,492 1,279 306 907
Adj. R2 0.726 0.758 0.745 0.678
This table reports the results of whether firms inflate RPSs when there are earnings management 
incentives, using the level model. ERPS, is the difference between RPS/SALE, for firm i and the industry- 
mean level of RPS/SALE, excluding the own observation for which I calculate the measure. SUSPECT, 
takes 1 if ROE, is more than the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings but PROE, is less than the 
regulatory thresholds and 0 otherwise. ST, takes \ if if ROE, is positive but less than the regulatory 
thresholds of new equity offerings and PROE, is negative and 0 otherwise. Other control variables are 
defined Appendix Five. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Two-tailed p- 
values are based on robust t-statistics that have been adjusted to control for the clustering by firm. 
***,**,*Signify statistical significance of two-tailed tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Table A19: Earnings Management Incentive—Level Model Controlling For ROE;
Dependent Variable = ERPSt
V A R IA B L E S
P R E D IC T E D
S IG N S
F U L L
( 1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 5 )
P R E
( 1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 5 )
T R A N
(2 0 0 2 )
P O S T
( 2 0 0 3 -2 0 0 5 )
S U S P E C T , + 0 .3 2 1 * * * 0 .3 7 3 * * * 0 .3 5 5 * * * 0 .2 4 4 * * *
(< 0 .0 0 1 ) (< 0 .0 0 1 ) (< 0 .0 0 1 ) (< 0 .0 0 1 )
ST , + 0 .3 1 8 * * * 0 .3 6 1 * * * 0 .4 0 5 * * * 0 .2 4 9 * * *
(< 0 .0 0 1 ) (< 0 .0 0 1 ) (< 0 .0 0 1 ) (< 0 .0 0 1 )
E R P S t-i + 0 .4 2 9 * * * 0 .3 9 2 * * * 0 .3 2 8 * * * 0 .5 1 3 * * *
(< 0 .0 0 1 ) (< 0 .0 0 1 ) (< 0 .0 0 1 ) (< 0 .0 0 1 )
S IZ E , ? -< 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 5 -0 .0 0 4
(0 .9 9 8 ) (0 .2 3 0 ) (0 .4 5 2 ) (0 .1 9 7 )
L E V , ? -0 .0 4 3 * * * -0 .0 2 2 -0 .1 0 6 * * * -0 .0 4 9 * *
(0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .2 6 4 ) (< 0 .0 0 1 ) (0 .0 1 5 )
M T B ,., ? -0 .0 0 8 * * -0 .0 1 1 * * 0 .0 1 1 -0 .0 1 9 * *
(0 .0 2 6 ) (0 .0 1 3 ) (0 .2 4 0 ) (0 .0 1 1 )
R O E , ? -0 .0 0 6 * * -0 .0 0 2 -0 .0 0 3 -0 .0 0 8 * * *
(0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .6 5 6 ) (0 .2 4 1 ) (0 .0 1 0 )
C o n s ta n t -0 .0 2 8 -0 .1 6 7 -0 .0 9 8 0 .0 9 7
(0 .6 5 1 ) (0 .1 2 4 ) (0 .5 1 3 ) (0 .2 2 8 )
IN D Y Y Y Y
Y E A R Y Y N Y
n 4 ,6 0 7 1 ,975 6 6 0 1 ,9 7 2
Aclj. R 2 0 .6 9 0 0 .7 0 7 0 .7 2 6 0 .6 7 1
T his table reports the resu lts  o f w hether firm s inflate R PSs w hen there are earn ings m anagem ent
incentives, u sing  the level m odel. E RPS, is the d ifference betw een  R P S /S A L E ,  for firm  i and the industry-
m ean level o f  R P S /S A L E ,  exclud ing  the ow n observation  for w hich I ca lcu la te  the m easure. SU SP EC T,
takes 1 if  R O E, is m ore than the regu la tory  th resholds o f  new  equity  offerings but PR O E , is less than the
regulatory  th resho ld s and 0  otherw ise. ST, takes 1 if if  RO E, is positive but less than the regulatory
thresholds o f  new  equity  offerings and P R O E , is negative and 0 o therw ise . O ther contro l variables are
defined A ppend ix  F ive. All con tinuous variab les are w insorised  at the 1% and 99%  levels. T w o-ta iled  p-
values are based  on robust t-sta tistics that have been ad justed  to con tro l for the clustering  by firm .
*** ,** ,^Signify  sta tistical sign ificance o f  tw o-tailed  tests at 1%, 5% , and 10% respectively .
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Table A20: The Effect of Regulation—Change Model
Controlling for ROE; Dependent Variable = ARPSt
VARIABLES
PREDICTED
SIGNS
FULL A R P S > 0
ROE > 
thresholds
SUSPECT, + 0.278*** 0.186*** 0.293***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
SUSPECT, x - -0.041 -0.028 -0.053
TRAN,
(0.311) (0.471) (0.184)
SUSPECT, x - -0.091*** -0.060** -0.095***
POST,
(0.004) (0.046) (0.002)
ST, + 0.250*** 0.158***
(<0.001) (0.003)
ST, x TRAN, - 0.073 0.087
(0.339) (0.257)
ST, x POST, - -0.020 0.015
(0.732) (0.804)
TRAN, ? <0.001 -0.021 0.025**
(0.999) (0.116) (0.035)
POST, ? 0.011 -0.018 0.030**
(0.210) (0.199) (0.013)
RPS,-i - -0.289*** 0.055** -0.283***
(<0.001) (0.039) (<0.001)
ARPS,.j - -0.103*** -0.173*** -0.130***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
ASIZE , 9 -0.006 -0.006 0.020
(0.559) (0.793) (0.203)
ALEV, ? -0.057** -0.041 -0.053
(0.018) (0.316) (0.175)
MTB,-i ? -0.006 0.017** -0.004
(0.182) (0.036) (0.581)
ROE, ? -0.001 -0.005 0.186***
(0.521) (0.372) (0.006)
Constant -0.014 0.004 -0.068***
(0.239) (0.858) (<0.001)
IND Y Y Y
YEAR Y Y Y
n 3,950 1,442 2,005
Adj. R2 0.379 0.312 0.434
This table reports regression results of the impact of regulation on the extent of earnings management,
based on the level model. ARPS, is the change in RPS/SALE from year t-1 tc) year t, calculated as
RPS/SALE, - RPS, i/SALE,-i. RPSt.i is defined as RPS,i/SALE,i. SUSPECT, takes 1 if ROE, is more than 
the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings but PROE, is less than the regulatory thresholds and 0 
otherwise. ST, takes 1 if if ROE, is positive and less than the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings 
but PROE, is negative and 0 otherwise. Other control variables are defined Appendix Five. All continuous 
variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Two-tailed p-values are based on robust t-statistics 
that have been adjusted to control for the clustering by firm. ***,**,^Signify statistical significance of 
two-tailed tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.________________________________________________
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Appendix Twenty-One
Table A21: The Effect of Regulation—Level Model Controlling for ROE;
Dependent Variable = ERPSt
VARIABLES
PREDICTED
SIGNS
FULL ERPS, > 0
ROE > 
thresholds
SUSPECT, + 0.358*** 0.209*** 0.391***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
SUSPECT, x - -0.035 -0.017 -0.042
TRAN,
(0.213) (0.578) (0.123)
SUSPECT, x - -0.091*** -0.083*** -0.093***
POST,
(<0.001) (0.002) (<0.001)
ST, + 0.348*** 0.202***
(<0.001) (<0.001)
ST, x TRAN, - 0.015 0.029
(0.769) (0.560)
ST, x POST, - -0.068** -0.069**
(0.045) (0.043)
TRAN, ? 0.015*** -0.026 0.017**
(0.009) (0.230) (0.017)
POST, ? 0.029*** -0.006 0.017**
(<0.001) (0.773) (0.046)
RPS,-i + 0.427*** 0.399*** 0.360***
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
SIZE, ? 0.001 -0.004 0.008**
(0.829) (0.673) (0.042)
LEV, 7 -0.043*** -0.081** -0.061***
(0.001) (0.031) (0.002)
MTB,.j 7 -0.007** -0.006 -0.009*
(0.035) (0.586) (0.079)
ROE, ? -0.006** -0.043* 0.237***
(0.013) (0.096) (<0.001)
Constant -0.048 0.155 -0.249***
(0.450) (0.466) (0.005)
IND Y Y Y
YEAR Y Y Y
n 4,607 1,173 2,492
Adj. R2 0.686 0.561 0.732
This table reports regression results of the impact of regulation on the extent of earnings management, 
based on the change model. ERPS, is the difference between RPS/SALE, for firm i and the industry-mean 
level of RPS/SALE, excluding the own observation for which I calculate the measure. SUSPECT, takes 1 
if ROE, is more than the regulatory thresholds of new equity offerings but PROE, is less than the 
regulatory thresholds and 0 otherwise. ST, takes 1 if if ROE, is positive but less than the regulatory 
thresholds of new equity offerings and PROE, is negative and 0 otherwise. Other control variables are 
defined Appendix Five. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels. Two-tailed p- 
values are based on robust t-statistics that have been adjusted to control for the clustering by firm. 
***,**,*Signify statistical significance of two-tailed tests at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.____________
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